



Cosmopolitan Education and Moral Education: 
Forging Moral Beings Under Conditions of Global Uncertainty 
 














Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
under the Executive Committee of the Graduate School of  

















































Matthew J. Hayden 
All rights reserved
ABSTRACT 
Cosmopolitan Education and Moral Education:  
Forging Moral Beings Under Conditions of Global Uncertainty 
Matthew J. Hayden 
 
The accelerating pace of globalization places an imperative on formal schooling to figure 
out how to educate students for the rapidly changing world that today reaches even into the smallest 
towns and regions of our shared globe. This project attempts to respond to that imperative by 
examining the moral component of schooling, and specifically, what might be the best way to 
provide moral education. I begin from a premise that prevalent existing moral education constructs 
fall short of this task because they consist of either pre-determined morals that students are expected 
to learn and adopt or they teach about morality systems without analyzing their merits, preventing 
the development of the important skill of judgment. In a world of significantly different cultures and 
ways of living, such forms of moral education are simply incapable of providing the kind of 
education in morality that can withstand and accommodate the diversity that exists and the new 
forms of life that are yet to come. 
Cosmopolitan education, based in cosmopolitan philosophy, is posited as a possible answer 
to this question. Beginning with cosmopolitanism’s grounding in the principle of shared humanity I 
show how cosmopolitan education might offer a more mutually beneficial response to evolving 
global conditions. This project uses conceptual analysis to examine the concepts of an education in 
morality and Hannah Arendt’s work on natality, thinking, action, and the public space of politics to 
show that an education in morality is public and political. As a result, cosmopolitan education can 
use the processes found in Thomas Nagel’s epistemological restraint, Jürgen Habermas’s discourse 
ethics, and Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism to help students acquire a disposition that both 
promotes active and flexible engagement in moral inquiry, as well as in other educational 
experiences, and embraces plurality and diversity by recognizing the positive contribution that 
others can make in one’s life. Shared humanity emerges as a collective possession of what Arendt 
calls ‘the human condition,’ which is essentially a collection of the human conditions of plurality, 
natality, action, and one that I add, the condition of uncertainty. Through a cosmopolitan lens, these 
conditions frame the way political processes can be utilized in an education in morality to encourage 
the development of a disposition that I call ‘moral agonism,’ which equips students to inquire into 
and participate in the development of morality in the face of constantly evolving and uncertain 
conditions in the world.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
You are wrong. That is immoral. Anyone who thinks that is a complete fool. I know I am 
right because I just am. There is only one correct thing to do. That is pure evil. Statements such 
as these, and innumerable variations, are familiar to all of us. Strong, bold assertions of 
irrefutable fact or moral judgment may make good headlines and argument starters, and may also 
be effective in arousing at least a momentary interest, but rarely can any of them hold up to 
critical scrutiny. Humans utter these statements, and we humans are fantastically flawed. Our 
perceptions are easily confused, our logic susceptible to twists, and even the smallest of appeals 
to sentiment can thwart our reason. Our judgments of right or wrong in human affairs are 
historically and notoriously corrupt, at times bravely and boldly consistent and at other times 
craven and self-serving. From Socrates’ condemnation—an example of the latter—and 
subsequent acceptance of his own ‘wrongful’ execution—an example of the former—to the 
actions of villagers in Chambon, France, during World War II, complex moral dilemmas present 
themselves and demand a response.  
As flawed humans, we are often left to judge without criteria, without grounding, 
“without a banister”1 with which to steady ourselves on a staircase that will either lead us up 
toward moral clarity and ‘rightness’ or down to moral failure and degradation. We have yet to 
find the ‘true’ moral guide, the infallible decision matrix that can deliver for us the perfectly 
appropriate moral decision for every conceivable moral event. Making matters worse, even if we 
were to find such a device, our flaws make it likely that we would misinterpret, misread, or 
simply fail to understand it. Socrates thought he had found a steadying precept, one those French 
                                                
1 Melvyn Hill, ed., Hannah Arendt and the Recovery of the Public World, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1979), 336-337. 
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villagers would surely have understood if not consciously articulated; a belief that it is better to 
suffer harm than to do it.2 Socrates paid for this principle with his life and subsequent 
generations of moral thought have attempted to determine if it was a worthy price. Perhaps we 
are determined to hopelessly struggle in our attempts at moral progress.  
Yet, we may look at our history and think that we have made progress. It is safe to say, 
now, that ending chattel slavery in United States was something we got right. At one point a 
critical mass of citizens thought that enslaving certain people was a morally good thing to do, 
that indeed, the slaves benefitted from it. Most of us now think that is not the case. It may be said 
that fewer men than ever before believe it is morally just to beat their wives or children simply 
because they will not do as they are told. Despite our flaws, we have neither given up on the 
notion of morality nor have we been complete failures at it, as these and other examples suggest. 
There is some room for optimism; we might indeed be more moral or get morality right. Some 
attempts to achieve this have gone the route of dogmatism or appeals to supernatural authorities. 
These have even been effective for some, but rarely so for those who fall outside the various 
religious or group membership domains from which they have sprung, and thus are inefficient, if 
not incapable, of universally delivering the kind of moral function and utility both desired and 
needed.  
It is into this gap that this dissertation steps. While framed within an educational context, 
and one aligned with formal schooling at that, the essential problem this dissertation addresses is 
that which has plagued humans for centuries. How are we supposed to act and live with each 
other? And now, with accelerating globalization, how can we educate students to live in this 
world with each other and those they have not yet met? Human groups have constantly and 
                                                
2 Plato, “Gorgias” in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett, II, (London: Oxford University Press, 
2009): 281-418. 
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consistently formed rules and codes of conduct to govern their relations, whether through 
questions of how to distribute the meat procured through a group hunt, or what to do with the 
group member who has taken from another (which contains within it the question of whether or 
not a person can actually possess property independent of other people). 
Presupposing all of these questions is the idea that there are some things that people 
ought to do and some things they ought not do, particularly in relation to each other. Much has 
been written about what exactly those things are, and only a little bit less has been written about 
how one is to teach those things to people. This dissertation, however, will not necessarily add to 
those to stacks. Instead, this dissertation wants to understand not what is moral and how to teach 
morals to people, but instead what it is that we are actually doing when we talk about or attempt 
to create morality, and how ought we pursue this endeavor in a way that is itself moral. Further, 
it is not interested how one group of people, one culture, or one nation, can grapple with this 
problem, but instead how can all of us do so together? The global context mentioned earlier is 
not going away. This is a problem for everyone and the solution matters to all of us; we cannot 
reasonably conclude that some of us will figure it out and apply it to everyone else. From the 
beginning, then, morality is inherently normative and this is a problem that must be grounded in 
a global perspective. It is for this reason that cosmopolitan philosophy will be the starting point 
as I attempt to offer a mode of education that can facilitate this ancient inquiry. 
 1.1 Key Elements of Cosmopolitanism, Morality, and Agonism 
This dissertation begins from a position that finds the current forms of moral education to 
be lacking in morality and educational value. Thus, the essential foundation of this dissertation is 
that first, moral education ought to be conceived as an education in morality rather than 
instruction in morals, and second, that cosmopolitan philosophy, through cosmopolitan 
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education, provides the philosophical and educational means to do so. Put as a question, should 
the field of moral education be reconceived under the auspices of cosmopolitan philosophy in 
general, and cosmopolitan education in particular? After answering that question in the 
affirmative, a second question is begged: How can moral education be moral and educational—
particularly in preparing students for a world that is constantly changing—and not violate its 
own conditions of morality? Answering the first question requires understanding cosmopolitan 
philosophy and education and an education in morality, while answering the second question 
requires looking at processes in education and morality. 
This project aspires to help both researchers and teachers rethink what they take to be 
moral education and the available options for conducting it. While lacking substantial 
prescriptive features for adoption in the classroom, this dissertation does hope to offer a way to 
conceive of moral education that can remain flexible and dynamic enough to be utilized as 
needed and as an ongoing process rather than a fixed result. It is for this reason that cosmopolitan 
education is considered. As a philosophy, cosmopolitanism is highly reflective, educative, and 
active, but also non-dogmatic. While early practitioners of cosmopolitan philosophy were 
prescriptive to a point, these prescriptions were always known to be subject to the vagaries of 
human experience, and are themselves responses to problems in lived experience that focus on 
both the self and that self in relation to others. Education has historically been concerned with 
educating the person in the context of social life; the development of both the individual and the 
individual as a member of society are concurrent and mutually dependent goals. For 
cosmopolitan philosophy, living in the world demands attention to oneself and others, and the 
adjustment of one’s actions to those considerations.  
An important trait of cosmopolitan philosophy, and an integral assumption in this 
 5 
dissertation, is the admittance of human fallibility and the importance of rectifying its results. To 
be in error is human and inevitable, but one ought to attempt to correct it when it happens. As 
Marcus Aurelius explains: 
If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think 
or act right, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth by which no 
man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and 
ignorance.3 
 
Epictetus and Aurelius, both considered cosmopolitan philosophers, wrote extensively about 
what one ought to do, or mused about what is done, but did so by way of the recognition of their 
own errors and in order to pursue the questions of life that these errors signified. They certainly 
made pronouncements, but they were always ready to revise them and showed a reluctance to be 
dogmatic. For instance, Aurelius’ books are written as meditations rather than rules, and as such, 
were titled ‘Meditations,’ not ‘The Rules.’ Instead, they are collections of observations and 
questions about the world in support of more accurate and complete understanding. Due to the 
anti-dogmatism inherent in cosmopolitan educational philosophy, one cannot lay down a 
concrete pedagogy and say “There, now go do this.” Instead, I will use concepts and processes 
found in political theory to show how cosmopolitan education could work. Before I present this 
outline, however, I must explain why I am using political theories for a treatise on morality. 
Essentially, and per the theorists used in this dissertation, politics is the (sometimes) 
shared, public space in which communities gather to create and enforce the rules that govern 
their associations. Conceived this broadly, politics then encompasses laws, institutions, customs, 
and mores that are developed through this association. Rules that are not developed in the public 
sphere and are instead developed in the private realm of the personal, the home, or the family, 
                                                
3 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans. George Long, Vol. 12, 29th ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1987), 276. 
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are not applicable to anyone else, at least in any enforceable way. This is rather straightforward. 
What is at issue is in which of these two sets of rules, the private or the public, do rules of 
morality lie? I claim that morality is public and not private for two reasons. First, morality 
involves issues of ‘ought,’ which, by their very nature, are utterances that are universal and 
therefore apply to everyone; one makes such a statement because one thinks everyone should 
comply, and thus the utterance is of public interest.  
The second reason is very similar to the first; the questions prompted in morality are 
social in nature. Bernard Williams notes that the traditional question of ethics is How should I 
live? and though other people certainly will factor into the answer to this question, the fact that 
the question is put to the same ‘I’ that asks it attempts to make it a wholly subjective, non-social 
question. However, in the process of answering that question one inevitably encounters the 
existence of others, prompting a set of questions regarding one’s own actions as they relate to 
and affect of others. These are the questions of morality. The existence of people prompts the 
asking of moral questions, or rather, questions relative to the domain of morality. Should I do x? 
Is it right or wrong to do x? What factors should I use in order to determine this? In this view, 
ethics could be seen as encompassing the large domain of human life, experience, and action 
wherein morality circumscribes a portion of that domain that is specifically called into existence 
by the existence of other people. Their existence demands of the ethical question a further 
question about one’s relation to those other people and the evaluation of the interactions that 
transpire between them and us. 
Since morality is to be taken up in this dissertation from the perspective of 
cosmopolitanism, which rests on the shared humanity of all people and thus entails the essential 
consideration of everyone in human action, the ethical question becomes How should we live? 
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This question is directed both outward and inward; it is asked of everybody about everybody. 
This makes morality fundamentally social. Even if the question appears to be one that is self-
directed, one asks it in response to the fact that there are other people in the world. If there were 
no other people in the world, one would not ask the question. Similarly, if there were no other 
people in the world, there would be no need for political organization to govern human 
associations, making questions of these associations just as much about morality as they do about 
politics. It is for this reason that Arendt is a part of this project; the condition of human plurality 
forces both politics and morality upon all of us. The cause of politics and the cause of morality 
are essentially the same, and both are located and enacted in the public sphere.  
Though I will bring politics into morality, I have no intention to bring morality into 
politics. Chantal Mouffe decries the ‘moralization’ of politics in which political opponents in the 
‘we v. they’ construction of politics is converted into ‘good v. evil.’4 Though I share this concern 
regarding politics, it does not negatively affect this project because my intention is the opposite, 
to ‘politicize’ morality, so to speak. By this I mean to say that I intend to bring some of the 
processes and concepts of politics into the moral domain, but only those that accrue logically 
from the fundamental conditions of shared humanity and human plurality such as democratic 
participation and consideration of all others in deliberations. Therefore, specific realizations of 
political mechanisms are not my aim; I am not asking that we subject morality to a vote. I am, 
however, asking that we make explicit what has been implicitly true of morality all along; that it 
is a product of social (public) forces that has incidentally managed to work its way into private 
structures and public organizational structures, and that it is generally amended, adapted, and 
reworked with micro-level intention but macro-level accident. Morality is as much a part of 
                                                
4 Chantal Mouffe, On The Political (New York: Routledge, 2005), 75. 
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pubic life as politics is, and thus our approach to it ought to reflect this fact. 
One of the more significant and important steps I take in this project is the semi-
equivocation of ‘shared humanity’ with the Arendtian human conditions of plurality, natality, 
and action, or rather the infusion of Arendt’s thinking to give more support to the idea of shared 
humanity. The concept of shared humanity has long animated the work of cosmopolitan theorists 
and actors. However, the concept occupies a rather ambiguous space. Is ‘humanity’ a noun or an 
adjective? Does it indicate a disposition of inherent ‘goodness’ in human nature or does it 
encapsulate a set of characteristics that in total make one a ‘human’? In Chapter 2, I will offer 
conceptual clarity for ‘shared humanity’ that removes much of the common and subjective 
meaning with which it has been imbued, and instead identify it with a broader understanding of 
humanness. I will offer Arendt’s conditions of human plurality, natality, and action to indicate 
what it is we humans actually share. It is these conditions of human existence that bind us 
together rather than some ephemeral sense of human goodness or behavioral optimism. These 
conditions are offered as more conceptually clear and theoretically sound bases from which to 
launch the cosmopolitan moral educational efforts, and also make possible the use of Arendt’s 
conceptions of thinking and public space to further advance key cosmopolitan educational points 
especially in relation to morality.  
Another important concept for this project is that of agonism, a term that describes a 
political concept that I bring into morality as a step toward making morality an explicitly public 
action. For one, bringing agonism into morality takes the violent and dogmatic edge off of the 
typical labeling of persons and actions as ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ which is the opposite effect that 
morality has had in politics.5 Agonism in morality aims to replace ‘good’ and ‘evil’ 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
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categorizations, such as those found in the labeling of ‘others’ as ‘enemies,’ with the concept of 
‘adversaries’ who compete to determine the best option rather than to eliminate or destroy each 
other. The moralization of politics, wherein terms such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ have entered into 
political arguments, has served to polarize and intensify disagreements and reduced opponents to 
‘enemies’ that deserve less consideration and respect as persons than does the appellation of 
‘adversary.’ Morality has had a long history of this kind of ‘demonization’ and could use an 
infusion of agonistic, ‘adversarial’ relations to replace the antagonism often found in everyday 
moral discussions. Further, the antagonism often found in moral relations has played a role in the 
movement toward more ambiguous, non-judgmental, and relativistic approaches to morality 
wherein judgment is avoided in order to avoid the conflict of antagonistic relations. Agonism 
will be offered as a way to repair and strengthen discourse in morality so that judgments can be 
made, but respectfully, inclusively, and without antagonism. 
Since I will not call upon transcendental, religious, or otherwise traditional authority and 
received morality to inform the content of an education in morality, I will not be able to say 
what, exactly, morals are or what specific behaviors are in fact moral. As will be shown, 
education in morality in cosmopolitan education is primarily a process that results in the 
acquisition of a disposition toward a certain kind of process, and morality is constitutive of that 
process; morality as a product and morality as a process cannot be separated. Politics is 
essentially a set of activities and processes by and through which the governance of associations 
take place. Since both politics and morality are animated by the same cause—the existence of 
other people—and since politics and education in morality are both essentially processes (rather 
than content) to formulate governance of human relations, I can use politics to help guide us to a 
process in education in morality that can be sustainable, ongoing, and non-dogmatic.  
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I will unveil these processes by examining a number of different mechanisms, each 
offering a crucial, and some times overlapping, feature necessary in cosmopolitan education. 
Philip Kitcher’s ethical progress provides a general model of the ongoing deliberations that are 
required in a cosmopolitan education in morality. Thomas Nagel’s conception of epistemological 
restraint provides a mechanism by and through which those with strongly held private beliefs 
might still participate in public morality while preserving a type of impartiality that can lead to 
valid, inclusive, and justifiable collaboration. Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics provides a 
more concrete example of how to achieve justification through deliberative democratic 
processes, while sharing with cosmopolitanism the acceptance of key principles of shared 
humanity, democratic inclusion, and dynamic engagement. Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism 
provides a way to move beyond the perceptions of the flawed dream of consensus in discourse 
ethics while admitting the ineradicable conflict that arises from the human condition of 
pluralism. Agonism provides the ‘grist for the mill’ of public morality, subjecting it to 
contestation for refinement and improvement, a process that emerges as a public good. 
Arendt’s conceptions of the human conditions of natality, plurality, and action, along 
with her thoughts on thinking and the necessity of the public sphere in human action, will serve 
as both the bridge between Habermas and Mouffe and that which unifies the components of 
cosmopolitan education, education in morality, and the political processes described. Taken 
together, they form the necessary space of morality, what I call moral agonism. Moreover, where 
Arendt is hoping to bring politics back into the public realm, I hope to do the same with 
morality; to remove it from the exclusively and traditionally private realm and put it squarely 
into the polis, so that agonism can be inhabited, and a more efficacious, and dare I say ‘moral,’ 
process may result.  
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1.2 Moral Education 
Before proceeding, I must make clear some technical terms as they will be used in this 
project. The nature of the terms to be used and the lack of suitable available synonyms that 
would make things clearer sets before me a rather difficult task; I must make important 
distinctions between very similar terms and concepts. First, when I wish to refer to the field of 
moral education as it is commonly understood, I will write the field of moral education. This 
phrase will then refer to the most common conceptions of moral education, the various moral 
systems used, and the diverse practices therein. For the most part, anything that anyone might 
choose to call moral education could be included as a referent of the phrase. When I use the term 
morals education I will be referring to the types of education for specific morals (as determined 
by religion, ideology, or politics, among others) that dominate the field of moral education. 
These are attempts to teach students a specific set of morals or traits that are part of a bounded 
morality system.6 When I use the term moral education I will be referring to a kind of education 
that is moral in its application, methods, or pedagogies such that it is not immoral. In this sense, 
‘moral’ is an adjective describing the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of the education. This does not 
describe the content of the education (as does morals education), but rather indicates a moral 
judgment of the education as implemented (and thus depends upon a judgment about what is 
moral). Lastly, morality education and education in morality will be used to indicate the kind of 
                                                
6 The use of the term ‘morality system’ comes from Bernard Williams’s use to refer to systems of morality 
such as Utilitarianism, deontology, or virtue ethics, as well as those derived from religious beliefs or bounded 
ideologies, to name only a few. More specifically, Williams crafted a set of nine ‘theses’ as criteria for describing a 
morality system. To describe and give adequate treatment to these theses takes more time and space than can be 
allotted here and would distract from my purpose, but suffice it to say that a system of morality that purports final 
answers or authority that can speak to specific traits and behaviors without reference to particulars would be a 
‘morality system.’ See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 174-196 in particular. For an excellent, and succinct, explanation of these theses see 
Timothy Chappell, “Bernard Williams,” edited by Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/williams-bernard/. 
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education that is an inquiry into what morality is and means such that the inquiry forms the 
content of the education and equips the student with the necessary tools and methodologies to 
conduct the inquiry (§4.2 will deal at length with this concept). Essentially I will position 
education in morality as the replacement for morals education, and the two should be seen in this 
project as competing forms in the field of moral education, though an education in morality 
should be seen as a richer, fuller, more inclusive, and better way to conceive the field of moral 
education. A more thorough description of some of these key terms is as follows: 
Ethics – I follow Bernard Williams’ interpretation and use this term in regard to the 
‘original question’ of ethics: How should I live? Ethical dilemmas, then, are dilemmas concerned 
with this question. I will not use this term to deal with the question of whether how a way to live 
is right or wrong, good or bad; for this I will reserve the use of the word ‘moral.’ However, 
ethics will be used often when referring to questions about how one should or might live, or the 
kinds of decisions one might make in trying to decide the activities and behaviors that will 
constitute one’s life.  
Education in Morality – Chapter 4 is devoted to the explanation of this term, but it can be 
briefly understood to refer to an education in the forms of life required for an inquiry into the 
human practices and behaviors that are judged to be right or wrong. An education in morality 
will not provide an answer to the question what should I do? but it aims to provide the tools for 
doing so. It engages students in the activities and process by and through which morality is 
developed, thus equipping them with the skills to do so and make their own judgments. 
Morality – I will apply the Latin use of the word as customs and mores that have 
attempted to answer the first question of ethics (How should I live?) with an emphasis on what is 
right or wrong, wherein the question then becomes what should I do? Morality is essentially a 
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field or domain of study, the object of an education in morality. John Wilson refers to this form 
of use as ‘logical’ in that it is a category rather than a description. In this sense, morality is a 
compatible, but not necessary, part of Ethics; it is not a necessarily required participant in the 
attempt to answer the original question. It is, however, an object of study in the attempt to 
understand what is meant by the question what should I do? as well as an attempt to answer it. In 
this sense, morality education may be a component of Ethics, but it is a part of the process 
enacted by a cosmopolitan education ethos and becomes one’s answer to the original question. 
Moral Education – ‘Moral’ is used as an adjective that refers to an evaluation, a moral 
evaluation, of the education itself. Thus, a ‘moral education’ is one that meets general criteria for 
education that is not bad, corrupt, or corrupting, and one that meets the criteria for fulfilling a set 
of moral principles. This use of ‘moral’ can be applied to different morality systems. One could 
say that a particular education program is a ‘moral’ one, as opposed to an ‘immoral’ or 
‘corrupting’ one. This is also the form of use that John Wilson refers to as ‘sociological’ as 
opposed to ‘logical.’ This term, ‘moral education,’ will be used rarely. 
Morals Education – I will use ‘morals’ as an adjective to describe the content of the 
education. In this project, it refers to an education that teaches, or teaches about, specific morals 
as described by a morality system. A morals education might teach students about character traits 
or desirable virtues, or how to bring about consequences that provide the greatest benefit for the 
greatest number of people. A morals education ultimately seeks to inculcate predetermined 
behaviors (or morals) or skills such as ‘moral reasoning’ that are generally demonstrable through 
either some form of evaluation process or observation of student behavior. The successful 
participant of a morals education is thought to possess a discrete set of skills, traits, morals, or 
even habits that can be deliberately implemented and consciously called upon. A ‘morals 
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educator’ is what I will name someone who attempts to bring about this outcome. 
Morality Education – In this case I will use ‘morality’ as an adjective to describe the 
object of the education described. Morality education, then, is an education that attempts to bring 
about a full and as-complete-as-possible understanding of the concept of ‘morality’ (see previous 
entry Morality). It could be said that ‘morality education’ is an education that inculcates the 
understanding of the customs and judgments of agent intentions, actions, and consequences, but 
not necessarily the skills or habits of ‘being moral.’ Such an education does not equip a student 
with specific morals, but rather a general morals knowledge that is capable, but not necessarily 
so, of influencing moral action. This understanding of ‘morality’ is not restricted to one system 
or ideology, and in fact, it is hoped that it might contain all of them and more, resulting in a full 
and rich conception. My use of this term will correspond most closely as a replacement of the 
traditional and common usage of ‘moral education.’ This substitution is necessary in order to 
distinguish the systemic reference with the descriptive reference as defined in the ‘moral 
education’ entry. 
Morality System (or ‘system of morals’) – I intend to invoke the meaning of this term to 
be synonymous with its use by Bernard Williams. It refers to a system or theoretical perspective 
that is prescriptive, proscriptive, and bounded. A morality system is comprised of moral 
principles, logically (or seemingly so) integrated and interdependent, that form a single coherent 
(again, apparently) system. Utilitarianism is a morality system, as is Virtue Ethics, or Kantian 
Ethics. It is not necessary for these systems to be completely ‘airtight’ – for example, within 
Utilitarianism you will find both Rule Utilitarianism and Act Utilitarianism. It is important to 
remember that a defining characteristic of a system is that it is bounded and therefore includes 
some things and excludes others, usually determined in advance through tradition or some form 
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of hierarchical authority.  
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of two general parts. In Part I, Chapters two through four 
primarily deal with the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan 
education, and moral education, essentially laying out the existing theories and concepts to be 
utilized and challenged. In Part II, Chapters Five and Six introduce the procedures by and 
through which the kind of cosmopolitan education in morality I envision could take place, all of 
which develops an educational space for morality I call moral agonism, which also doubles for 
the name of a kind of disposition that results.   
Chapter 2 begins with a look at the historical origins and contemporary conceptions of 
cosmopolitan philosophy by identifying and describing prevalent typologies. I then describe a 
general sense of what a cosmopolitan education might consist of and be concerned with, while 
concluding that it contains a process-centric orientation. Chapter 3 continues with the process-
centric nature of cosmopolitan education and examines this idea in more detail, using moderate 
and strong forms of cosmopolitanism as a way to highlight the importance of processes in 
education. It concludes with a look at the concept of ethical progress which conceives of ethics 
as a democratic and ongoing deliberation about how to live together, and offers an illustration of 
the kinds of aims a cosmopolitan education in morality could have. Chapter 4 investigates the 
concept of an education in morality, as distinct from ‘morals education,’ that, in light of Chapter 
3’s conclusion about processes and results shows that an education in morality aims to produce 
individuals with the skills to participate in moral inquiry and not only be capable of adhering to 
pre-determined moral strictures. An examination of Hannah Arendt’s conception of natality in 
education in the second half of Chapter 4 will underscore this point. It becomes clear that any 
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education in morality must entail the preservation of the opportunity and creative potential for 
subsequent generations to challenge, revise, amend, or accept existing moral frameworks as well 
as develop new ones.  
Chapter 5 begins the second part of the dissertation and involves the introduction and 
explanation of key processes, some borrowed from politics, by and through which cosmopolitan 
education in morality could take place. First, epistemological restraint is used to show private 
belief can be suspended, though not ignored, to create the public space necessary for justificatory 
processes to take place. Then Habermas’s discourse ethics is used to more specifically delineate 
the kinds of dialogic dispositions and processes that can be invoked to initiate and maintain 
publicly collaborative deliberations about morality. Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism is then 
explained as a way to remove the status quo maintaining affects of consensus in deliberations 
and to show the ineradicability of pluralism in human interactions. These pluralistic interactions 
are then shown to create the space in which agonism can allow for the collaborative and mutually 
beneficial affects of contestation of morality. Chapter 6 begins by examining Arendt’s thoughts 
on thinking in morality and the public/private distinction that ensues. Then Arendt is used to 
provide a synthesis of discourse ethics and agonistic pluralism that combine in moral agonism, a 
concept that I hold represents an educational disposition produced by cosmopolitan education in 
morality.  
What follows is essentially a vision of a type of education that describes a guiding 
approach to education that is not only applicable in the field of moral education. In fact, another 
significant assumption made here—one that has no direct bearing on any of the arguments and 
could be true or false without affecting the processes I will offer—is that education is a moral 
endeavor regardless of subject area or discipline. Thus the pedagogical philosophy embodied by 
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the kind of education that will be described is one upon which the more specific disciplinary 
content of formal schooling can be built and delivered. A chemistry teacher can be a 
cosmopolitan educator in morality equally as well as a music teacher, or, should such a school 
exist, even the ethics teacher, without ever talking about morality, per se. The threshold of 
cosmopolitan education lies mostly in how the chemistry teacher teaches chemistry and how she 
can bring the relevant life of the subject area into the learning experience of the students. I will 
use the words cosmopolitan education, cosmopolitan moral education, and cosmopolitan 
education in morality at different times depending on either the specific point I am trying to 
make or which conceptual clarifications have been made thus far, but it is my intention to 
suggest that by the end of the dissertation I might write ‘cosmopolitan education,’ but one will 
read ‘cosmopolitan education in morality,’ or even ‘moral education.’ The goal is to show that a 
cosmopolitan education is not only an education in morality, but also an education that is itself 
an embodiment of what morality is. The most important lesson taught in cosmopolitan education 
is how to live and interact with others as one collaborates with others to live, work, and learn in 
and about the world.  
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Chapter 2 
Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitan Education 
 
Cosmopolitanism has recently experienced a revival and the increase in global 
communication and mobility is but one reason among many. During a similar time of global 
expansion in the 18th-century Immanuel Kant implored his contemporaries “to step from the 
lawless condition of savages into a league of nations… [wherein] even the smallest state could 
expect security and justice.”7 His idea, rooted in cosmopolitan philosophy, was based on the 
hope that humans could find ways to improve their conditions and interactions. Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism has strongly influenced contemporary cosmopolitan thought and has found an 
emphasis in scholarship on educational institutions where the next generation might be 
transformed into the kind of people and society imagined by Kant.8 It is my assertion that 
cosmopolitanism’s grounding in the fundamental fact of shared humanity offers moral education 
the best hope for the discovery of acceptable, justifiable, and unifying principles to guide human 
interaction. 
Most of the prevalent forms of morals education do well enough for what they do. They 
indicate the kind of traits or behaviors that are desirable and attempt to inculcate these in 
students. If students were to acquire these traits then we might be able say the world has gotten 
‘better’ insofar as these behaviors would be likely to translate into improved interpersonal 
interactions that might reflect an improvement in morality. However, upon closer inspection, 
                                                
7 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, edited by Lewis White Beck, 2nd ed., 
(Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1997), 19. 
8 See Tom G. Palmer, “Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and Personal Identity,” Ethics & Politics, no. 2 
(2003); Klas Roth, “Good Will: Cosmopolitan Education as a Site for Deliberation,” Educational Philosophy and 
Theory (April 2010); Jørgen Huggler, “Cosmopolitanism and Peace in Kant’s Essay on ‘Perpetual Peace’,” Studies 
in Philosophy and Education 29, no. 2 (2010). 
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these model’s machinations look like those of liberal economics, which professes to benefit 
everyone as a consequent of individual thriving and it essentially treats each person as the 
fundamental unit of a utilitarian and Pareto-like moral happiness rather than as an individual 
moral unit of a larger group. For liberal economists, for example, if the rich get richer and the 
poor get less poor, then everything is working as it ought. In typical morals education, the belief 
is that if we can get individuals to see themselves as individual moral agents who should act a 
certain (prescribed) way and we can get them to act that way, they will create a more moral 
world as a collection of morally acting and interacting individuals.  
It should be said that there has been work in a model of morality that is similar to the one 
that will be proposed. Cosmopolitan education in morality is largely relational, and there have 
been many, mainly feminists, who have focused on morality relationally. This work traverses a 
wide range of scholars from Carol Gilligan’s groundbreaking work to contemporary theorists 
such as Nell Noddings and the field of ethics of care. Gilligan found that young girls presented 
with moral dilemmas often viewed the situation in regard to the relationships they would have 
with the persons in the dilemma construction, whereas young boys tended to view the dilemma 
as one based largely on rationally logical or consequentialist impulses.9 Noddings has written 
about a form of “ordinary conversation” that takes place between adults and children wherein 
one’s “conversational partner is recognized to be more important than the topic, argument, or 
conclusions.”10 A very clear affinity with the relational approach in cosmopolitanism can be seen 
in Noddings’s statement, particularly the subordination of the result to the processes that achieve 
it, but even more importantly, the recognition that the other person in conversation matters at 
                                                
9 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 29th ed., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 28-31. 
10 Nel Noddings, “Conversations as Moral Education,” Journal of Moral Education 23, no. 2 (1994):107. 
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least as much as oneself.  
The work in this field is a rich and interesting, but will not be investigated here. First, 
since the cosmopolitan moral education model will be inclusive, such relational models will 
ultimately have a home in this philosophy. Second, these models are situated in highly 
contextualized environments and the overall scope of my project is broader and more abstract. 
Cosmopolitan morality is certainly more relational than not, but it is not wholly so. Further, its 
relational qualities lie primarily in the processes by and through which morality is undertaken, 
not necessarily decided. Ultimately, cosmopolitan education in morality includes the 
examination of many models and systems in morality, including relational models of morality, 
allowing for flexibility in the appropriate application of one or another, or where the combination 
of experience and judgment dictate. The goal of cosmopolitan approaches is to ensure that all the 
tools for understanding and enacting morality are at our disposal. 
Cosmopolitan education sees each person as the fundamental moral unit of the larger 
society, and the point of departure for morality is each person’s relationship with others. Most 
morals education systems treat the social component as a secondary beneficiary of the individual 
moral agent’s actions. Other traditional moral conceptions start from a point of individual moral 
agency with the goal of becoming connected through moral actions. By starting with the 
individual, independent of the social living conditions, it then becomes possible to justify self-
interest in the guise of moral action. In cosmopolitan moral education, the individual and society 
are not positioned as competitors for a limited good or in a unidirectional morally causal 
relationship. Instead, the individual sees himself as a moral agent in a world of other moral 
agents and as part of a social fabric, the threads of which connect every person morally. This 
connectedness is the cosmopolitan moral education starting point, not the goal. We start out 
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connected and the goal is to conduct ourselves with that in mind.  
Across society, an education system is typically representative of the socio-economic, 
religious, linguistic, ethnic, and cultural groups that society contains. Educational institutions 
bring children into direct contact with diversity that can inform their learning as they attempt to 
be more at home in the world in which they live and will inherit. H.B. Danesh points out that 
“the universal presence of conflict and war in human history has always necessitated that priority 
be given to education for conflict management and war preparation, and for the preservation of 
the larger community.”11 It is with these thoughts in mind that the following section will first 
provide an overview of cosmopolitanism, and then a general definition of cosmopolitanism 
education, followed by a discussion of some main strands of cosmopolitan education. The third 
section will discuss a key dilemma facing the implementation of cosmopolitan educational 
processes, a dilemma that requires a choice, the choosing of which indicates the positive 
contribution of cosmopolitan education in morality.  
A note about dispositions 
The educational goal of a cosmopolitan education is the development of a particular type 
of disposition (or rather a set of dispositions), often reflected in discussions about ‘character’ and 
‘traits’ in education (though the cosmopolitan project should not be confused or equated with the 
moral education program called Character Education). This link betrays cosmopolitanism’s 
origins in Stoic philosophy, which was interested in the normative dimensions of human 
behavior.12 This original Stoic model is more prescriptive than modern conceptions that require 
                                                
11 H. B. Danesh, “Towards an integrative theory of peace education” Journal of Peace Education 3, no. 1 
(March 2006): 55. 
12 See Mark A. Holowchak, “Education as Training for Life: Stoic Teachers as Physicians of the Soul,” 
Educational Philosophy and Theory 41, no. 2 (April 2009). 
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flexibility and communication, wherein collaborative dialogue and engagement are utilized to 
develop the capacities that help the student come to understand how she is to regard and interact 
with others in everyday life. Cosmopolitan education is inherently reflective and deliberative and 
is therefore well positioned to affect the dispositions of a student through the rational faculties 
because the deliberative nature of humans is directly responsible for character formation.13 
Having the “moral strength or virtue to fulfill” one’s duty is the determinant of character,14 in 
this tradition, but formalist and subjectivist accounts of character education offer too little for 
students to learn, and more expansive and inclusive accounts offer too much that becomes 
contradictory in its plurality.15 This is only a problem, however, for educators who are led to 
believe that it is specific morals, traits, or principles that should be taught. For the cosmopolitan 
educator, inhabiting some uncertainty and ‘morals confusion’16 is vital since its challenge 
provokes inquiry and will find its expression and procedural solution in moral agonism. Further, 
it is through dispositions that the link between the social life and ethical life is made manifest by 
virtue of their existence in dispositions.17 Cosmopolitan education’s greatest, and least 
challengeable, characteristic might be its fairness or sense of justice in allowing space for people 
                                                
13 Roth, “Good Will,” 6. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See Kristjan Kristjansson, “In Defence of ‘Non-Expansive’ Character Education,” Journal of Philosophy 
of Education 36, no. 2 (May 2002). 
16 This is not to say that some kind of functional or ‘operational’ certainty is not desired nor acquired, but 
only that expressions of absolutism about morals are not made. The way in which ‘working moral rules’ are 
acquired will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
17 In fact, Williams basically equivocates the two when he states, “In this sense, social or ethical life must 
exist in people’s dispositions. It is the content of the dispositions, their intelligibility and their degree of 
particularity, that differs between societies and is at issue between different interpretations of modern society.” The 
“or” between “social” and “ethical” is not there to indicate exclusivity (i.e. one or the other), but rather indicate the 
identical nature of the concepts. The social life and the ethical life are the same thing. See Williams, Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy, 201. 
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to share freely ideas about morality (moderate) rather than delineating specific morals to acquire 
(strong). The dispositions required to abet this approach are key to the formation of cosmopolitan 
and moral dispositions, as is the process by which they are acquired. 
2.1 Cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitanism’s philosophical roots can be found in Stoic philosophers such as 
Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and their Cynic precursor, Diogenes. Cosmopolitanism can 
be traced first, to Socrates’ claim that he was not an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the 
world,18 and second, to Diogenes’ assertion that he was a ‘citizen of the world.’19 The basis for 
these statements is the idea that all humans are part of the same human family, participants in a 
shared humanity, and interconnected and interdependent for flourishing.20 Whether flourishing is 
perceived as best achieved through moral introspection, political institutions, economic activity, 
or cultural exchange, the core is the same: the fundamental presumption of shared humanity. 
Cosmopolitanism does not assume that the practical unity of humans is easily achieved, or even 
desired, in practice; it only suggests that the fact of our shared humanity compels us to attempt to 
create some kind of unified fact ‘on the ground.’21 As the Cynic philosophers determined, moral 
obligation is actually allegiance to humanity.22 This allegiance requires attention and cultivation. 
                                                
18 Plutarch, “Of Banishment, or Flying One’s Country,” in Plutarch’s Morals, Vol. III, edited by William 
W. Goodwin, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1878): 19. 
19 Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, “Cosmopolitanism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, (Spring 2011). 
20 See Aurelius, Meditations, 264. “If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which 
we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what 
not to do: if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common political community will any one 
say that the whole human race are members?” 
21 Of what the unity consists will be touched on in section §3.2, and elaborated upon throughout the 
chapters that follow. 
22 See David T. Hansen, “Curriculum and the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Inheritance” Journal of Curriculum 
Studies 40 (2008). See also Epictetus, The Works of Epictetus. Consisting of His Discourses, in Four Books, The 
 24 
The concept of shared humanity offered here requires some explanation. First, what it is 
not. It is not a clear, complete, and closed conception of human nature. There are many 
competing offerings of what humans are like insofar as how they behave and the psychological 
characteristics they possess, but they are not at issue here. There are also numerous descriptions 
of the biological and physiological characteristics of what is entailed in being a ‘human.’ Others, 
including philosophers, have defined humans as possessing a rationality that sets them apart from 
other sentient beings. While these latter descriptions are certainly germane in a reductive sense, 
my conception of humanity is not limited only to the physiological, biological, psychological, 
and cognitive elements of being human. Instead, the conception that matters, the only conception 
we can use with any real consistency, sees humanity as what Arendt called the human condition. 
For Arendt, there are different parts of the human condition including, but not limited to, the 
human conditions of plurality and natality.23 It is these conditions of human existence that I have 
in mind, and these conditions will be elucidated later where they have a specific bearing on the 
education in morality I propose. Thus, ‘humanity’ represents a set of human conditions that, 
together, represent a condition of ‘humanity.’ 
This condition encompasses much of what is produced in the previously mentioned 
perspectives, but also the capacities of humans. For instance, take the quasi-psychological 
conception of ‘humanity.’ In this case, I refer to the use of the word to indicate a positive trait of 
sorts. An example would be when someone says that something is ‘humane’ or that one should 
                                                
Enchiridion, and Fragments, trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1865), 428. “A 
person once brought clothes to a pirate, who had been cast ashore, and almost killed by the severity of the weather; 
then carried him to his house, and furnished him with all necessaries. Being reproached by some one for doing good 
to the evil; “I have paid this regard,” answered he, “not to the man, but to humanity.”” 
23 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). These 
concepts will also be examined in more depth in Chapters Three and Six. 
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summon one’s ‘humanity’ in one’s dealings with other persons. I take seriously Sharon Todd’s 
analysis of the difference between the concept of ‘humanity’ and its typical adjectival use to 
denote something good or to represent ‘goodness’ in opposition to ‘inhumanity,’ which is 
something bad and ‘evil.’24 In this sense of the word I take ‘humanity’ to be that human-ness that 
is possessed by all human beings, including good, evil, and the combinations in between. I do not 
propose to define human nature, nor even assert that there is one, beyond repeating Terence’s 
observation that “I am a man; I deem nothing that is human to be foreign to me,” nor to any other 
person.25 Humanity as it is conceived in this project in regard to such use represents all that is 
human, from benevolence to violence, compassion to indifference, moments of beauty and grace 
to acts of cruelty and self-destruction. In this case one would be ‘rolling the dice’ when asking 
someone to summon her ‘humanity’ in her interactions with another person because doing so 
could bring forth any possibility in the entire range of human action. To possess the potential for 
all actions known to be within the capability of a human, as well as the potential for all actions 
not yet known to be possible by a human, essentially frames the human condition that serves to 
represent what ‘humanity’ means.  
Regarding that which is ‘shared’ I only mean to say that the conditions of human 
existence are contained in each person’s existence, possessed by each. Humans do not share 
‘humanity’ in the way that one would share a loaf of bread, but rather they share in common 
conditions of human existence in the way that those sharing the bread might each posses 
individually the same need to eat. Thus, the need to eat is a need that is shared by all humans; all 
                                                
24 See Sharon Todd, Toward an Imperfect Education: Facing Humanity, Rethinking Cosmopolitanism, 
(Paradigm: London, 2009). 
25 Terence, in David T. Hansen, “Cosmopolitanism and Education: A View From the Ground,” Teachers 
College Record 112 (2008): 16. 
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humans similarly share the set of qualities and conditions of human existence. This does mean 
that they all realize their desires or even manifest all of the same needs, but that at birth, by 
virtue of being a human, there is a subset of general conditions of human existence that frames 
their lives, from limitations—such as external limitations on human movement like gravity—to 
capacities—such as the potential for new thought or the development of new concepts. Thus 
each of us is a participant in a shared humanity. We co-inhabit a set of conditions that are 
necessary extensions of our existence. It is this co-habitation, this ‘sharing,’ of the conditions of 
human existence that sits at the base of cosmopolitan philosophy.  
One last point about shared humanity and the human condition is one that has far 
reaching implications in morality. If we understand shared humanity to include the bad as well as 
the good, it forces us to see wrongdoers differently, and can help us distinguish between the 
merely ‘bad’ and the truly ‘evil.’ When we only think of humanity as consisting of those ‘good’ 
characteristics that we may possess and express, then those who do not do those things are 
excluded from humanity. We hear it in common language every time someone suggests 
something is inhumane or that someone has ‘lost his humanity’ by acting against prevailing 
norms of conduct. However, if one human is capable of an immoral act, it is quite possible that 
another person is. We can find commonality with others not only in our good, saint-like acts of 
kindness and compassion, but in our darkest moments, too.  
Recognizing ‘all-in-one’ does two things. First, it prevents us from excluding others and 
denying their humanity as a result of their transgressions. In cosmopolitan shared humanity, we 
cannot deny them this; if shared humanity is deemed sufficient when things go well, then it must 
be enough when they go awry. Secondly, it opens a door for us to see not only the often tenuous 
lines that separate ‘good’ from ‘bad,’ but allow us to engage with questions about what is wrong 
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to do, why it is wrong, and to what degree various wrongs go wrong. The type and severity of 
‘wrong’ behavior matters, especially in a society that metes out punishments and constraints on 
persons whose behavior offends or threatens. Including both bad and exemplary actions in 
morality retains the grounds for a principle of shared humanity, and protects us from subjection 
to a tyranny of our own making in which we would lock ourselves in the past and prevent 
ourselves from moving forward.26 It requires of us, through a commitment to non-exclusion, to 
construct something like forgiveness in order for us to let go of the past instead of maintaining 
old grudges. It allows us to move on from what has happened to instead focus on what might 
happen or begin again. 
Often cited as an historic originator of cosmopolitanism, Diogenes’ positive contributions 
to cosmopolitanism were in living in accordance with nature and resisting all forms of 
convention that erect obstacles to doing so.27 For the Third Century Stoics, goodness involved 
serving one’s fellow human beings as well as possible and doing so required political 
engagement, an engagement that might extend beyond one’s own polis. Roman Stoics found it 
easy to be cosmopolitan given imperial pax romana. If the entire ‘known’ world is part of Rome 
and each of these parts is connected, then all are citizens, both literally and figuratively, of the 
‘world.’ Operating under such imperial constructs under relatively peacefully conditions, but not 
offering justification for them, provided clear intellectual sailing for cosmopolitan ideas to 
                                                
26 The redemptive potential found in this conception lies at the root of forgiveness, a significant component 
of social, political, and moral goods as identified by Arendt in a number of her works. See Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 236-242. See also Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: 
The Viking Press, Inc., 1964), particularly the Postscript. The concept in Arendt is intriguing, but not necessary for 
this project. It is used here only to show one benefit of a more comprehensive conception of ‘humanity’ and the 
implications therein. 
27 See Kleingeld and Brown, “Cosmopolitanism.” My reference to Diogenes is for historical and origin 
purposes only and though he certainly possessed many traits of a cosmopolitan as I see one, I do not offer Diogenes 
as an exemplar of a cosmopolitan. 
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develop and spread. The terms ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘world citizenship’ began to evolve in the 
eighteenth century to describe an attitude of open-mindedness and impartiality, and to indicate 
“someone who was not subservient to a particular religious or political authority, someone who 
was not biased by particular loyalties or cultural prejudice.”28 In this context, a cosmopolitan was 
an erudite and objective individual, a conception that still remains in many perceptions of 
cosmopolitanism. 
Stoic-based characterizations of cosmopolitanism focus on the universal nature of shared 
humanity and contemporary examples are often associated with the work of Martha Nussbaum.29 
Cosmopolitanism has also been approached from a cultural perspective, focusing on the shared 
traditions, languages, and social structures that constitute different groups of people such as is 
found in the work of Jeremy Waldron.30 Other conceptions of cosmopolitanism orient toward 
‘sensibilities’ and the understanding that life itself, and the experiences derived, constitute one’s 
cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan education.31 Still others, such Kwame Anthony Appiah, have 
approached it in a way that includes all of these distinct approaches.32 Kleingeld and Kleingeld 
and Brown33 described various typologies of cosmopolitanism, in addition to Cultural 
                                                
28 Ibid. 
29 See Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 5, no. 
1 (1997); Martha C. Nussbaum, “Symposium on Cosmopolitanism Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: 
Cicero’s Problematic Legacy,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2000); and Martha Nussbaum, For 
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Norton & Company, Inc., 2006). 
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cosmopolitanism, such as Economic, Legal, Moral, Political, and Romantic/Utopian; this work is 
often referenced in regard to these typologies.34 These prevalent categories of cosmopolitanism 
illustrate the different understandings of cosmopolitanism, and may be useful in attempts to 
understand what cosmopolitan education is and how it might be best understood. I will now 
briefly describe the predominant Kleingeld and Brown typologies as a way to illustrate common 
expressions of cosmopolitanism that will have resonance with that which I develop in this paper. 
2.1.1 Moral Cosmopolitanism 
Moral cosmopolitanism focuses on the shared humanity of all human beings.35 It grants 
universal rights of human dignity, security, rights of person, etc., not legally but morally, and is 
primarily based on Kant’s categorical imperative.36 This form of cosmopolitanism emphasizes 
universalized ethical and moral conduct and treatment of all people, regardless of nationality, 
ethnicity, gender, and culture.37 In particular, moral cosmopolitanism claims that one is obligated 
to deliver aid (when possible) to any person regardless of their nationality. Some cosmopolitans 
state that this aid is never to be subject to preference toward one’s fellow citizens over a citizen 
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of a different country while others admit some form of duty and obligation to one’s compatriots 
is extant and may have priority over obligations toward non-compatriots. This issue illustrates 
strong (the former) and moderate (the latter) camps within moral cosmopolitanism (see section 
2.1.7). Critics of moral cosmopolitanism argue that morals or values education on the part of 
schools38 could take the form of indoctrination39 or of hegemonic oppression40 and in this way 
would be in conflict with most types of cosmopolitanism. 
2.1.2 Cultural Cosmopolitanism  
Cultural cosmopolitanism focuses on acceptance, celebration, and embracing of the 
‘other’ and his/her way of living originating in cultural practices. Ideally cultural cosmopolitans 
advocate creating bridges of understanding and encourage cultural diversity and creations.41 It 
supports universal human rights42 such that they are available to all cultures, but at the same time 
may not be ‘forced’ upon them43. Individuals are free to reinforce their cultural norms, transform 
them, or assimilate.44 Cultural cosmopolitanism hearkens to intercultural exchange, 
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41 See David T. Hansen, “Education Viewed Through a Cosmopolitan Prism,” Philosophy of Education 
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44 See Kevin McDonough, “Cultural Recognition, Cosmopolitanism and Multicultural Education,” 
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communication, dialogue,45 and acceptance, as well as to an identity and affiliation that is fluid.46 
Most cultural cosmopolitan scholars admit the flexibility and adaptability of cultures and 
identities that follow.47 Cultural cosmopolitanism can also be expressed in a form of hospitality 
that is the culture rather than merely possessing hospitable attributes that a cosmopolitan would 
possess.48 Critics of cultural cosmopolitanism cite the problems of cultural pluralism that can 
arise through the mutual exclusivity of the actions of members of different cultures. For instance, 
it is one thing to accept someone’s right to hold a belief, quite another to accept and condone 
another’s actions that result from that belief. One answer to these critics is that cultural 
cosmopolitanism is not purported to be a solution to cultural conflicts, only a means by which 
coexistence can be maintained to provide the space for the engagement of constructive and 
positive dialogue.49 It suggests an attitudinal perspective that can then facilitate more concrete 
and mutually beneficial solutions, even if it cannot immediately resolve the disagreement. 
2.1.3 Political and Legal Cosmopolitanism 
Kleingeld listed political and legal cosmopolitanism separately, but in recent years these 
forms have been blended together. In its most concrete forms this cosmopolitanism contains the 
goal of a one-world state50 and a truly global citizenry51 who possess concrete global legal rights 
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and duties.52 Cosmopolitan arguments focused on issues of justice that tend to legalism are often 
found in political and legal forms.53 In some strong forms it may refer to a literal perspective on 
the traditional Stoic version of “citizen of the world.”54 The United Nations (UN) represents a 
manifestation of this type through which multilateral treaties apply laws of conduct and rights as 
universal and thus subject all people in its member-states to their mandates.55 Similarly, the 
development of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) as a form of ‘civil 
society’ has created a veritable non-government global community that often acts as an 
intermediary between citizens and their governments.56 Human rights, in their empirical and 
legal forms, have found theoretical support in cosmopolitan thinking57 while requiring political 
and statist structures for their protection and implementation in both policies and laws.58 
Conceptions of this kind also find expression in notions of citizenship education that attempt to 
fulfill the local demands of civic participation as well as their application to those beyond the 
immediate political or civic group.59 This form of cosmopolitanism suffers from the criticism 
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that it threatens the sovereignty of nation-states and may conflict or interfere with their civic and 
political practices (or, may also be seen as a supporter of the nation-state status quo in order to 
maintain the continued existences of states to protect and ensure human rights). It is less 
common now to find discussions of one world government in cosmopolitan theory, and even 
Kant eventually withdrew his support for it.60 
2.1.4 Economic/Market Cosmopolitanism 
For economic/market cosmopolitanism, the focus is on the economic imperatives of free 
trade, free movement of capital, and open markets with an emphasis on freedom of individuals 
and groups to exercise economic prerogatives without national or ethnic constraints.61 In this 
conception, the marketplace is the ultimate peacekeeper by using the interconnectivity of 
markets, and thus the mutual dependencies they foster, to prevent violent conflict that would 
prove detrimental to the economic welfare of all. However, even though this version advocates 
for the loosening of national and ethnic constraints on labor mobility, it is clear that nation-states 
are reluctant to comply as immigration laws attest. Truly free markets have the potential to 
diminish state control by virtue of free markets themselves being free of state control62 and thus 
pose a challenge to some of the political/legal supporters who see the nation-state as an 
important organizational component of their version of cosmopolitanism. This is complicated by 
a historical reflection on contemporary cosmopolitanism’s roots in Kant by Mignolo63 who 
concludes that cosmopolitanism, intentionally or not, has become an imperial support 
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mechanism for Western governments, economies, and thought, which places cosmopolitanism in 
a shared space of both political and economic cosmopolitanism. Generally, economic/market 
cosmopolitanism is finding less traction as the inefficacy of conflating globalization with 
cosmopolitanism becomes more of a known fact. This conflation often occurs, however 
unintentionally, in discussions of the similarities of cosmopolitanism with globalization.64 It is 
important to distinguish between globalization as a set of empirical processes and facts and the 
thematic discourse about globalization which Papastephanou65 terms globalism. If 
cosmopolitanism is to be invoked in any way alongside globalization, it is in the thematic 
discussion of globalism in which cosmopolitanism emerges as one form of that discussion, but 
neither as theoretical support for nor as a theoretical framework of globalism nor globalization. 
2.1.5 Romantic Cosmopolitanism 
Another type of cosmopolitanism is romantic (or “utopian”) cosmopolitanism though it 
has largely fallen from contemporary favor. In romantic cosmopolitanism, the focus is on the 
human characteristics and concepts of love, emotion, and beauty. It opposes atomistic 
reductionism and the Enlightenment emphases on rational thought. Romantic cosmopolitans 
believe that we must create in each individual a love of his fellow man and an appreciation of the 
beauty of human existence and interaction. Other aspects of romantic cosmopolitanism have 
been incorporated into the other types. For example, moral cosmopolitans’ emphasis on shared 
humanity could be a de-emotionalized version of the Romantic notion of ‘love of humanity.’ 
Some forms of peace education seek to educate for a way of peaceful living, absent legal laws 
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and external proscriptions; this is consistent with a cosmopolitan desire for peace that ranges 
from Kant66 to Papastephanou.67 Jollimore and Barrios critique those they call “sentimentalists” 
and their assertions that cosmopolitan goals can be better achieved through the encouragement of 
emotional responses that support a given moral framework.68 They reject this approach and its 
refusal to account for the important role of cognitive faculties in moral education, arguing that 
judgment is a cognitive virtue and therefore cannot be derived from sentiments. Despite critics 
who decry its alleged utopianism an argument could be made for romantic cosmopolitanism 
being highly pragmatic from the perspective of mutual survival and avoidance of war. Gur-Ze’ev 
highlights this perspective in describing Dewey’s conception wherein he “identified peace with 
the elevation of humanity and the development of rational and pragmatically enlightened human 
capacities” ultimately leading to peace.69 In this rare case the Romantic notion of 
cosmopolitanism manifests itself in a highly utilitarian and pragmatic form. 
2.1.6 Instrumental Cosmopolitanism70 
Some forms of cosmopolitanism manifest themselves in terms of personal interest, gain, 
achievement, or success, a category I will call instrumental. These forms focus on tangible, 
concrete, quantifiable and discreet outcomes wherein cosmopolitanism becomes a “functionalist 
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instrument” or means to an end.71 Cosmopolitanism in this light is a technique, a skill, or even an 
application that produces a desired effect.72 This instrumentalism was identified in a study of the 
cosmopolitan aspirations of 67 international schools that found that over 82% of these schools 
admit cosmopolitan education goals in their mission statements.73 These schools are confronted 
with significant educational incentives to promote a global or cosmopolitan educational 
curriculum, incentives made manifest by demands of parents and students. Weenink found that 
local populations rather than expatriates fueled the growth of international schools in the 
Netherlands. The demand for these schools was driven by the practical reasoning of parents who 
saw the international school as a better means to educate their children for an increasingly 
competitive and globalized world and for the acquisition of cosmopolitan attributes.74 A majority 
of these parents (referred to as “pragmatic cosmopolitans”) maintained that the skills and 
competencies—akin to ‘cosmopolitan capital’—obtained would be of great material benefit, 
while only a minority of parents (referred to as “dedicated cosmopolitans”) cited the attention of 
these schools to such characteristics as open-mindedness, flexibility, and the willingness to 
understand and identify with people across borders and boundaries.75 Cultural capital acquisition 
supports Nerland’s identification of a growing need to develop one’s place within a global 
professional network of knowledge workers who require “skills in reflexivity and self-
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management,” a conception that adds a ‘tool bag’ of cosmopolitan skills to go with the 
intangibles of cosmopolitan capital.76 This instrumentality will be addressed in a discussion of 
process and results in Chapter 3. 
2.1.7 Strong and Moderate Cosmopolitanism 
Beyond the typologies identified by Kleingeld and supported consistently in the 
literature, there are also ‘strong’ and ‘moderate’ forms of cosmopolitanism that can be seen in 
any of the typologies and is reflected generally in the rigidity or flexibility, respectively, of 
cosmopolitanism’s implementation.77 Strong cosmopolitanism regards its tenets as non-
negotiable or fixed, often holding extreme and inflexible positions.78 Scheffler argues against 
extreme forms of cosmopolitanism which tend to be more legalistic while moderate versions 
emphasize the construction of the self.79 External compulsion to cosmopolitan behaviors requires 
more ‘force’ because it needs to coerce or alter, whereas internally dictated cosmopolitan 
behaviors require only the appropriate self-regulated governance of the individual’s will80—an 
important distinction in determining the kind of processes that are allowed. For example, a strong 
version might promote cosmopolitanism as the way to live, while a moderate version would not 
defend the cosmopolitan lifestyle, but rather serve to promote knowledge of culture, tolerance, 
respect, and understanding through education of similarities. This contrasts with another 
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moderate version in which agonism found in difference and conflict should be explored for the 
same reasons.81 Because many conflicts find their causes in irrational or emotional origins, they 
cannot be resolved simply through rational, cognitive, and deliberate negotiations. Therefore, 
agonism may not be the site of resolution, but rather a site of unsettled stasis, reflecting a more 
moderate stance. Regardless of the type of cosmopolitanism, the recognition of where one’s 
conception rests on this strong or moderate ‘mean’ is necessary in order to understand how to 
inform educational processes. For instance, will an educator lay down a set of cosmopolitan traits 
the students must strive to achieve (strong), or will the educator take a more implicit route by 
modeling the cosmopolitan behaviors he wishes the students to acquire (moderate)? 
Since this project is about cosmopolitan education and education in morality—the 
foundations and justification of which lie at the core of all cosmopolitanism—I will not treat 
these typologies individually in cosmopolitan moral education. Since my inquiry is about 
morality, there is nothing about it that cannot be drawn into the domain of these typologies, and 
as a concept, must exist genitivally separate from them. The definition of cosmopolitanism I 
have exists prior to the branching out into various fields and conceptions, and in fact must exist 
as such. It should also be noted that I aim to develop cosmopolitan moral education as something 
separate from the typology of ‘moral cosmopolitanism,’ while allowing that some similarities 
and overlap will occur, as it will with the other typologies. The point is that cosmopolitan moral 
education springs from the fundamental core origins of cosmopolitan thought, not as a means to 
inculcate a specific variant or typology of cosmopolitanism. Additionally, given the historical 
origins of cosmopolitanism and the use of the world ‘citizen,’ I will argue neither for nor against 
a notion of ‘citizenship’ that is substantive, such that could be envisioned within a global or 
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federative state. That kind of citizenship has no bearing upon that which I focus. Though I admit 
that in implementation cosmopolitan moral education arguments about citizenship, state 
sovereignty, and political participation may, or will, matter greatly, these issues are moot unless I 
can establish the theoretical conception I seek.82 
Drawing from the common features of the Kleingeld and Brown typologies of 
cosmopolitanism results in the following list of cosmopolitan characteristics:  
• Recognition of shared humanity  
• World citizenship; ‘citizen of the world’ 
• Membership in a global community 
• Respect for others as people/humans and for other ways of living  
• Multiculturalism, diversity, and cultural pluralism83  
• Active pursuit and maintenance of peaceful interaction 
• Tolerance  
• Acknowledgement of the universality of certain basic human needs84 and concepts of 
human interaction; not necessarily specific, prescribed traits, but rather the acceptance 
of abstract universal dispositions to act or treat each other in some way 
 
Each of these characteristics exists in the social and collective domain. They are about being a 
person who lives among and with other persons, thus the ethical and moral component of 
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cosmopolitanism is clear; it is a moral philosophy. This non-exhaustive list is not intended for 
dogmatic instruction, nor does it constitute a checklist for assessing one’s acquisition of 
cosmopolitan traits. The characteristics in this ‘list’ simply contain important links to the main 
strains of cosmopolitan thought, and they are not incompatible with the kind of cosmopolitan 
moral education that will emerge in this project. 
2.2 Cosmopolitan Education 
Cosmopolitan education is, simply put, an educational program designed to promote or 
inculcate cosmopolitan philosophy. To say on the one hand that there is cosmopolitan philosophy 
and on the other cosmopolitan education (or even “educational cosmopolitanism”85) is to say the 
same thing. In this study, I take philosophy to be a discipline, practice, or way of living that 
constitutes an educational project. Dewey states, “[i]f we are willing to conceive education as the 
process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and 
fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education.”86 It is the 
inherent nature of philosophy to inquire, unsettle, dislodge, critique, engage, investigate, 
discover, acquire, and ultimately grow. Cosmopolitanism, as a philosophy, is a way of being that 
is educative and educating. The Stoic application of the medical metaphor to matters of wisdom 
and ignorance—it is unhealthy to be ignorant, a condition that can be cured—meant that the 
cosmopolitan philosopher is a ‘physician’ who should be ever ready to provide the cure for those 
so afflicted.87 So, too, the cosmopolitan philosopher should always be ready to educate the 
ignorant and lead them to the ‘healthy’ effects of wisdom. It indicates action or processes as 
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much as it might traits. To be a philosopher is to be an educator. To be a cosmopolitan 
philosopher is to be a cosmopolitan educator. What follows is an attempt to describe some of the 
characteristics of cosmopolitan education. 
Cosmopolitan education starts from the most fundamental principle of cosmopolitanism: 
the fact of shared humanity. This fact, however simple, commands a stance from which one sees 
oneself as a person in a world full of other persons with whom one is connected by virtue of that 
shared humanity. Humanity is expressed in any number of ways, the most central being that, 
whether we like it or not, we live in a world with other persons. Shared humanity and the shared 
world require attention to these facts, attention through which we must figure out how to live 
with and alongside each other. In this conception of morality, individual flourishing does not 
depend upon group flourishing, but rather exists through it. In this way, cosmopolitan education 
is positioned primarily as an ethical and moral endeavor. The primary fact of shared humanity 
entails that the processes that erect rules, customs, or structures be subject to that primary fact of 
human existence. Thus the grounding of these governing implementations must involve the input 
of all of those who will be governed by them. For cosmopolitan education, this democratic 
impulse is derived not from liberal ideology nor from Plato’s Republic, but rather as a logical 
extension of shared humanity. 
The description of cosmopolitanism offered is not necessarily aligned or positioned 
within the ‘moral cosmopolitanism’ of the Kleingeld and Brown typology, but instead lies within 
cosmopolitanism in general and among all of the ‘types’ available. It adheres to a moral 
perspective because cosmopolitanism itself is a moral philosophy, not an economic, political, or 
cultural one. Cosmopolitanism offers a philosophy about how one should live in the world, an 
endeavor rooted in the ethical; the core principle of shared humanity makes the endeavor moral. 
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The political, economic, and other cosmopolitan types are outgrowths of the original principle of 
cosmopolitanism (shared humanity), not the fields—politics, economics, or culture—after which 
they are named. My conception of cosmopolitanism essentially takes the individual human as the 
fundamental unit of moral concern.88 In moving from cosmopolitan moral philosophy to 
cosmopolitan moral education in schooling,89 this moral cosmopolitanism becomes political by 
virtue of its placement in schooling. Moral education does not necessarily occur in nor imply 
only schooling, but since state-supported or public schooling is educational, it becomes 
political.90 Since this is precisely what I am doing and advocating, my project becomes political 
as much as it is educational, and it invites comparisons to political life, processes, and theories. It 
is for this reason that I will examine some political theories in Chapter 5, particularly as they 
relate to democracy, in order to show how cosmopolitan moral education could work in 
schooling as both a socio-political process and an education in morality. 
While I recognize the political nature of this project, I will also refrain from overt 
political construction. Socrates, while recognizing that his actions were political, attempted to 
avoid traditional political engagement as he went about examining himself and others.91 While 
noting that one cannot separate education, ethics, and politics, the scope of political issues such 
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89 I recognize that education can and does occur independent from and outside of formal schooling. 
Throughout this project I will typically contextualize education as formal and most of the examples given will be the 
same, but this is done for the clarity of writing rather than to make a distinction that does not exist.  
90 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education School and Community, (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 
1909), 1. “Education is a public business with us, in a sense that the protection and restoration of personal health or 
legal rights are not.” 
91 Plato, Gorgias, 521d 6-8. More to the point, Socrates essentially enacted through philosophical inquiry a 
process that could have served as a model for genuine politics though the resulting aporia of his methods would 
have ultimately undermined politics. I hope to show that a genuine inquiry in morality will lead to aporia of a kind, 
but not one that paralyzes like Socrates’ torpedo-fish, and one that not only is action, but produces action along with 
further inquiry. 
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as justice and equality, and to a lesser extent freedom and liberty, are too vast to be dealt with in 
this project. Where these concepts enter into the discussion, they do so only as markers of 
additional concern, but not as relationships to be explained or defended neither by nor through 
cosmopolitan moral education. For justice in particular, cosmopolitanism (to the extent that I will 
take it) does not say what is just, only that all those within its scope ought to be able to play a 
part in determining what is just. Therefore, the only claim about justice made by 
cosmopolitanism is that in order to determine what is just, it is just to allow everyone a chance to 
make his/her case about what is just. There will be times when justice may appear alongside or 
as a result of arguments about cosmopolitan moral education, but my goal is not to investigate 
cosmopolitanism as a theory of justice. 
In the move from shared humanity to cosmopolitan morality, it becomes important to 
discern from whence the moral principles can be derived. If each of us is a human with moral 
agency, how are we to determine the shape and details of that agency? Further, how are we to 
justify such morality once it has been determined? These sorts of questions animated much of 
Thomas Nagel’s work in ethics. While he was not a cosmopolitan philosopher, his ‘view from 
nowhere’ offers contemporary cosmopolitanism a place to begin. Nagel’s ‘view from nowhere’ 
embodies and describes a perspective that combines the personal and impersonal standpoints in 
ways that retain the ‘human’ of local relationships and affiliation, yet curb the most self-
interested impulses that spring from them by recognizing the nature and inescapability of living 
in a world with other persons and their interests.92 Since this is the fact of our social existence, an 
inescapable ‘human condition,’ it becomes a fact of our ethical and political existence. However, 
moving into ethics and politics does not automatically separate us from this fact, so it must also 
                                                
92 See Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere: Knowledge Creation Diffusion Utilization, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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be the starting point for ethical and political processes and considerations. The ethical component 
compels us to retain the recognition of the collectivity of flourishing, and the political must 
therefore operate to that end. We cannot figure out what the good is without being a ‘we,’ and 
this requires an inclusive, collaborative, democratic process.93 In this section, these principles 
will be examined in looking at four correlates of shared humanity and inclusive deliberation: 
living with other people, dynamic engagement, openness and receptivity, and the lack of finality. 
2.2.1 – Living with Other People 
The cosmopolitan characteristics previously identified can easily be turned into 
statements about how one should live and interact with other people. Though doing so will go 
against the wishes of many cosmopolitanism proponents,94 it is temporarily necessary in order to 
illustrate how I mean this to be. It can be said that one who holds a cosmopolitan disposition 
believes one ought to consider oneself a part of a larger, global community and possess 
recognition of the shared humanity of all people. One ought to respect others and their ways of 
living, and ought to exhibit tolerance for ways with which one disagrees. One ought to actively 
engage with diverse people and cultures when the opportunities present themselves. One ought to 
apply one’s preferred treatment of oneself to all people of the world, and not just national 
brethren, thus making one a transnational ethical actor. These are simple examples of how a 
cosmopolitan might wish that people live with other people, but at a fundamental level exists the 
recognition that living is something that is done with other people. Thus purely self-interested 
motivations and living will not suffice.  
                                                
93 This does not commit me to the advocacy of democratic governments or institutions. It is possible to 
conceive of structures that would allow for the processes of ethical and political participation that I describe without 
the existence of liberal democratic governments or republican democracies. 
94 The Stoics were more willing to delineate specific attributes than contemporary cosmopolitans. One can 
find direct admonitions and instructions in Aurelius and Epictetus, but they are mostly in the form of aphorism, 
illustrations, or anecdotes rather than ‘commandment-like’ lists. 
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2.2.2 – Dynamic Engagement 
Cosmopolitanism itself is not a static set of principles or characteristics, despite the 
provisional listing above. Rather it is a disposition, a bearing, and a way of engaging the world. 
A disposition is a power that finds itself in active properties such as capacities and tendencies.95 
These dispositions are powers that contain not only the capability to act, but also the motivations 
or origins of a will to enact them such that possessing the disposition is quite likely to produce 
the powers/actions. The characteristics previously listed are merely the outward manifestations 
of an ongoing dialectic of an individual’s awareness of and interaction with his environment and 
are behavioral manifestations of dispositions. Dewey articulates my conception of this in the 
following passage, though the passage itself engenders much more than just this one aspect, and 
in fact embodies features of cosmopolitan education itself.  
Hence, normally, there is an accentuation of personal consciousness whenever our 
instincts and ready-formed habits find themselves blocked by novel conditions. 
Then we are thrown back upon ourselves to reorganize our own attitude before 
proceeding to a definite and irretrievable course of action. Unless we try to drive 
our way through by sheer brute force, we must modify our organic resources to 
adapt them to the specific features of the situation in which we find ourselves. 
The conscious deliberating and desiring which precede overt action are, then, the 
methodic personal readjustment implied in activity in uncertain situations.96 
 
The individual who cultivates a cosmopolitan disposition is ready, willing, and able to conduct 
this process. In this passage the “brute force” phrase is recognizable as implying an ethical 
obligation. When confronted with a “novel condition” should I attempt to think and reflect on it 
and understand it? Or, should I disregard what it says, means, and who it might affect simply 
because I would rather not be troubled with the effort or fear that I might have to give up some 
previously held principle that now stands in opposition to newly discovered facts and conditions? 
                                                
95 Luke Robinson, “Moral Principles as Moral Dispositions,” Philosophical Studies, (2010): 3. 
96 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 348. 
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Recognizing that one is part of a process of dynamic, ongoing engagement with others and the 
environment can prevent one from cultivating a sense of settling or stasis that would encourage 
the erection of immutable certainty and a subsequent refusal to engage or adapt. In cosmopolitan 
education one acts, and does so in relation to and with others. 
2.2.3 – Openness and Receptivity 
There is not much distance from dynamic engagement to the cultivation of an open or 
receptive mind that is willing to engage with potentially principle-threatening experiences, yet 
the difference is important. One cannot participate in an experience if one is not open to it and 
what it might bring, nor can one engage with the “novel conditions” if one does not want to risk 
the danger of a challenge to current convictions. Yet even the word ‘convictions’ requires 
questioning. The cosmopolitan sensibility contains only a conviction of shared humanity, one 
that implies living in a world with other people. Mere observation of the world indicates that 
things change, including human interactions. These facts necessitate receptivity to the 
potentiality contained in new experiences, and not the defense of a library of immutable facts and 
principles. To live in the world is to receive an onslaught of new experiences and a constant 
unfolding of one’s relationship to oneself, one’s environment, and other people. Individuals can 
either be receptive to these experiences and this unfolding, or be resistant to them. However, if 
they are resistant and refuse to acknowledge and understand what there is to be gleaned from 
them, they will be ill-equipped to accurately and successfully adjust their actions and aims to fit 
current and emerging conditions, and doomed to count on chance for their acquisition of making 
improvements in their lives with others. Recognizing and accepting the dynamism of life and 
being receptive to what it brings while not discarding wholesale that which already exists is 
crucial to developing a cosmopolitan disposition and requires an intentional and delicate balance. 
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2.2.4 – The Never Ending Process 
The recognition of living with other people, the need for dynamic engagement, and the 
necessity of being open and receptive to the world are states of mind and activities that are never 
completed. One does not ‘do’ this for a period of time, acquire the necessary bits of knowledge, 
and then stop. Cosmopolitan education instills in students the knowledge that there is always 
more to learn and that all conclusions are subject to revision. This practice is supported by any 
close inspection of human history. The world was indisputably flat until this knowledge was 
successfully disputed. The discovery of Newtonian physics transformed not only physics, but the 
basic structure of thought of the average non-physicist in the world. Yet, it is simply incapable of 
explaining such phenomena as electricity or the kind phenomena that have prompted the 
development of quantum physics, wherein the world is no longer seen as a collection of 
interacting objects, but rather an undivided whole containing faster and slower bits of energy. It 
was once believed that traveling faster than the speed of sound would incinerate or vaporize a 
person doing so, but Chuck Yeager certainly survived his experience.  
Though these four characteristics are not unique to cosmopolitan moral philosophy, their 
emphasis and centrality in it play crucial roles in making the cosmopolitan orientation to the 
world what it is. They are not shuttled aside to conveniently make way for efficiency or 
instrumental self-interest, nor for the impressments of one individual. For instance, take one 
version of the classic ‘Trolley Car problem’ in which you could push the fat man off the bridge 
to stop the trolley car from killing five children further down the track. The traditional question 
inquires whether or not you are morally justified in causing the man’s death in order to prevent 
the deaths of the five children. A cosmopolitan would immediately ask an important moral 
question that indicates a significant flaw in this, and other, typical dilemma constructions: can we 
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ask the man what he thinks? Can he, too, have a say in this and whether or not it is morally 
justified? Such relational methods of inquiry may also be found in feminist ethics, and most 
concepts in most moral and ethical systems will have resonance or similarities with concepts in 
others. Most systems share more than they differ, but what makes separates them are the ways in 
which they frame the problems that life presents us. Cosmopolitanism frames the moral problems 
of life so that shared humanity front, democratic inclusiveness, and these four dispositional 
characteristics can guide our considerations, while also leaving open the possibility that the 
framework will need to change. 
What we come to know as facts are constantly changing over time, and this is even more 
evident in human and social interactions. Laws change and are amended repeatedly, customs and 
norms fade out and re-emerge, and what counts as ethical or moral has been in constant 
development for as long as humans have attempted to make such judgments. It is to this last 
point that cosmopolitan education is oriented. It is in the nature of the natural sciences to inquire, 
investigate, and constantly test and challenge findings, but in ethics and morality many humans 
have acquired a curious habit of deliberate inertia. Though the demonstration of human history 
exists as a stark statement to its futility, many people still want to claim that the ethical systems 
they have or the moral behavior they exalt is the final and correct judgment on the matter, and 
for some, to the degree that they refuse to investigate further.  
Cosmopolitan philosophy brooks no finality in such matters and actively supports the 
constant investigation into the ways in which people ought to live together, which includes 
examining past and present ways of living. Philip Kitcher gives the example that “very few 
people…have retained exactly the constellation of attitudes towards sexual behavior that were 
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originally passed on to us by parents and other ethical teachers.”97 Whether such changes in 
individual and societal values are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is a different point, and the process of 
determining that is to be taken up in Chapter 3. Even within the confines of religious systems 
there has been change and alteration to accede to the realities of the changing world.98 This fact 
renders incomprehensible any assertions to the contrary. The only fixed truth in ethical systems 
is that they change over time. The recognition of human fallibility is a key part of cosmopolitan 
education. Aurelius would remind us “It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for 
things to subsist in consequence of change.”99 The cultivation of a cosmopolitan sensibility 
creates in the individual an acute awareness of the constant diffusion of ways of living and the 
dynamic nature of multiple forms of ways of living to form a dynamic, growth-oriented 
disposition to the world. 
Cosmopolitan education, in a very general sense, is an education that attempts to prepare 
an individual to live in the world as a reflective and active participant. It is an education that 
eschews dogmatism and absolutes and sees the educational process as without end. It is 
‘transnational’ in that it does not educate for a particular nation-state, but rather for citizens of 
the world at large. The primary characteristics of cosmopolitanism are, on the one hand, largely 
behavioral pathways indicating how to live with other people and, on the other hand, actions by 
and through which to live with other people. There have been formalized attempts at producing 
students with these characteristics, with an emphasis on transcending national boundaries 
                                                
97 Phillip Kitcher, The Ethical Project, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011): 330. Kitcher’s work 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
98 Examples abound, and they range from the practice of local Catholic Bishops giving dispensation during 
Lent for congregants who eat various traditionally Lenten-banned foods such as corned beef or capybara, to Martin 
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99 Aurelius, Meditations, 267. 
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through education. Moravian bishop John Amos Comenius, in the 17th century, called for the 
“establishment of a ‘Pansophic College’ where learned men from the nations of the world would 
collect and unify existing knowledge towards ‘international understanding’.”100 In 1817, Marc-
Antoine Jullien wrote about the need to “collect information about educational activities 
throughout Europe,”101 which could then be used to as a means to understand and create 
institutions of education. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) expresses a cosmopolitan stance when it defines an international education “as a 
process resulting from international understanding, cooperation and peace” and one that “is 
education for international understanding.”102 Despite these examples, cosmopolitan education 
need not take place on the ‘global stage.’ One can possesses a cosmopolitan disposition without 
ever having left one’s hometown. For instance, when dealing with difference or racism, 
cosmopolitanism does not require that one travel to a distant land to learn or to adapt to different 
people and traditions. Most people actually acquire much of these cosmopolitan tendencies 
locally, whenever “they confront racial boundaries in their daily lives.”103 Difference is 
experienced locally by most people every day, and how one negotiates it plays a large role in 
developing a cosmopolitan disposition. Since cosmopolitanism originates in a something shared 
by all (shared humanity), the dispositions developed are accessible by all as well and we need 
not go to extreme lengths, or distances, to find the formative experiences that do so.  
                                                
100Robert Sylvester, “Framing the Map of International Education (1969-1998),” Journal of Research in 
International Education 4, no. 2 (August 2005): 96. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Juan Ignacio Martínez, What is International Education? UNESCO Answers (San Sebastian, 2004), 5. 
103 See Michéle Lamont and Sada Aksartova, “Ordinary Cosmopolitanisms: Strategies for Bridging Racial 
Boundaries Among Working-Class Men,” Theory, Culture & Society 19, no. 4 (August 2002): 2. This is to say that 
dealing with racism is about dealing with ‘difference,’ not necessarily racism qua racism. Learning how to deal with 
difference and diversity are both important cosmopolitan educational endeavors. 
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The emphasis on understanding is crucial to engaging in the kind of process 
cosmopolitan education requires. One cannot understand another unless one engages that person; 
true engagement of this kind cannot take place without the aim of the engagement centered on 
articulations of the visions of each party’s interests, not only one’s own, which is in direct 
consequence of recognizing that we live in the world with other people. In many public schools, 
particularly in the U.S. during the latter-half of the 20th century, there was a movement to 
‘internationalize’ education by teaching about other countries, teaching about cultures, and 
teaching foreign languages, and was primarily motivated by the political and economic strategic 
interests of the U.S. government.104 The larger aim of this was not in the interests of both parties, 
but rather in the interest of one party’s (the United States’) dominion over and/or protection from 
the other. This kind of education is a means to an end that has as its aim self-aggrandizement or 
the marginalization of another, something clearly not in the other’s interest. The motivation for 
this education will influence the instruction and what is learned, such that, for example, a student 
would be interested to speak with and understand her counterpart from a different country so that 
she can create advantage in some competitive way and not for mutual benefit. Not only is this 
type of education contrary to cosmopolitan education, it stands in opposition to it.  
 A quote by Charles Gellar illustrates a conceptualization of cosmopolitan education that 
moves away from this personally instrumental version: 
Not so much curriculum, but what takes place in the minds of 
children as they work and play together with children of other 
cultures and backgrounds...that cooperation, not competition, is the 
only viable way to solve the major problems facing the planet, all 
of which transcend ethnic and political borders. 105 
                                                
104 See Mary Hayden and Jeff Thompson, “International Schools and International Education: A 
Relationship Reviewed,” Oxford Review of Education 21, no. 3 (1995). 
105 Charles Gellar in Hayden and Thompson, “International Schools and International Education,” 337. 
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This characterization is neither non-national nor transnational orientation that, rather than being a 
specific philosophy, pedagogy, or curriculum, describes a disposition or state of mind. One will 
not find examples of such an orientation in a lesson plan or by tabulating test scores, but rather in 
the approach taken by the instructor or the institution in its educational and, more importantly, 
interpersonal practices. This quote also illustrates the dynamic quality of cosmopolitanism and 
its relevance to moral education. Working and playing together forms a disposition in the minds 
of children, and the meeting of these activities signifies the moral dimension.106 It is not 
sufficiently acquired by reading about how others work and interact together. It is not static, and, 
more importantly, the disposition itself does not form if the individuals do not interact 
meaningfully with each other. Thus the nature of the interaction, and the process by and through 
which it occurs, is of ultimate significance. The schools, teachers, and pedagogies that invoke the 
ways of living with each other, the dynamic method of engagement, and the openness and 
receptivity described are enacting a cosmopolitan education; the students are learning to cultivate 
a cosmopolitan disposition. But in what ways might educators do this? To what might they turn 
to evoke the experiences necessary?  
2.2.5 – Thematic Tensions in Cosmopolitan Education 
Cutting across and through the cosmopolitan typologies previously listed, educators 
recognize important areas of tension and interest in cosmopolitanism. Identity, for example, has 
garnered interest as a point of entry in cosmopolitan education. “The Stoics argued that people’s 
identities as humans and cosmopolitans are more fundamental than their local or conditioned 
                                                
106 These children are ‘disclosing/revealing’ themselves to each other as they negotiate the rules that will 
govern their interactions. They are in a polis as moral and political actors, a recognition that will be relevant to 
Chapters Five and Six. 
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identities,”107 and this non-nationalist conception is still present in contemporary 
cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan education is also found to recognize that all cultures change 
over time, and we should not assume fixed identities within them.108 Increased mobility and 
migration seem to demand that individuals develop multiple identities109 to match their past, 
present, and evolving circumstances. For example, there are ‘third culture’ international school 
students who are not immersed in any one culture for long yet still manage to create an identity 
through constant interactions with other students in similar circumstances.110 There is also 
reasonable criticism of the popular ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative that purports to explain the 
source of geo-political conflict as cultural rather than ideological or economic and instead 
proposes a pedagogical approach that “highlights both the cognitive and ethical dimensions of 
intercultural learning, and suggest[s] that learning about others requires learning about 
ourselves.”111 Conceiving of a cosmopolitan orientation as open-ended and evolving allows for 
the creation of hybrid identities that “weave together a variety of disparate cultural 
‘fragments,’”112 but we “must pay attention to the complex situational factors of particular and 
unique cases.”113 This poses a challenge to cosmopolitan proponents of universalism in the 
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context of diversity. 
Justifications for universalism usually begin with the core cosmopolitan tenet of shared 
humanity and spread into conceptions of the human capacity for rational thought, human rights, 
the interdependency of humans and groups, and the global benefits of peace and harmonious co-
existence. Some cosmopolitan scholars, such as Martha Nussbaum, are proponents of a 
universalized cosmopolitanism wherein the fundamental component of our shared humanity 
compels us to accept and create mechanisms by which compassion for compatriots can be 
extended, with strength and consistency, to those persons beyond nation-state borders.114 Strand 
suggests that universalism illustrates “a dilemma between an abstract universalism from above 
versus a concrete moral commitment from below,”115 in which the tendency toward 
universalization in cosmopolitanism must be reconciled with specific, local moral dilemmas. 
This has influenced attempts in cosmopolitan education to “formulate the universal conditions 
(political, legal, and/or moral) through which coexistence can be made more democratic and 
more harmonious.”116 Criticisms of universalism point to the near infinite particulars of life that 
make the application of universals almost impossible. A theory of living that promotes the “right 
to rights” that would require people to accept a universal claim with which they disagree might 
in fact violate that theory’s own condition of the right to one’s rights.117 At its most strident, 
whether in politics, economics, culture, or morality, universalism implies a one-size-fits-all 
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ideology. Proponents of universality believe that the same rights, government, customs, or 
morals can be applied to everyone while opponents adhere to the primacy of the particular 
nation, culture, or religious system to make those determinations.118 This type of strong 
cosmopolitanism was identified earlier in this chapter and will be rejected in the chapter that 
follows. 
It is possible to reconcile the competing tensions in universalism. Hansen illustrates this 
tension in comparing the views of Nussbaum and Appiah. Nussbaum has a much stronger 
emphasis on “universal moral fealty,” whereas Appiah grounds his “rooted cosmopolitanism” in 
the recognition of one’s particular local and familial relationships and allegiances.119 Appiah’s 
moderate version allows for the acceptance of a positive partiality as opposed to a negative or 
exclusionary one. Hansen’s moderate position goes on to show that cosmopolitanism does not 
exist in opposition to localized values, but instead encourages “reflective (rather than naïve) 
openness to the new with reflective (rather than dogmatic) loyalty to the known.”120 Such an 
educational project aims to help students identify the values embedded in their local existence, 
understand the origins and applications of these values, and then apply these same processes to 
understanding the values of those living different local existences. 
The subtle way in which this tension in cosmopolitanism is situated in education can be 
seen by Hansen’s distinctions between it, liberalism, and multiculturalism. Cosmopolitanism and 
multiculturalism are distinct from each other by virtue of their respective points of organization. 
Multiculturalism begins with culture and community, a point that has already categorized 
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humans and therefore separated them; cosmopolitanism starts with humanity as ‘becoming’ and 
thus grouping everyone together by virtue of this shared state. Similarly, liberalism is distinct 
from both multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism because it organizes itself around the 
individual. Simply put, cosmopolitanism “presupposes individual and community diversity.”121 
Hansen’s conception is one of the individual and community as in the process of ‘becoming,’ a 
place that is between the individual and the community. Hansen’s strain of moderate 
cosmopolitanism attempts to bridge the gap that these sharply defined paradigms create, and this 
distinction about the points of organization is fundamentally crucial to the construction of 
cosmopolitan moral education. 
Sharon Todd, too, finds space in the debate for a more nuanced understanding of 
universalism. It is not necessary for universalist claims to “trump” local traditions in every case, 
as most of the critics of cosmopolitan universalism charge. It is conceivable that the universalism 
itself is open to revision upon particular experiences. “This means that claims to universality 
(human rights, humanity, rational communication) are themselves subject to translation as they 
come into contact with a new set of cultural and linguistic practices.”122 Indeed, as will be 
demonstrated later, what is universal about cosmopolitan moral education is the way that the 
process is informed by shared humanity, and as Todd notes, cosmopolitan education is really 
about “how one adjudicates between universals and particulars against the horizon of our 
‘cosmopolitan existence.’”123 Here we see a ‘moderate’ conception of universalism, such that its 
own meaning can be adapted rather than indelibly and dogmatically forced. 
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In contrast to, but concurrent with, the struggle with universalism is the concept of 
diversity. Dewey believed “diversity of perspectives is essential for growth”124 and diversity 
plays the same role in cosmopolitan education. Diversity, along with unity, identity, and social 
cohesion, is a global concern125 and a school that explicitly hopes to produce students who will 
acquire “an appreciation of, and respect for, diversity” must also recognize that both 
universalist/global and particularist/local claims are susceptible to absolute claims about their 
unity or impermeability.126 Diversity permeates individual cultures and universal unities and 
blurs the lines used to draw around each. Additionally, a cosmopolitan education emphasizes the 
importance of an “integrative society” that consists of citizens who respect unity in diversity and 
maintain relationships that are collaborative and consultative rather than hierarchical.127 This 
kind of an education aims for growth and integration and would welcome the collaboration of 
diverse ideas, opinions, and ways of thinking that promote creativity, all of which would increase 
the capability of students to be socially cohesive while retaining what is meaningful to them. To 
accept this exposes both the necessity of establishing the omnipresence of dialogue in order to 
navigate these tensions fruitfully and peacefully, and the agonism inherent in cosmopolitanism 
because not all tensions can be resolved. 
Cosmopolitan education requires prioritizing dialogue, which promotes engagement, 
interaction, understanding, and respect. Hansen, et al, classifies dialogue among the 
cosmopolitan “arts of living” that “enable people to gain reflective distance from their values 
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even while remaining attached to them,”128 a distance that is necessary to suspend judgment long 
enough to learn about and understand the other and helps to produce “working criteria for 
reaching judgments reflective of everyone’s input.”129 Koczanowicz takes the dialogue-as-bridge 
further and suggests a “dialogical cosmopolitanism”130 that requires rethinking universalism that 
exists in the openness and willingness to listen and communicate rather than in the particulars 
heard or stated, a process that contrasts with examples of dialogue that are used as a means to 
‘win’ an argument and dominate the other131 rather than to understand. It is vital for 
cosmopolitan education to communicate the idea that dialogue is a collaborative process of 
growth rather than a competitive process of conquest. This moderate cosmopolitanism does not 
aim for a predetermined outcome, but rather to uncover an emerging reality that can help 
construct a more full, inclusive, whole.  
Cosmopolitan dialogue requires “a capacity for agonistic respect”132 wherein agonism 
helps people maintain distance, while respect invokes self-limits that govern interactions. This 
‘distance,’ also used by Hansen, is an important concept in the way that cosmopolitanism 
eschews final judgments but also rejects relativism. This distance is found and maintained in 
                                                
128 David T. Hansen, Stephanie Burdick-Shepherd, Cristina Cammarano, and Gonzalo Obelleiro, 
“Education, Values, and Valuing in Cosmopolitan Perspective,” Curriculum Inquiry 39, no, 5 (December 2009): 
509. See also Hansen, “View from the Ground” and Nagel, “The View from Nowhere.” Something similar also 
occurs in Nagel’s discussion of objectivity in morals. The objective ‘seer’ is viewing and evaluating his subjective 
self, while at the same time containing the subjective character that influences the objective ‘seeing.’ This will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
129 Hansen, “Chasing Butterflies,” 162. 
130 Koczanowicz, “Cosmopolitanism and its Predicaments,” 148. 
131 See Hytten, “Deweyan Democracy.” 
132 Donald, “Multiculturalism Revisited,” 295. 
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agonism and supports a moderate, flexible cosmopolitan education.133 Agonism plays a central 
role in the cosmopolitan moral education I conceive and has the potential to increase 
understanding through examination of conflict and difference by focusing not only on conflicts 
in education but in real, everyday issues faced by students and societies. The kind of agonism 
most expressive of this kind of cosmopolitanism is described by Mouffe’s distinction between 
‘antagonism’ as conflict between enemies and ‘agonism’ as conflict between adversaries.134 Both 
take place within a political relationship, but the goal is to convert the former into the latter, and 
thus redefine the conflict as one that is more democratically collaborative even if the difference 
remains. The agonism found in cosmopolitanism also recognizes that some conflicts (or better 
yet, contestations) are not substantively resoluble, but that does not mean that it necessarily 
devolves into violent conflict; there might still be positive influences available in the 
contestation. In this sense, agonism is “in fact [democracy’s] very condition of existence.”135 It is 
to this kind of agonism we will return in Chapters 5 and 6, and upon which the crucial moral 
work of cosmopolitan education turns. 
Conclusion 
Cosmopolitan philosophy as a way of living, and as an educational construct, cannot help 
but embark on a moral educational project, but what can it say about morals and morality? 
Whatever cosmopolitan moral education can say about morals or morality can only be derived 
from its core tenets: shared humanity and our subsequent living with others. What can we derive 
                                                
133 It is important to remember that this conception of dialogue does not rest exclusively on interpersonal 
conversation through the use of verbal language. Cosmopolitan dialogue can take many forms as long as the 
communication is open and honest, and aims to inform, present, share, enlighten, and provide a medium for intended 
understanding. 
134 See Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox New York, (New York: Verso, 2000). 
135 Ibid., 16. 
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from these? First, it should be clear that cosmopolitan moral education cannot prescribe 
predetermined morals. There is nothing in the concept of shared humanity that can automatically 
generate a moral principle without first being clear about the implications of this fact. It does, 
however, indicate a starting point for inquiry. If we recognize our shared humanity and the fact 
that we all live in the world together, there is no basis upon which to exclude others from the 
conversations about how we ought to go about living with each other.136 Therefore, any 
subsequent cosmopolitan inquiry in or about morality should include those whose lives are 
affected by the results of the inquiry. This is the first condition of a cosmopolitan moral 
education and inquiry. Since inclusion is a principle from the outset, exclusion cannot be 
introduced later without conflicting with cosmopolitanism’s own initiating conditions, and is 
therefore prohibited. Thus, at is barest level, cosmopolitan moral inquiry is an inclusive, 
democratic process of inquiry into morality. 
Once these conditions are set it is difficult to say with any certainty where the inquiry 
will lead. The participants may choose to disband the democratic proceedings if they wish, but 
they must start from somewhere and that somewhere must be consistent with the two principles 
stipulated. Additionally, if the participants in the inclusive, democratic processes decide to 
eliminate the inclusive and democratic nature of the processes, they may choose to do so, but 
they may only choose to do so for themselves or for those participating and not for others. This 
would also cover subsequent generations of people such as their children.137 This would mean 
                                                
136 I will suspend any discussion or exploration of what capacities are required for full and legitimate 
participation in the deliberations. For instance, there might be some persons who possess certain cognitive 
impairments that make their participation impossible, and yet they are persons who deserve equal consideration. 
Though this is an important question to resolve, it cannot be resolved in the context of the present project. 
137 The issue of ‘preserving’ or ‘renewing’ the world lies at the center of Hannah Arendt’s thoughts on 
human ‘natality,’ a condition which contains the potential for each generation to renew the old world and/or create a 
new one. Arendt’s natality will be examined in Chapter 4. For more on natality see Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in 
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that even if the parents chose to eliminate inclusive democratic processes, those processes would 
need to be available to their children so they, too, have the opportunity to partake in the decision-
making processes that will govern their moral lives. The reason for this comes from 
cosmopolitan education’s construction, one that is both flexible and non-negotiable. 
 
                                                
Education,” in Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 
1961). See also Arendt, The Human Condition. 
 62 
Chapter 3 
Cosmopolitan Education Processes, Results, and Progress 
 
The previous chapter discussed cosmopolitan philosophy and identified cosmopolitan 
educational traits, but what does it do? Cosmopolitan education, like any education, has aims. 
For instance, vocational education aims for the development and mastery of marketable skills, 
usually with a specific occupation or activity in mind, such as carpentry or metalworking. An 
engineering program aims to train students to be capable engineers. They learn the crucial 
components of the practice and duties of engineering, and the tools and methodologies necessary 
for that practice. Cosmopolitan education aims to produce individuals who are proficient in 
morality and socially contributive citizens in the world community. These aims include the 
transmission of the essential approaches or forms of life, and the tools and methodologies 
required, in order to competently participate in morality. It does not aim to produce prime 
ministers or marketing executives, though its students may certainly occupy these positions. The 
aims of cosmopolitan education are neither economic nor industrial, but rather philosophical and 
moral. Cosmopolitan theory has, over its long history, provided us with a picture of what the 
ethical and moral characteristics desired might be, though its contemporary forms tend to not be 
as prescriptive in this area as the Stoics were. Despite this lack of prescription, there are two 
characteristics that cosmopolitanism implicitly offers up as required traits. The first has been 
related repeatedly: the recognition of shared humanity as a fundamental fact of human existence 
and as a motivating guide for behavior. I will now introduce the second, more controversial of 
the two, that is directly related to the first: democratic process.  
I do not mean democratic in the sense that we think of ‘democracy’ as a political system. 
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Nor do I necessarily mean that everyone gets to vote, though there is certainly something to be 
said in favor of that idea. Instead, democratic processes in cosmopolitanism mean that because 
every person shares with every other person in the world a common humanity all governing rules 
derived from that association ought to be amenable to all over whom the derivations govern. At 
the very least everyone should have some opportunity to participate in the processes that 
determine what those rules will be. Put more simply, the formation of rules that govern everyone 
ought to involve everyone. There is a political necessity for such, since the laws that create 
institutions and governments also carry with them sanctions and punishments; one might want to 
have a hand in how and which consequences are derived. While many moral judgments are 
inscribed in laws, not all are, and yet these morals still carry a governing force in the lives of 
people through social coercion and sanction. Ought not these governing principles be subject to 
the same democratic scrutiny as the others? The idea of democratic processes in cosmopolitan 
education is one in which the core principle of shared humanity is sufficient for requiring that all 
humans be allowed to participate in the making of the rules that govern their lives. 
Cosmopolitanism asks How ought we live? and cosmopolitan education attempts to facilitate the 
answering of that question. But how does it go about that facilitation? What processes are 
required? What result does cosmopolitan education seek? How will it know if the result has been 
achieved?  
3.1 Cosmopolitan Processes and Results 
In this section I will examine more closely the important distinction to be made between 
strong and moderate forms of cosmopolitanism and show that only the moderate form can result 
in a cosmopolitan moral education. This distinction is of vital importance because it rests on the 
difference between processes and results. While there is no doubt that cosmopolitan educators 
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are interested in the results of their educational processes, there is a greater emphasis to be found 
on the process, even in the face of results that are less than satisfactory, and furthermore, the 
result sought is embodied by the process. Cosmopolitan education aims to create a living process 
that can be the penultimate ‘result’ to the next ‘result’ that saturates the ongoing process. I will 
show that for cosmopolitan education to be a moral education and meet its own moral standards, 
it must adopt the moderate, process-oriented version of itself. In this chapter I will explore a 
model of deliberative ethics offered by Philip Kitcher that provides an illustration of what 
cosmopolitan moral education might look like insofar as it addresses the four main components 
of cosmopolitan moral education disclosed in Chapter 2. 
3.1.1 Empirical and Methodological Morality 
I first identify two general ways in which moral education could be evaluated by offering 
two distinctions: empirical morality and methodological138 morality. Empirical morality consists 
of behaviors that are actually moral in the ways in which people live with and treat each other 
and meets standards of moral behaviors that have been set or determined. Empirical morality is 
identified by the results of moral education. Moral lessons are taught, behaviors are affected, and 
the intended outcomes occur or they do not. The challenge for empirical morality is to be able to 
make a truth claim that certain behaviors are moral, the individual in question knows that, and 
that what counts as moral is actually being done.139  
                                                
138 This does not mean a ‘method’ in the rigid sense of something like the scientific experimental method or 
others like it, though it could mean that. This ‘method’ is meant to represent whatever process, criteria, and steps are 
used to facilitate the morality desired. In one society this process could be highly prescribed and rigid, while in 
another it could vary widely and be revised frequently. In Dewey, Democracy and Education, 170, Dewey states, 
“[s]uch matters as knowledge of the past, of current technique, of materials, of the ways in which one’s own best 
results are assured, supply the material for what may be called general method,” but one is not restricted to these. 
Originality, creativity, and experimentation with new ideas are also part of the method of education.  
139 See Kitcher, The Ethical Project; Marc D. Hauser, Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrong 
Psychology, (New York: HarperCollins, 2006). Kitcher explores this primarily through anthropological and 
historical investigations whereas Hauser uses contemporary research in psychology and neuroscience. Also see 
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Methodological morality is the name I have given to the deliberations, discussions, and 
adjustments that are involved in moral inquiry. In contrast to empirical morality, it may be that 
the actual outcomes of the moral education (i.e. the actual actions) have less bearing on morality 
learned than the manner in which they were derived. Clarifying the morality of the process lies at 
the heart of some debates about moral education’s efficacy and is where the battle lies for 
methodological morality.140 How are these morals determined, who determines them, and to 
what degree is this process itself a moral one?  
This brings me to the more contentious point between empirical and methodological 
morality: is it still morality if the means or processes have taken on more ethically inclusive 
characteristics even if the results are not seen (by some) as moral or if the question of morality is 
still open? Is it moral if deliberations and debates are more inclusive, more tolerant, than 
preceding top-down mandates, even if those previous, autocratic mandates resulted in actual, 
tangible moral behaviors and widespread morality? It is this question that is put to 
cosmopolitanism and one that I think must be answered in the affirmative for cosmopolitan 
education. 
3.1.2 Cosmopolitan Morals 
As stated earlier, cosmopolitanism generally avoids prescription, a point in its favor as a 
non-doctrinal moral education, but a formidable obstacle in descriptive research. It involves the 
                                                
Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” 
Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2011) for a moral intuitionist view of the perception of the outcomes of behaviors 
and ethical ‘improvements.’ I am not concerned with which morals are actually ‘moral,’ only that the group in 
question has a working conception of morality, they try to achieve it, and that they can determine whether or not 
they have done so. 
140 I resist the temptation to use the word ‘ideal’ to signify this concept because it is my contention that 
there is no ideal ethical system, and thus it would be misleading to use this term in any way in this discussion. 
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acceptance of uncertainty,141 but does not suggest a permanent state of ambiguity. Cosmopolitan 
education encourages inquiry that recognizes that what is known today may ring false tomorrow, 
but involves acting on one’s best knowledge while allowing for further exploration and inquiry. 
This inquisitive disposition (or set of dispositions) is the ‘product’ of cosmopolitan education, 
but one that is not quantifiable or measurable because it is dynamic. Dispositions are not static, 
concrete, or fixed, but rather undergoing constant adjustment and adaptation.142 The judgments 
that result are not indelible and final. 
Cosmopolitan education is an inquiry that brings students into an act of thinking and 
being that is both philosophical and lived. This cannot be done by simply teaching about content, 
or about morals, but should involve the students in the crucial act of generating knowledge 
through inquiry, analysis, and deliberation of the content itself. The process is one of action. 
Cosmopolitan education is a way of educating without a definite and absolute end in mind or 
with pre-set answers, but is instead an embodiment of a philosophical inquiry into morality. To 
do cosmopolitan philosophy is to participate in your own education, one that is intellectual and 
moral. 
Cosmopolitan theory has been periodically offered as a theory that can serve to make 
either tangible improvements in the lives of people (e.g. the management of conflict or 
difference), or to offer adherents the cultivation of an orientation to the world that is an 
improvement in everyday life derived more exclusively through their own lived experience. 
Historically, cosmopolitanism’s popularity seems to ebb and flow with the expansion and 
                                                
141 See Donald, “Multiculturalism Revisited”; Thomas S. Popkewitz, “Alchemies and Governing: Or, 
Questions About the Questions We Ask,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 39, no. 1 (2007).  
142 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy; 197-202. See also Bernard Williams, Philosophy as a 
Humanistic Discipline, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), particularly Chapter 6, “The Primacy of 
Dispositions,” pp. 67-75. 
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contraction of global movements, reappearing during times of increased contact, local instability 
due to foreign influence, and fear and confusion about the future. Thus cosmopolitanism implies, 
however softly or unintentionally, a means to inquire into moral questions that beset groups of 
people. But what is it that cosmopolitanism offers by way of morality? Does it hold the promise 
that it will deliver morality empirically143 through newly legislated behaviors, forms of 
governance, and correct moral behaviors, or does it offer a way to produce a disposition in an 
individual that has the motivational properties necessary to thus make moral improvements in 
behaviors and processes that can contribute to morality?144 Some conceptions of cosmopolitan 
educational theory purport to cultivate a disposition wherein the emphasis is on certain types of 
ethical discourse,145 and thus implicitly support methodological morality in absence of any 
assurance of immediate empirical morality. In order to determine where empirical and 
methodological morality fit in cosmopolitan education, I must revisit the distinction between 
strong and moderate cosmopolitanism. 
3.1.3 Strong and Moderate Cosmopolitanism, Again 
As with many concepts, one can adhere to a type of cosmopolitanism that contains strict 
criteria and rigid controls for behavior, responsibilities, and obligations, or one can hold a more 
                                                
143 See Pradeep A. Dhillon, “A Kantian Conception of Human Rights Education,” in Education in the Era 
of Globalization, edited by Klas Roth and Ilan Gur-Ze’ev, 51-64, (Springer, 2007); Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
Experiments in Ethics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Walter Parker, “Is there Space for 
Cosmopolitanism in Today’s ‘International Education’ Movement in U. S. Schools?” in American Educational 
Research Association, 1-27, (San Diego, 2009). These authors articulate versions of Cosmopolitanism that take root 
or emphasis in the actual outcomes of human interactions and empirical manifestations of a Cosmopolitan ‘actor.’ 
144 See Hansen, “A View from the Ground”; and Gunesch, “Education for Cosmopolitanism.” These 
authors are only two of many that methodologize cosmopolitanism as a disposition or orientation rather than a set of 
prescriptive traits or rules. 
145 In cosmopolitanism see Donald, “Multiculturalism Revisited”; and Koczanowicz, “Cosmopolitanism 
and its Predicaments.” There are political theories that operate similarly, such as discourse ethics, deliberative 
democracy, transcendental pragmatism, and agonistic pluralism, some of which will be taken up in more detail in 
Chapter 5.  
 68 
nuanced and flexible position. This dichotomy is omnipresent in conceptions of 
cosmopolitanism. Whether a strident version of universality or a nuanced conception of “unity in 
diversity,”146 this tension is one of which scholars and educators must be aware. As mentioned 
earlier, strong versions might promote cosmopolitanism as the way to live, but such a stance 
would conflict with cosmopolitan theories that one should be open and accepting of other ways 
of living. In the moderate version there would be no active endorsement of a cosmopolitan way 
of life in schools; doing so would devalue non-cosmopolitan lifestyles. Furthermore, moderate 
cosmopolitanism can be defended with mutually beneficial, society-wide reasons such as the 
need to eliminate prejudices or promote cooperation and respect by focusing on the similarities 
between cultures rather than their differences.147  
Strict forms of cosmopolitanism, with their assertions of specific traits to acquire, would 
require methods of assessment that would yield empirical data to determine if the morals were 
acquired or not. Such assessments and the processes that support them would involve external 
structures or influences (i.e. laws or rules), unlike moderate cosmopolitanism, which is more 
interested in what is going on inside the individual (i.e. internal dispositions). An individual 
exhibiting a more moderate cosmopolitan disposition possesses an approach or way of engaging 
the world that is open and elastic and not one that imposes or ‘requires.’ The extreme forms of 
cosmopolitanism are given concrete form in prescribed behaviors and organizational structures 
which would be inscribed in laws or rules in order to facilitate the kind of behaviors and 
interactions that best suit a cosmopolitan way of life.148 In the moderate version, individuals 
                                                
146 See Golmohamad, “Education for World Citizenship.” 
147 However, to focus on similarities is only one of multiple approaches, another of which is the educational 
benefits of focusing on difference and diversity, all of which have a place in cosmopolitan education. 
148 I do not want, at this point, to go into the specific details of what this might be, but rather try to describe 
the theoretical or paradigmatic dichotomy involved.  
 69 
attempt to live in a certain way. In the more extreme or strong version, external structures and 
environments are erected to facilitate and encourage those ways of life.149  
Thus the educational consequences are brought into relief. Will an educator lay down a 
set of cosmopolitan traits the students must strive to achieve, or will the educator take a more 
implicit route by modeling the cosmopolitan activities, behaviors, and processes he wishes the 
students to acquire, or model ways of inquiring into what behaviors ought to or might be 
adopted? How can one’s understanding of the ranges, limits, and flexibility within cosmopolitan 
educational philosophy inform the most useful and effective approach? I am now able to develop 
my distinction between structural and dispositional cosmopolitanism 
3.1.4 Structural Cosmopolitanism 
To build on my previous distinction between empirical and methodological morality, I 
now distinguish between two types of cosmopolitanism;150 the first kind is that which concerns 
itself with terms such as structures, entities, politics, nationalism, laws, and nation-states, among 
others. I call this structural cosmopolitanism, and it is the type of cosmopolitanism that provokes 
a great deal of criticism. Political and legal conceptions of cosmopolitan would find their 
manifestations in structures and institutions erected to facilitate the enforcement of some of the 
cosmopolitan characteristics noted earlier. Critics point to the legal and logistical difficulties 
with codifying ‘world citizenship’ and determining the explicit civic obligations therein, or they 
point to the ill-fated League of Nations or the hit-or-miss activities of the beleaguered behemoth 
                                                
149 I recognize the inevitable interplay between the two, and in effect, there is a necessary conjunction that 
must be obtained in order to maintain equilibrium. The point of the dichotomy is to show the origins of emphases for 
structures or dispositions that might come, and why I advocate for an emphasis on dispositions.  
150 These types are similar to, and influenced by, Scheffler’s distinctions between two strands of 
cosmopolitanism: one a doctrine about justice, and the other a doctrine about culture and the self. See Scheffler, 
“Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism.” My ‘structural’ and ‘dispositional’ categories loosely correspond to these, 
respectively, though there is more similarity in the former than the latter.  
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that is the United Nations as evidence that such manifestations of cosmopolitan theory are 
flawed, or simply impossible and utopian.  
Most of these critics have as the objects of their criticism the empirically realized 
versions of the aforementioned cosmopolitan theories and treatments. Surely it is clear in many 
instances that these structural and otherwise tangible implementations of cosmopolitan theory 
have failed to perform as promised or intended, but why? Is it simply because the theories are 
wrong or that their aversion to prescription leaves large, vague holes in which to find fault? Is it 
because human nature does not fit a cosmopolitan paradigm? Is it because human psychology 
simply cannot wrap itself around the apparent contradictions contained in cosmopolitanism? Or 
is it because the most crucial element of the cosmopolitan paradigm is missing in these structural 
models? In defense of critics, non-strong cosmopolitans are vague or in disagreement about what 
they can or do promise, which allows space for critics to insert themselves. It is quite possible 
that the second part of my distinction is in part a response to these criticisms and is an attempt to 
blunt or deflect them as well as an attempt to offer a positive, if modest, account of what 
cosmopolitanism can offer. 
3.1.5 Dispositional Cosmopolitan  
I believe that the most significant problem that presents itself in structural 
cosmopolitanism is that the crucial element is missing: what I call dispositional 
cosmopolitanism. Dispositional cosmopolitanism is the kind of cosmopolitanism that emphasizes 
individual attitudes and dispositions and finds no fundamental imperative to depart into 
reconciliations with national identities nor debates about the tensions between local and global 
loyalties (at least initially), or how to cope with adhering to structural mandates. In dispositional 
cosmopolitanism the individual stands central in relation to his or herself not as a participant in a 
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structure or framework, but rather as a participant in morality with other participants. 
Dispositional cosmopolitanism begins from the standpoint of the person who lives with other 
persons, whereas structural cosmopolitanism begins from the standpoint of the external entities 
designed to influence the person. Instead of adopting the structural cosmopolitan point of view 
that begins with external structures designed to impart codes and behaviors from without, codes 
and behaviors determined independent of the person who must conform to them, dispositional 
cosmopolitanism adopts a position from inside or ‘alongside’ the person that then extends out 
into a local, regional, and global web of interactions.  
I assert that the failures of structural cosmopolitanism cited by its many critics can be tied 
to the lack of dispositional cosmopolitanism in the populations of which the structures are 
comprised. In effect, the critics of structural cosmopolitanism are probably justified, not because 
of something wrong with cosmopolitan, but rather due to something wrong with the 
implementations they cite. That ‘something’ is the lack of a sufficient number of cosmopolitan-
disposed people contained within or constituting the populations governed by the structures. 
Stated more frankly, the structural cosmopolitans are guilty of placing the cart in front of the 
horse. You cannot sustain a cosmopolitan institution unless the people who exist within its 
domain and governance have cosmopolitan dispositions.151 It is analogous to the argument that 
democracy cannot be imposed (top-down), it must come from the people (bottom-up). 
Cosmopolitanism is no different. If one of the core tenets of cosmopolitanism is to require the 
inclusion of those whom social policies will affect, then cosmopolitan policies or social action 
                                                
151 One could ask why this is not a ‘chicken and egg’ issue. I grant that a specific disposition is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for policy implementation; holding a disposition does not automatically result in 
disposition-derived action or implementation. I do, however, assert that first, a certain disposition to X is more likely 
to result in policies that reflect X than a disposition to Z will result in X, and second, policy X (or policy Z, for that 
matter) is more likely to be successful, be maintained, and receive broader support if the people ‘governed’ by it 
contain dispositions that comport with it.  
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cannot be imposed on a population that has not been involved in the decision.  
3.1.6 Structural and Dispositional Cosmopolitanism and Morality 
Using the distinctions constructed, I pair empirical morality with structural 
cosmopolitanism and methodological morality with dispositional cosmopolitanism. Empirical 
morality, and its emphasis on the transmission of specific morals and actual moral behaviors that 
result from the education, forms the content of the morality sought. Because empirical morality 
requires morals that are discrete and specific and evaluations and corrections of behaviors that 
are explicit and measurable, these results manifest themselves in governments, laws, regulatory 
agencies and agents, as well as in non-codified, but equally structured, social stigma and 
sanctions. Methodological morality, like dispositional cosmopolitanism, cannot be measured in 
the results but rather in the process, and finds its manifestation in the attitudes, dispositions, and 
forms of life of those in whom it resides. Empirical morality might be able to point to 
dispositions, too, as an origination point, but since it relies upon observable behaviors it cannot 
be certain of, nor prioritize, the origins of the manifested behaviors. Structural cosmopolitanism 
will certainly welcome dispositions that result in behaviors it is designed to produce, but will not 
be so welcoming if the dispositions are not manifested. As Table 1 indicates, dispositional 
cosmopolitans are more interested in how the morals are derived, who gets to be involved, and 
whether or not all options are democratically ‘on the table.’ This edges close to the questions of 
justification. When asked what justification there is for either empirical or methodological 
morality, the former must work much harder to produce it whereas the latter has but two steps: 
shared humanity and the logical consequence of collaborative deliberations. Structural 
cosmopolitanism might be effective but only if it is preceded by realized methodological 
morality supported by widespread dispositional cosmopolitanism. The structural/empirical form 
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ultimately puts the conclusion first and the method second. Put another way, the 
structural/empirical forms start from a point of fixed morals and fixed actions and then work to 
force others to comply. 
TABLE 1. Pairings of Distinctions of Cosmopolitanism 
Strong cosmopolitanism Moderate cosmopolitanism 
 
Empirical Morality  Methodological Morality 
External, measurable products and  Internal, unquantifiable attitudes and 
outcomes approaches 
 
Structural cosmopolitanism  Dispositional cosmopolitanism 
External laws and structures to guide  Internally developed dispositions 
or coerce 
 
Strategic, instrumental motivation  Universal, communal motivation 
Dependent upon external conditions  Dependent upon internal grounding 
for maintenance       of shared humanity 
Externally compelled  Internally motivated 
Indifference to methods?   Indifference to results? 
Leads to direct instruction or  Leads to collaborative facilitation 
for maintenance 
 
If, as in structural cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan education is primarily concerned with 
the actual output of moral education and morality is determined by these outcomes, then the 
moral evaluation of structural cosmopolitanism rests on these outcomes. It would also mean that 
the evaluation of a cosmopolitan education would rest on the outcomes of its products (student 
behaviors) and the subsequent results of their activities in moral life. We would ultimately 
evaluate both the students and the education they received by calculating the sum of their moral 
productivity/lives. The difficulty of assessing such a program is addressed in traditional 
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criticisms of Consequentialism and Utilitarianism.152  
More importantly, however, the significant weakness of the empirical morality/structural 
cosmopolitan educational program lies in that it is primarily oriented toward educating for 
existing moral codes and structures since it takes as its point of emphasis and its goal only that 
which currently exists or the navigation of structures rather statically obtained. Empirical 
morality/structural cosmopolitanism predetermines the moral outcome in order to prescribe 
actions and assign criteria to adjudicate the morals acquisition of its students. For an approach 
that focuses on the results there can be no other way to assess the success of such a morals 
education program; it must determine what is moral before the morals education has taken place. 
Thus any moral inquiry that is held within such system is not a true inquiry – the dataset (which 
morals) is constrained and what constitutes morality has been fixed; the answer already known.  
I admit that one must start from somewhere. We are all socialized into forms of life from 
the time we are born until we are old enough to begin making our own judgments, and these 
forms of traditional morals judgments will likely be our starting point. That does not, however, 
mean that we must begin with these received morals as our fixed destination; doing so will also 
make it increasingly difficult for empirical morality/structural cosmopolitanism ‘graduates’ to 
participate in future deliberations of morality in greater society since they have been ‘trained’ 
only for externally imposed, top-down, received morals, not for taking part in a collaborative 
inquiry or negotiation. Educating students in this way effectively condemns them to a future of 
moral alienation since, as noted earlier, ethical codes and constitutions of morality are subject to 
change over time, these students will be ill equipped to participate in these that change them.  
                                                
152 There are numerous critiques of utilitarianism and Consequentialism. I hew more closely to those found 
in Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, or John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised, (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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If, as in dispositional cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan education is primarily concerned 
with the process by which the deliberations of and inquiry into morality occurs, then one can 
assess it (the process) by examining the types of dispositions required for the kinds of 
deliberations that would be necessary for an inclusive inquiry into morality. Thus a cosmopolitan 
education of this type would require a greater emphasis on the morality of the methods of 
instruction in order to deliver a process-centric education in lieu of one that simply trains moral 
habits and behaviors regardless of method. A program that relies on the outcomes could be 
justified in using such techniques as negative reinforcement, threats of violence, coercion, and 
other forms of habit-inducement that should give us pause. The empirical morality/structural 
cosmopolitan program essentially attempts to guarantee pre-determined behavioral outcomes 
rather than be engaged in the deliberations over what outcomes might be morally preferable 
given the problems students are liable to face in their unknown future, and increasingly less 
likely to inquire into, and about morality in general. Methodological morality/dispositional 
cosmopolitans see the manner in which decisions are made to be of utmost importance, such that 
they are more likely to be able to accept, however temporarily, an undesirable result as long as 
they agree with the process that obtained it.153 
Why should this matter to cosmopolitan education? If I am going to posit cosmopolitan 
education as an education in morality I need to know which scheme of cosmopolitanism under 
which I will operate in order to understand what educational options are available and in what 
ways the process of cosmopolitan education might run afoul of its own principles. The 
cosmopolitan who prefers the empirical-structural approach must accept that s/he is essentially 
                                                
153 This foregrounds a position to be argued in Chapter 5 wherein participants can inhabit a position of 
‘epistemological restraint,’ a concept developed by Thomas Nagel. See Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political 
Legitimacy,” Philosophy 16, no. 3 (1987). 
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resigned to a kinder, gentler version of Consequentialism, and the variable is which set of morals 
will s/he attempt to teach. The cosmopolitan who prefers the methodological-dispositional 
approach must accept the fact that s/he is not teaching morals—and that there will be tensions 
when (alleged) moral procedures do not produce the desired results—but is instead attempting to 
equip students with the skills and dispositions necessary to participate in a collaborative moral 
inquiry that is the most inclusive process available.   
My conception of cosmopolitan education requires that one recognize the fundamental 
fact of shared humanity, and this fact compels us to consider moral questions from a truly 
socially and communally aware perspective; we recognize that the moral question is how should 
we regard and interact each other? and the ‘we’ in these questions demands a collaborative 
inquiry to answer. Cosmopolitan education requires active engagement with the world and those 
in it and an openness and receptivity to learn from that which the world and experience contains 
and creates. The objects, or rather persons, who deserve our consideration in these matters, 
consist of everyone, not only our locally defined familiars. The cosmopolitan participant does 
not shy away from difference or conflict, but inhabits the ambiguity found in new ideas and the 
erosion of old ones and the possibility that a previously held conviction might have been morally 
incorrect.  
3.2 Toward Ethical Progress 
Cosmopolitanism’s contemporary iterations have emerged in part due to the recognition 
of an increasingly ‘smaller’ and more interconnected world. Human history has shown a 
consistent and technologically induced acceleration of increased global and cross-cultural contact 
that suggests the inevitability of more of the same, which erects an imperative for the 
examination, possible expansion, and combination of multiple conceptions of the good and what 
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counts as moral. Doing so encourages the development of an ethical process in which we are 
confronted with a pragmatic question of how the people of the world are to live and survive 
together in the face of these inevitable contacts and changes. Though not for the intentions of 
cosmopolitanism, Philip Kitcher presents an approach to ethics he calls ‘pragmatic naturalism’ 
that stresses the need for ongoing deliberations of ethical progress, and the deliberations he 
envisions may serve as a model for cosmopolitan moral education. In this section I will show 
that cosmopolitanism provides a theoretical and practical home for the kind of ethical inquiry 
described by Kitcher, and that these ‘ethical deliberations’ embody a cosmopolitan moral 
inquiry. Conversely, it could also be said that the process described by Kitcher is, however 
unintentionally, a cosmopolitan one. 
In The Ethical Project, Kitcher describes and argues for an approach to ethical progress 
that he calls “pragmatic naturalism” wherein existing ethical codes stand as responses to altruism 
failures that have been experienced.154 The ethical project was ‘invented’ by our ancestors and 
subsequent humans have been amending them ever since. Simply put, (psychological) altruism 
occurs when a person’s actions in a given context are the result of his recognition of the desires 
of another person such that those actions produce the outcome desired by the other and without a 
primarily instrumental desire to procure benefits for oneself. The failure of a person to act in 
such a way in a situation in which it would be appropriate to do so is an ‘altruism failure.’ 
Kitcher provides the example of a hungry person alone in a room with food. He is hungry and 
desires to eat the food; all of it. Now consider that this person is in the same room with the same 
food except there is now another hungry person in the room who desires the food. In this case, an 
altruist would now have the desire to see an outcome in which both himself and the other hungry 
                                                
154 See Kitcher, The Ethical Project, 3-12, where  he introduces the term, concept, and relationship with 
ethics.  
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person are able to share the food. “Here your desire responds to your perception of the needs and 
wants of someone else, so that you adjust what you might otherwise have wanted so as to align 
your desire with the wants you take that other person to have.”155 Ethical progress requires a 
purposeful deliberation about altruism failures and how to best remedy them: Where have things 
gone wrong and how can we do better? Rather than a discussion about what those ‘better ways’ 
are, societies must engage in ethical discussions to determine what those ‘better ways’ might be, 
and though decisions must be made, they are decisions ‘for now’ that are open to adjustment as 
the principles and criteria derived from deliberations evolve. 
According to Kitcher, the core of ethics consists of “relatively imprecise and vague, 
ethical statements”156 that give us a sense of where it is we want to go and how we are to get 
there. These ethical statements orient us to the ‘correct’ behavior, and the deliberations result in 
an orientation and a disposition to act. The traditional question of ethics is about how one ought 
to live in the world. Cosmopolitanism is about how we ought to live and act. Both are primarily 
interested in how one/we ought to live, not necessarily or only the ‘what’ that results from living. 
Fundamentally, ethical pragmatism is an educational process that prepares its newest members 
for physical and social survival. Its chief lessons are, regarding physical survival, about how to 
stay alive and in social survival, about how to live with other people. “The one thing every 
individual must do is to live; the one thing that society must do is to secure from each individual 
his fair contribution to the general well being and see to it that a just return is made to him.”157 
Ethics is a mix of habits and reflective deliberations that are socially mediated. Social mediation 
                                                
155 Kitcher, The Ethical Project, 21. For a thorough discussion of psychological altruism see pages 17-25. 
156 Ibid., 246. 
157 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 215. Kitcher draws from Dewey as well as the work of Charles 
Peirce and William James.  
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and the survival imperative require that the deliberations of what constitutes ethical progress 
should be a society-wide conversation that is as democratic as possible, and, as such, as many 
members as possible should be involved.158 Kitcher asserts that in such ethical deliberations we 
should be aware of past and present circumstances that have resulted in the ethical judgments we 
have inherited. Additionally, those involved in the deliberations should be willing to experiment, 
test, and evaluate the conclusions or ideas of the ethical discussions.159 The scientific method, as 
conceived by Dewey, informs this process. “Science represents the office of intelligence, in 
projection and control of new experiences, pursued systematically, intentionally, and on a scale 
due to freedom from limitations of habit. It is the sole instrumentality of conscious, as distinct 
from accidental, progress.”160 It is in this scientific account of progress that notions of ethical 
progress find a cognate. 
In looking at transitions and changes among ethical codes, one can see if they have been 
progressive.161 Ethical codes contain conceptions of the good, and these ethical codes change 
over time. Thus conceptions of the good change as well. As a result, final conceptions of the 
good that contain concrete and distinct characteristics find difficulty holding up over time. The 
good does not change on its own; people make alterations to it, and they do so as a result of a 
combination of social tensions arising from altruism failures, attempts to resolve them and 
                                                
158 Kitcher, The Ethical Project, 181. “Since I shall conclude that realist truth about ethics cannot be 
sustained in any of its guides, it is best to be inclusive about the possibilities allowed.”  
159 See ibid., 207, note 29 in which Kitcher notes that for Dewey, this was of significant importance. 
“Dewey is optimistic that ethics can find its own analog of scientific method,” Dewey himself writes “[t]he 
coincidence of the ideal of progress with the advance of science is not a mere coincidence. Before this advance men 
placed the golden age in remote antiquity. Now they face the future with a firm belief that intelligence properly used 
can do away with evils once thought inevitable” (Dewey, Democracy and Education, 224). 
160 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 227. 
161 Kitcher’s use of the term ‘progressive’ is not synonymous with ‘Progressivism’ or the school of thought 
known as ‘progressive education.’ For Kitcher in this case, ‘progressive’ is merely an adjectival form of ‘progress.’  
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provide remedies, and the adoption of new remedies and behaviors to do so. It is vital that the 
conversation about them continue and not cease once a remedy has been found; it is crucial that 
there not be an essentialized, a priori conception of the good because then the focus is on 
adhering to the conception of the good rather than what the situation requires for a just outcome, 
as well as what can be done to achieve it. According to Kitcher, a priori attempts to conceive the 
good must be rejected and instead there should be a conversation about the good that builds 
concepts and suggests proposals of the good rather than defining it. This creates a dynamic 
picture of the good and ethics that is necessary to making them better, or progressive. One would 
not attempt to make improvements to something one does not conceive as capable of changing. 
A fixed, a priori conception of the good, no matter how flawed, would never be altered or 
corrected, and thus ethical progress would be impossible. However, by recognizing the 
dynamism of the ethics, more intelligent changes can then be made. There is no promise of the 
elimination of all tensions that surround the difficulties and conflicts over the good and ethics, 
but there is hope that some of the tensions we experience from known altruism failures can be 
remedied.  
No ethical system is truly static; all have changed over time. Even within the confines of 
religious systems there has been change and alteration to accede to the realities of the changing 
world and our evolving understanding of it.162 This fact renders incomprehensible any assertions 
to the contrary as well as any attempts to brand all changes in existing formulations as dangerous 
or unethical. The only fixed truth in ethical systems is that they change over time. Since the 
conception of the good is ever evolving and all of society’s members have an interest in what 
that good is, then it is only reasonable that all members of society participate in the deliberations 
                                                
162 For one instance, it is no longer blasphemy in the Roman Catholic Church to assert that the world is 
round and that Earth revolves around the Sun.  
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regarding the good and how it can be obtained. We must engage in the world around us, and that 
includes other people.  
However, Kitcher admits the practical impossibility of one-hundred-percent global 
participation in these deliberations. The obstacle presented here is not insignificant. Our social 
groups have grown so large that global-communal deliberations are impossible in a formal sense. 
In another sense, we simply may not always be directly cognizant of the existence of certain 
altruism failures. The ‘invisibility’ of the results of these failures and the distance between 
ourselves and the ‘victims’ means that the most efficient motivating influences (e.g. their anger, 
our empirical observation of their plight) for remedial deliberation become at best abstract and 
faint echoes. In such societies a citizen loses “the ability to perceive oneself as playing a role in 
joint projects, conceived by each participant as directed towards a common good. The shared 
ethical life begins to disappear,” and most obviously in a large society.163 If we think of the 
global society we cannot get much bigger, and thus cosmopolitanism is faced with serious 
practical problems vis-à-vis democratic and inclusive, ethical deliberations. There are further 
difficulties in understanding what or where ‘community’ is to be drawn. ‘We’ are diverse and 
geographically jumbled, yet our interactions are so interconnected that neither boundaries nor 
accurate delineations can be drawn between or around ‘us’ particularly because ‘we’ are part of 
so many different groups all at the same time.164 I do, however, assert that informal global 
deliberations take place every time people from different parts of the world interact and must 
negotiate ways to live together, for however brief a period of time. In this regard increased 
contact and interaction can continue to force an evolution of ethical practices, perhaps in 
                                                
163 Kitcher, The Ethical Project, 298. 
164 Save for one: humanity, but that does not solve the practical problem of who ‘we’ are and how that 
identification affects the way I conduct myself on the street.  
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temporary and microforms that can be transmitted and incorporated into local systems. This 
diffusion itself may or may not be deliberate, but the ethical deliberations they contain will still 
be similar processes.  
Kitcher’s solution to the impossibility of one-hundred-percent participation is to 
understand the dynamic nature and different layers of community. A community is not to be 
thought of as an innermost circle in a series of concentric circles, expanding outward, so much as 
a hodgepodge of overlapping communities marked by relationships and associations of our daily 
lives, and within each community is a different, or dominant, code of ethics that governs them. 
All of these communities make up the ‘world community’ for each person, and it is unlikely that 
any two are ever identical. This denies “that all ethics is local,” but instead indicates that 
“[w]herever there is a failure to respond to the desires of another person, with respect to whom 
there is the potential for interaction, we have a contemporary analog of the problem that 
underlies the original function of ethics.”165 Thus a ‘world community’ of ethical actors and 
thinkers exists through multiple layers of interactions and deliberations. I hold this conception to 
be similar to and compatible with the fundamental nature of shared humanity as conceived by 
cosmopolitanism, and both conceptions stand as consequents of the human conditions of natality, 
plurality, and action that will be discussed in the following chapters.  
There is a temptation to evaluate ethical progress, its existence, and efficacy by 
suggesting we have failed miserably as evidenced by the altruism failures that occur with more 
frequency than one can identify, or instead to hold up some idea of an ethical system and 
evaluate ethical progress by it. In the latter case one commits an immediate error upon assuming 
there is an ideal system to which the idea of ethical progress can be compared. In the former, one 
                                                
165 Kitcher, The Ethical Project, 304. 
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assumes we have failed or that we should have eliminated them all by now. Why are there still 
such altruism failures? Why have we not eliminated them if we, as humans, have been at it so 
long? One of the reasons for repeated altruism failures and thus the failure to reduce all social 
tensions in societies is that there has not been the kind of democratic, inclusive deliberation 
Kitcher seeks. Instead, a priori conceptions of the good (such as those derived from religious or 
cultural authority), or conceptions that are socially reifying and thus designed primarily for the 
benefit of the hegemonic powers or socio-political elite, are perpetuated, resolving nothing. Thus 
‘in’ and ‘out’ groups are delineated by boundaries conceived to be impermeable without 
capitulation, resulting in the creation of unbridgeable gaps over which communication becomes 
impossible.  
At any moment throughout human history, existing ways of addressing altruism failures 
have never been completely adequate for addressing the social tensions that arise from new 
conditions presented by increased contact with those from different cultures and ethical systems. 
Dewey can be helpful here. Events that entail the interaction between people and their 
environments constitute ‘experience.’ These experiences often present problems, such as 
altruism failures, and our attempts at resolution constitute inquiry. These are the moral problems 
of our lives, and they constitute the inquiry that forms the process of ethical deliberations. Moral 
inquiry springs from real-world experiences that present themselves as problems to us (i.e. 
contemporary struggles with increased inter-cultural and inter-ethical contact). We encounter 
such problems every day when we puzzle about the reasons why someone cut in front of us in 
the line or stole our parking space or, more existentially, why in some societies there is so much 
suffering amidst so much capacity to alleviate it, transforming these ethical questions into 
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political ones as well. The “unsolved problem [is] the stimulus for thought.”166 Remove the 
problem through tradition or dogma and there is no reason to reason further.  
And so we continue to challenge and amend our ethical practices. Critique lies at the very 
foundations of competing traditions or conceptions of the good. Those that are not simply 
received or delivered dogmatically automatically require a critical eye (assuming they are not 
identical to the traditions already practiced). Hanan Alexander points out that dogmatic traditions 
(in ethics) undermine their own attempts at making “ethical discussions or debates…meaningful 
altogether—that within reasonable limits people are the agents of their own beliefs, behaviors, 
and desires.”167 It is not possible for someone who is the agent of his own actions to be infallible, 
so it is possible that he is wrong. If he was not capable of incorrect actions he could not very well 
be held responsible for them.  
Ethical traditions that provide genuine standards of assessment 
must therefore be dynamic not dogmatic, embracing ideas that 
represent the best available formulation of the good, at least as we 
are given to understand it for now, but assuming that there could 
always be a better way or a more compelling perspective.168 
 
For Alexander, knowledge (and our beliefs about ethics an morals) is rendered temporal, 
contextual, linguistic, cultural, historical, and imperfect, but does consist of something that exists 
independently and outside of a person’s experience. As a result, ethical ideals would need to lie, 
at least partly if not wholly, beyond our own experience and be embedded in culture, history, and 
traditions, placing our knowledge and our viewpoint, not to mention the discussions, 
deliberations, and adjustments of them, in the public sphere where they are discussed and 
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During the current period of increasing regional and global contact, people and societies 
are confronted daily with numerous situations and experiences that must be sorted out. However 
modified the experience vis-à-vis one’s traveling or one being ‘traveled to,’169 the intellectual or 
imaginative trip, the cosmopolitan experience, results in the same need; to find a way to make 
sense of the new experience and situate it in one’s condition, locale, and ethical understanding. 
This dynamic has caused people to require a reframing of their world into a new conceptual 
framework, and issues a challenge to moral educators to prepare students for such a dynamic, 
ongoing reframing. Kitcher’s ethical deliberations outline a democratically inclusive, 
communicatively active discourse community through its many particular perspectives and 
acceptance of the open-ended search for the non-predetermined good as well as the recognition 
of the irresoluble tensions that result. I will take a closer look at these processes in the chapter 
that follows, as well as examine one of the more entrenched challenges to such an inquiry; that of 
belief based on received tradition or that which does not admit reasons beyond the belief itself. 
Conclusion 
Building upon the four correlates of cosmopolitanism described in §2.2, and the 
importance of the moral educational process discussed in §3.1, cosmopolitan moral education 
begins to take shape. Recognizing that one lives in the world along with other people forestalls 
purely self-interested morals pursuit. One will respect others and their ways of living, and 
possess tolerance for ways with which one disagrees. One will not exclude those who are 
different based upon that difference. One will apply one’s preferred treatment of oneself to all 
                                                
169 Given the prevalence and availability of emerging technologies, one need never leave the town of one’s 
birth to have access to significantly jarring influences from around the world, or to have such influences ‘visit’ you 
without reaching for them.  
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people of the world, and not just national brethren. Living with, and not only among, others 
brings to the fore the necessity of engaging with them. Since the world contains dynamic systems 
of change, both in environments and people, moral engagement with others reflects that reality, 
and is adaptive and growth-oriented rather than fixed and settled. Maintaining this moral 
engagement requires a commensurate openness and receptivity that emerges as part of this moral 
process. One cannot engage without being open to the engagement and receptive to what the 
experience brings. And finally, the cosmopolitan moral education is never complete. There is 
always another experience to have, another person with whom to inquire or deliberate, another 
moral riddle to be solved. As Kitcher’s analyses show, moral judgments and ethical systems have 
always changed over time, and there is no reason to think they will not continue to do so. Thus 
the cosmopolitan moral inquiry will continue, as well.  
Such a philosophical perspective is destined to be unsettling as one grapples with the 
uncertainty derived. Each stage in this moral inquiry will result in a temporary conclusion, a 
judgment ‘for now’ that can inform one’s actions in morality, and every conclusion in morality is 
contestable, too. The discussions, the contestations, will continue. It is for this reason that morals 
education is inherently incapable of being a moral inquiry, and in fact, is not an inquiry at all. 
Morals, predetermined, are taught as traits to acquire and are presented as static, fixed modes 
embodying morality. Morality is seen as merely acquiring morals, and once one has appeared to 
do so, one’s moral growth is complete. The danger in this approach is that an individual who 
acquires such perceived-as-fixed morals will be incapable of (or at least less proficient in) 
making whatever adjustments are necessary over time. The lack of capability to participate in the 
collaborative inquiry into morality will alienate him from the ‘findings,’ and will more than 
likely serve to dogmatize his convictions in the received tradition of morals and morality into 
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which he was indoctrinated.  
We now arrive at the most difficult position a cosmopolitan must accept: one may not get 
what one wants. Moral/ethical progress, as perceived by the individual, will not always appear to 
be progressive, and at times, simply regressive. By adopting a cosmopolitan disposition to moral 
inquiry, one must recognize that because of a commitment to a process that comports with the 
core principles of cosmopolitanism, it is possible that adherence to these processes may result in 
outcomes that do not match what one intended. Instead, one’s preferred outcomes may not be 
those adopted or accepted by those with whom one lives and with whom one collaborates. What 
then? How can one go from a moral inquiry to lived morality when one does not agree with the 
conclusion of what counts as moral? How can one put oneself in a position to continue engaging 
with other people morally while being constrained by what morality is? What mechanisms or 
processes are available? 
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Chapter 4 
Education in Morality and Natality 
 
Now that I have marked out the relevant territory of cosmopolitan education, its core 
tenets, entailments, and situation as a process of inquiry, it remains for me to explain what kind 
of inquiry it will be while retaining the characteristics sketched. This chapter turns to the field of 
moral education in general, and an education in morality in particular. Wide-ranging debates in 
the field of moral education focus on such themes as which morals or morality system to teach, 
teaching morals v. teaching about morals, how to teach morals morally (i.e. education v. 
indoctrination), the cognitive limits of moral education, the physio-neurological limits (if any) of 
moral reasoning, how to measure moral reasoning, the use of role-models or exemplars, and the 
most appropriate pedagogies to use depending upon one’s answer to these debates. But what is it 
exactly that we are talking about when we talk about or endeavor to implement ‘moral 
education?’ A small portion of the literature in the field of moral education does identify a dearth 
of scholarship in this area, and more precisely, on what John Wilson called “the first steps” in 
moral education.170 These steps consist largely in undertaking a conceptual analysis of morality 
so that it can become fundamentally clear what it is that educators in the field of moral education 
are talking about when they talk about morality; before we can inquire into the nature of 
morality, we must have an idea of what morality is. It is only then, once we have an idea of what 
morality is, that we can talk about how to conduct education in morality. This chapter will focus 
on these steps, but it will first be necessary to make a finer point about what morals education is 
and why it is not sufficient for the purposes of education in morality. Then I will investigate what 
                                                
170 See John Wilson, “First Steps in Moral Education,” Journal of Moral Education 25, no.1 (1996). 
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Wilson’s “first steps” might be in order to better understand what the necessary conceptual 
components of morality education are. I will then follow with an examination of Hannah 
Arendt’s conception of natality in education and why it is necessary for an education in morality, 
at which point the challenge for cosmopolitan education can be more clearly set. 
4.1 Morals Education 
The field of moral education is large and shifting. From the outset, distinctions must be 
made between the practices of morals education; the empirical study of morals education and 
development; and the theoretical analyses of morality, moral development, and the aims of such 
an education.171 This project is more concerned with the last of these three, though the first two 
will be present throughout. To get a sense of the research trends in the field of moral education, I 
performed a content analysis of article titles and abstracts from the Journal of Moral Education, 
the main English-language scholarly publication for moral education. This research found that 
from 1970 to 2010, articles about Kohlberg, psychology, and cognitive developmental moral 
psychology outnumbered articles about Aristotle, Kant, Dewey, philosophy, and virtue ethics or 
character education by a ratio of almost 2:1 (1.7:1, n263:n153).172 The research in the field of 
moral education is clearly dominated by psychology and empirical research and Kohlberg is the 
dominant figure and may “be regarded as the most significant influence on moral education of 
the post-war period.”173 
                                                
171 Matthew Sanger and Richard Osguthorpe, “Making Sense of Moral Approaches to Education,” Journal 
of Moral Education 34, no.1 (March 2005): 58. 
172 Kohlberg, psychology, and cognitive developmental moral psychology are most associated with moral 
psychology, while Aristotle, Kant, Dewey, philosophy, and virtue ethics or character education are more likely to be 
associated with moral philosophy, and their methods and data reflect these disciplinary origins. See Appendix A, 
Table 2. 
173 David Carr, “Moral Education and the Perils of Developmentalism,” Journal of Moral Education 31, no. 
1 (March 2002): 14. 
 90 
Research about moral reasoning has also been dominant and it has an equal emphasis in 
both moral psychology and moral philosophy. However, within the competing pedagogical 
traditions in moral education cognitive developmentalism, a psychological concept derived 
primarily from the work of Kohlberg, continues to maintain the strongest role while 
philosophical-based concepts such as character education, virtue ethics, and citizenship 
education have seen slight, recent increases in research.174 Citizenship education has eclipsed 
cognitive development in the last decade, has been seen as an emerging avenue for moral 
education, and also indicates a link between morality and politics in the field of moral education. 
The concept values, like moral reasoning, sees significant crossover between psychology and 
philosophy while the concept cognitive, which has been hitherto dominant in the field, has only 
recently been passed by character and citizenship175 in usage in moral education articles. 
What these iterations of the data show is that the field of moral education has been 
dominated by psychology, empirical research, and the psychologized pedagogies thusly derived. 
Emler warned that “the dominance of Kohlbergian [and psychology] theory in moral education 
research risks confusing evidence that interventions have worked as intended with the conclusion 
that they have effects on relevant outcomes” and that there is still no “clear causal link from 
moral reasoning to conduct”176 in morals education. Despite the presence of decades of morals 
education through such popular and influential approaches as ‘character education,’ ‘values 
clarification,’ Kohlberg’s cognitive developmentism, and ‘ethics of care,’ there does not seem to 
                                                
174 See Appendix A, Table 2. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Nicholas Emler, “How Can We Decide Whether Moral Education Works?” Journal of Moral Education 
25, no. 1 (1996): 125. 
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be any ‘performance based’ difference among them.177 Thus the field is left in a tug-of-war 
between moral education systems, with constantly shifting emphases, but no over-arching or 
syncretic goal.   
As with other educational aims, many in morals education find it critical to determine the 
validity and reliability of evaluations of morals education programs, and much progress has been 
made in evaluation of the most popular forms of morals education (i.e. programs from 
Kohlberg’s developmental theories) mostly because these models lend themselves most easily to 
assessment.178 However, this does not solve the problem of deciding how to measure success in 
morals education. An assessment may tell us if a particular trait has been exhibited by a student, 
or a form of thought has been internalized by the student such that the student can identify it as a 
form of reasoning that could be used to confront a particular moral problem, but the assessment 
cannot tell us whether that trait is desirable or not, nor whether the student’s actions will be 
influenced by this knowledge. Further, even if we are satisfied with the desirability of the trait, 
we have no way of knowing whether the student sees its exhibition as moral or instead as merely 
an answer to a question put to him. What matters is whether or not these types of morals 
education are actually morally instructive and not merely capable of measured description. 
Complicating the morals evaluation picture further, there is a significant difference between the 
results of quantitative assessments of moral judgment in pre-service teaching candidates and 
                                                
177 The field of moral education has produced a plethora of research on these approaches. For general 
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qualitative evaluations of the moral judgment of these same candidates, which reveals the 
difficulty in accurately assessing dispositions and calls into question the use of either quantitative 
or qualitative assessments of moral judgment as the basis for determining the efficacy of a 
morals education program, as well as the efficacy of assessing moral judgment at all.179 It is one 
thing to attempt to discover or reveal moral traits or judgment empirically, quite another to 
determine what is moral through these same methods. Such work temptingly invites one to 
confuse the determination of what is with the determination of what ought to be. 
Most work in morals education carries on in opposition to the claim that in the field of 
moral education there are no definitive answers.180 Much morals education involves quite clearly 
stated answers to questions in morality though it is not necessary to produce them. Even though 
“empirical questions about laws governing human activity do not have definitive answers,” that 
does not mean that some idea of a “better or worse understanding, a more or less efficacious 
response, cannot still be reached in particular cases. Such understanding is achieved through 
philosophy and the study of the humanities.”181 Empirical research may show us what was or is, 
but can only suggest possibilities for reasons or as predictions of future outcomes.182 It cannot 
provide definitive answers for questions of human behavior and conduct—either before or after 
it happens—but, more importantly, it cannot tell us what morals are actually moral. Even 
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Kohlberg himself avers such: “Science, then, can test whether a philosopher’s conception of 
morality phenomenologically fits the psychological facts. Science cannot go on to justify that 
conception of morality as what morality ought to be.”183 Such ambiguity prompts the question 
whether it is better to not talk about morality in schools at all.  
Graham Haydon refers to Williams’ assertion that we would be better off without the 
“peculiar institution”184 (of morality systems) and opposes Wilson’s claim that moral education 
is an indispensable necessity in education.185 Haydon argues that morality in education should 
only be pursued by taking the social conception of morality in a narrow sense. That is to say that 
morality as a social institution, as a public morality of action, “can be publicly acknowledged 
and shared, and thus can have in the public realm a life of its own apart form underlying “states 
of the soul” which may or may not be shared.”186 Society has an interest in taking morality 
seriously and as an attempt to live by publicly agreed upon norms of actions. In cosmopolitan 
education it would not be enough that the norms are there to be followed, but that the individuals 
are disposed to enacting them. Acting is the key. Such a position echoes Williams’ claim that 
ethical values lie in dispositions, and “the replication of ethical life lies in the replication of 
dispositions.”187 The connection between moral education, cosmopolitan education, and the 
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development of dispositions takes place, or ‘replicates,’ in education in morality.188 
Additional problems for morals education arise as a result of the diversity of moral life in 
families, which requires a very careful balance between honoring family rights to their own 
morals education and “the right of schools to teach the “shared” values of the broader 
society…and the right of children to develop into autonomous moral agents.”189 This forces open 
the question of which morals to teach, which recognizes the complexity of morality rather than 
blindly establishing a simplified version. Typical approaches in morals education tend to 
oversimplify by using binary analytic schemes to what are complicated and complex issues. 
Sanger and Osguthorpe argue for “the development of theoretical tools for understanding” the 
field of moral education “by more systematically, comprehensively and explicitly identifying the 
variety of assumptions” made by most approaches to morals education.190 Critically 
understanding any approach to morals education requires understanding its constitutive parts and 
that which determines them. This requires a critical analysis of the assumptions behind our 
choices of morals education methods and the morality systems they represent.  
The problem with morals education might simply be that it cannot achieve its goal while 
embedded in education; it might just be that morals education is not good enough because 
education is not moral enough.191 The claim is based on the idea that morals education should 
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not aim to form individuals in the manner and desires of a particular church, state, or system, but 
rather to create moral individuals. Nonetheless, one must still have an idea of what a moral 
individual looks like or what traits and dispositions she possesses, and what behaviors are 
expected. Doing so requires a “compassionate balancing of the perspectives of all participating 
parties…each party being responsible for the good of each other party”192 which contains 
elements of universalism, diversity, agonism, and dialogue found in the themes in cosmopolitan 
education.  
The balancing act required connects cosmopolitan education and morality education with 
Mesa’s exploration of what he calls the Creative Tensions Account (CTA) which provokes a 
creative resolution of the core tensions between the individual and the community, what he terms 
“the modern predicament.”193 Mesa’s CTA is designed to inhabit the space of conflict between 
the individual and community, but not to see this space as static. It is a dynamic tension wherein 
significant movement, contextually based, is not only allowed, but also seemingly required. The 
primacy of contextualization is similar to Thomas Bender’s account of the historical struggle 
between the individual and the community, but one that has gone on for centuries while always 
managing a temporal solution. At one point Bender conjectures “how will people manage to live, 
simultaneously, in radically different social worlds: one communal, and the others associational, 
or perhaps even entirely abstract[?]”194 My approach to education in morality will not be 
restricted to only this “modern predicament,” but there is affinity with Mesa’s approach to 
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difference, agonism, and disposition formation encountered in both education in morality and 
cosmopolitan education. If an understanding of cosmopolitan education is to occur, and if my 
assertion that cosmopolitan education is education in morality is correct, then what is morality 
education? One is still left to begin where Wilson indicated: what are the first steps in morality?  
4.2 Education in Morality 
The first step Wilson suggests is that we understand moral education as education in 
morality. This rather simple formulation is extremely important. If Wilson had said “education in 
morals” then there would be nothing left to do but to pick the system or morals one prefers and 
then to indoctrinate the student. That is not to say that we begin from nothing; there is a ‘starting 
place.’ I recognize that we are socialized into forms of life from the time we are born. However, 
the ‘starting place’ must be only that and subject to critique and revision. Schooling can do 
both.195 Morals are specific, discrete traits of behavior, action, or ways of thinking that one can 
acquire through certain specified processes. Morality, as distinct from ‘morals,’ is similar to 
other subjects we might teach in that it represents a form of life. For example, in science one 
educates, or initiates, students into using the ‘scientific method,’ which in turn teaches students 
how to think about scientific problems. One does not have ‘morality’ any more than one might 
have ‘science.’ Instead one might have acquired the appropriate tools and skills to conduct a 
moral inquiry much as one might be able to conduct a scientific experiment using the appropriate 
skills and methods as practiced by the scientific community. As Wilson states, “we do not (a) 
simply hand them ‘right answers’ on a plate, nor (b) suggest that there are no such things as right 
answers—that it is all ‘relative’ or ‘a matter of taste.” 196 In administering education in morality 
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one provides students with the means to conduct their inquiry with the best available tools, tools 
that help them participate in morality by inquiring into it and what morals there might be.  
This ‘equipping,’ of course, contrasts sharply with morals education, in which one starts 
from a point of ‘right answers’ and then sets about getting the students to ‘learn’ or adopt them. 
An education based upon receiving and adopting pre-determined morals within a closed and 
bounded system of morality does not actually educate one in morality and only equips those 
instructed with the skill to adopt a morality system that is provided for them. In fact it is this 
characterization of morals and transmission of morality that has been criticized by both 
Nietzsche and Arendt, the latter of whom found that such an approach reduces morals to simply 
‘values’ that are “as easily interchanged as money.”197 
 Wilson sees great value in scrutinizing the crucial terms in this field. For Wilson, ‘moral’ 
is a descriptive term that classifies an action as either ‘moral’ or ‘not moral,’ and has different 
criteria for use. He identifies two general types: one ‘sociological,’ and the other ‘logical.’ The 
‘sociological’ sense of ‘moral’ describes what various groups determine to be ‘moral’ or ‘not 
moral’; right or wrong. These are primarily concerned with mores and such use provokes 
judgments such as ‘that is wrong to do’ or ‘that is a moral action.’ However, the invocation of 
‘moral’ sentiment or judgment may only be applicable in one social group and not in another. 
‘Moral’ in this context refers to a custom or norm that is bounded and defined differently by 
different groups. It is this form of ‘moral’ that often provokes an authoritarian ‘we are right and 
everyone else is wrong’ stance about morals, or a less certain, but certainly more confusing, ‘all 
things moral are relative to one’s specific group’ attitude. Additionally, this use of ‘moral’ fits 
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with the conception of empirical morality as described in Chapter 3.  
In the ‘logical’ form one speaks of the different uses of ‘moral’ or the different actions 
that make up the content of what is considered moral. There is a concept in which something is 
judged to be ‘moral’ or not, and then there is a concept in which one thinks about all of the 
various kinds of moral systems and moral judgments that are made from one group to another as 
well as what it might be that the word ‘moral’ signifies. “The chief difficulty…is the assumption 
that ‘morality’ must have a particular content.”198 This ‘logical’ form is not interested in the 
content of the moral judgment or code of mores, but of what all of this activity consists. It 
“mark[s] out a particular kind of human thought and action,” and is logical and conceptual rather 
than particularly specific about what is moral or not.199 It is this second, ‘logical,’ sense of moral 
that constitutes thinking about or inquiry into morality, and informs what ‘morality’ means for 
this project. Additionally, it is this kind of ‘moral’ that best combines with the conception of 
methodological morality as described in the previous chapter. 
Dewey has a similar, though not identical, dichotomous construction that might be 
helpful. For Dewey, there is a distinction between teaching “moral ideas” and “ideas about 
morality.” The former was primarily the result of direct instruction with the intention to bring 
about specific actions, and is similar to Wilson’s conception of received or traditional morals 
education. The latter involves the discussion of ideas about morality that were indifferent or non-
moral and were not intended to bring about moral actions, but rather an understanding of what 
morality is. Teaching ‘moral ideas’ and primarily through direct instruction “even at its very 
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best, is comparatively small in amount and slight in influence.”200 For both Wilson and Dewey 
the specific moral details are not important, nor useful or effective. Instead the emphasis is on the 
understanding that one has about morality and its connections to both one’s thoughts and actions 
in social life. The content of an education in morality is one’s life experiences, not specific 
morals. 
Conceived thus, ‘morality’ is not the same as ‘virtue’ or ‘moral.’ The question ‘What is 
morality?’ is a very different question than ‘What is virtuous?’ or ‘What is moral?’ Socrates may 
have searched in vain for a satisfactory answer to his question about virtue, but our question 
about morality is easier. For instance, asking the questions ‘What is science?’ or ‘What is literary 
criticism?’ is very much like our question ‘What is morality’ and differ only in subject. Science 
is identified by specific methodologies, tools, and domain of inquiry, as is literary criticism. 
Education in morality can be identified similarly, but it takes some effort. We must shed from 
morality the detritus of doctrine and dogma it has acquired and strip it down to its most essential 
components: its specific mode and domain of inquiry. 
In thinking of morality as one might about science, the content-free conception commits 
one to neither absolute authoritarian dogmatism nor wide open relativism. In science, there may 
be currently accepted ‘facts,’ but due largely to the derivation of them from the tools and 
methodologies appropriate to scientific inquiry. To work on a scientific problem is to use the 
tools and methodologies developed, but also “to acknolwedge the possibility of error, to be eager 
to scrutinize the evidence, [and] engage in critical discussion.”201 These conclusions are not 
delivered as the immutably correct answers, but rather as ‘provisional.’ Both of the morality-as-
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content options focus on the ‘right answers,’ the one professing to have them and the other 
denying that there can be any. Both miss the important work of what morality education is. As 
Wilson states, the respecability of science and other fields “is not that we can feel incorrigibly 
certain of particular answers—on the contrary, we cannot— but that we can feel resonably 
certain of the procedures.”202 The conceptual confusion about morality in the field of moral 
education, a confusion that is often elided, is the result of our not having made clear what these 
concepts and procedures are. “Until we are clear about these criteria, we cannot start educating at 
all…[these] first steps are philosophical.”203  
 In an explicit response to his own analysis, Wilson has developed a list of “moral 
components” that a teacher could use in an eduation in morality. Originally consisting of five 
general areas, these components have grown to four general areas with a total of seventeen 
components, due to the subdivision of some of the original ideas. These four general components 
are: PHIL–the degree to which one can identify with other people; EMP–insight into one’s own 
and other people’s feelings; GIG–the mastery of factual knowledge; KRAT–the ability to 
translate these principles into action.204 Two of his original components—DIK and PHRON 
which refer to the rational formulation of a set of rules or moral principles to which one commits 
oneself, relating to other people’s and one’s own interests—have been removed from the general 
categories and are now subsumed within these four. For example, “the degree to which one can 
identify with other people” is a general description of the PHIL category, but the specific 
capacity of “having the concept of a ‘person’” is identified as PHIL(HC), which is different from 
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“claiming to use this concept in an overriding, prescriptive, and universalized (O, P and U) 
principle,” identified by Wilson as PHIL(RSF)(DO and PO).205  
Wilson’s components have had a tepid reception from researchers, most likely because it 
may not always be obvious what the components are supposed to identify, be it moral behavior 
or moral decision-making, among others reasons.206 Wilson’s components do, however, give 
name and form to areas of specific inquiry, something that should not be out of line for a domain 
of inquiry as conceived by Wilson. For example, what does it mean for moral relations for an 
individual to have developed an ability to understand what another person thinks or feels? This is 
a question one can attempt to answer—which can be done without saying that one must develop 
such a skill—that might shed light on what morality is. This view of morality is the result of our 
social realities and conditions, and one of those realities is that there appears to be something 
valuable to human flourishing when we understand what another person thinks or feels. Getting 
to the heart of why that might be is the goal of an education in morality.  
Though I introduce these components here, I do so only to provide an illustration of one 
possible conception of specific procedural components that could be utilized in education in 
morality. These components could be included in a cosmopolitan morality education, but I do not 
claim that they ought to be included. It is not my present purpose to prescribe what exactly a 
‘moral component’ is; at most one might offer possibilities as Wilson does, and further, the 
inquiry into them and their efficacy would itself be an important way to participate in morality. 
However, saying ‘these are the components’ puts me directly in the path of my own critique of 
morals education. It is enough for me that these components are not at odds with the essence of 
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the processes described in the previous chapter and to be described in the chapters that follow, 
and thus serve as examples both of what I accept about Wilson’s understanding of education in 
morality as well as possible concrete steps toward pedagogical content. Further, Wilson’s 
emphasis on reason (i.e. the capacity for rational, logical thought) is not to be mistaken with my 
emphasis on reasons, which are merely the products of the ability to provide publicly justifiable 
and defensible evidence and arguments. 
That there has been significant resistance to this step which Wilson suggests independent 
of his answer to it through his moral components might be due to either the authoritarian desire 
to indoctrinate or ‘sell’ a particular moral content or the relativistic aversion to any prescription 
or answer to moral questions.207 Most of these arguments are, Wilson claims, rooted in 
psychological issues of comfort, fear, and familiarity that manifest themselves in a reflexive 
‘need’ for an ‘authority’ upon which moral claims can then be founded. Wilson has consistently 
reminded the field of moral education of:  
…the importance for research and teaching in moral education to 
be conducted in the light of, and governed by, a clear account of 
“the moral” and of the morally educated person, the need to 
introduce students to the “form” of morality rather than to any 
particular substantive content, and the vital importance of securing 
a coherent overall approach to the area.208 
 
To educate requires a “change in the direction of reason,…in which the main weight is placed 
upon the basic criteria of reason and not on any specific content.”209 Ultimately, what we decide 
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we ought to do comes down to the “key feature of moral thinking—that is, what counts as a good 
reason. We can teach this to our pupils.”210 Going back to science, students are not initiated into 
accepting as fixed the conclusions derived from Newtonian physics, but rather that in Newtonian 
physics there are certain foundational theories, formulas, and expectations of how to go about 
‘proving’ (justifying) the conclusions of their experiments and measurements; in particle physics 
there are others. But in both the basic tools of inquiry are the same.211 Other reservations toward 
Wilson’s conception might be due to the perception that it is too scientific, too based in logic and 
rationality. Such criticism is valid, to a point, and that point is the place at which rational moral 
thought becomes one mode among many in discerning morality and the obligations it contains, 
which is what a broader, more inclusive education in morality such as would be found in 
cosmopolitan education.  
Wilson is not alone in questioning the ‘morality’ of morals education, and in particular its 
pre-determination of morals. David Carr criticizes developmental models of morals education or 
moral formation, alleging that such models that trace or follow moral growth across stages of 
cognitive, conative and/or affective growth, are inherently normative, and therefore evaluative 
rather than descriptive.212 Nonetheless, he also believes that there is no reason for these moral 
norms to be empirically based since they merely state how one ought to act as opposed to how 
one does act. Further, these developmental models persist despite the lack of mutual consistency 
from one model to the other, thus the efficacy of these models remains unclear.213 Simply put, to 
                                                
210 Ibid. 
211 This is not to suggest that the sciences do not have their dogmatic adherents, but rather that the methods 
and tools used in science are that which form the activities of science education and forms of life for scientists.  
212 Such as those found in Rousseau, Piaget, and Kohlberg. See Carr, “Perils of Developmentalism.” 
213 Carr, “Perils of Developmentalism,” 5. 
 104 
say that we ought (prescriptive) to do something does not require proof that people actually do 
that something. However, to say what we actually do (descriptive) does require empirical proof. 
Herein lies the quandary for morals education based on psychology and developmental models; 
they are rooted in empirical inquiry, and can therefore make no prescriptions except those that 
have predetermined ends. 
Straughan notes that despite the volume and insightfulness of Wilson’s work that 
questions the foundations of the field of moral education, his work not been as influential as one 
might expect.214 First, because Wilson was more interested in what morality ‘means,’ he refused 
to approach his questions from within existing theories and methodologies, and thus his work has 
been isolated outside the prevailing debates that have taken place between and among theoretical 
perspectives and morality systems. Secondly, as suggested by Straughan, Wilson’s ‘list’ of moral 
components might be either too complex or not prescriptive enough for teachers.215 On the one 
hand teachers complain that they do not have the time to develop curriculum from Wilson’s 
work, and on the other hand teachers are becoming accustomed to being told what to teach, and 
Wilson resists the temptation to do so, though his components are a step in that direction. 
Additionally, many teachers simply may not possess the professional (teaching) knowledge 
about moral education even thought they might be sufficiently interested and motivated to teach 
it. These observations are important cautions for this project, especially given the extra-systems 
approach that will be offered and the lack of prescription to be issued. 
To move beyond these “first steps” requires that we continue to be clear about what 
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morality is and what we are doing in our attempts to find out. Since we, as humans, possess 
“certain concepts, certain interests, and therefore certain roughly demarcated fields of enquiry 
which necessitate certain rules of procedure,”216 and we have successfully done this in other 
fields, we should be able to do this in morality, and particularly in education in morality. We 
need not have all the right answers, but we do need to think that we can find them. Any hope for 
progress in morality education relies on our ability to be clear about morality and sort out what 
our concepts mean and, for Wilson, what our criteria are for assessing the basics of human action 
in morality. Education in morality becomes progressive because it is educative, and it builds 
upon what we know in order to learn more. To do this, we need to know what it is that counts as 
morality in action. That is not to say only the manifest content of moral actions, but rather what it 
is that humans do, the processes in which they participate, when they participate in actions that 
are constitutive of morality.  
Education itself, then, not ideology and neither authoritative nor relativistic desires, forms 
the basis of education in morality; not pre-existing morals or those received from some blindly 
accepted ‘authority.’ Education involves the pursuit of learning about the world as truthfully and 
honestly as possible with what skill, resources, and expertise one can bring to bear, and 
education in morality requires the application of the same to an inquiry in morality. In deciding 
the approach to education in morality, one asks “‘What rules will best help our pupils to learn 
more?’ not ‘What rules best instantiate or promote our particular ideological (moral, religious, 
political) values?’” 217 The goal in education in morality must be similar to the general goal of 
education: to provide students skills and tools that initiate them into a form of life that is 
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educative and one that allows them to grow, adapt, and learn more—in the various and intended 
fields of inquiry—over time. Wilson’s aims, however, necessarily lead us to ask, what 
procedures will best help our pupils to participate more in the practice and emergence of 
morality? 
Education in morality must involve the transmission of a way of life that equips students 
with the tools to make reasoned, thoughtful judgments. It must equip them with the skills to 
reflect upon their actions even when such actions were not the result of reasoned and thoughtful 
judgments. It must be an education in a form of life that entails procedures and activities that 
allow one to make distinctions and determinations about those things which are included in its 
domain. Neuroscientists do not do work on plant fibers, and for good and obvious reasons; such 
activity lies outside of their expertise as well as their professional and practical domain. The 
domain of morality consists of the ways that human beings regard and treat one another, which is 
another way of saying how we live with each other. The social realities of human life and the 
inherent sociability of morality require that neither the inquiry nor the judgments that result take 
place completely and soley in some kind of individualized vacuum; it must take place ‘in the 
world.’ This is an admittedly large domain, but its size does not make us less responsible for the 
task. Nor can such an education take place without some kind of knowledge about what kind of 
judgments have been made or are currently in a place of guidance. Education in morality requires 
that we not be immutably restricted to the dictates or beliefs of any religious, moral, or poitical 
ideology, “but by the notion of education itself.”218 And therein lies the key point of separation 
of education in morality from morals education. It cannot be education worthy of the name if it is 
designed to restrict or inhibit the growth or limit the possibilities of the student. Pre-determined, 
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fixed morals presented for compulsory adoption cannot be genuinely educational, nor can a mere 
survey of differently held notions of morality and morals. Without inquiry, without the use, 
practice, and implmentation of the tools of inquiry into the the foundations of what morality is 
and means, no student can ‘learn’ or be educated in morality. 
However, all of this presupposes a belief in or desire for the ‘new’ or to admit the 
permissible possibility of it. To promote an inquiry that is an education in morality means that 
there is more to morality than we currently know or understand. This not to say that there is 
some final morality that is yet to be discovered, but rather that humanity has not yet finished with 
morality. As long as there is genuine inquiry and conceptual clarification, there exists the 
possibility for morality to be more than it currently is. In Chapter 3 I gave an example of ethical 
progress that is quasi-evolutionary; it grows, it regresses, and is in constant flux. Each generation 
or set of ‘deliberators’ has at their disposal the opportunity to reflect and revise the ethical codes 
they have inherited, and seemingly without fail, they do just that. Certainly there are pieces that 
seem to never go away (i.e. judgments about murder), and yet the ceaseless revision suggests an 
ethical rebirth and compulsion for the exploration of possibilities that underpin both education 
and morality in a way that binds them together through an almost identical philosophical 
understanding and urge. 
4.3 Education in Natality 
For many people who are committed to the field of moral education their general goal is 
to teach young persons how to treat others morally and how to be moral persons in the world. 
One of the appeals of traditional morals education in which students are compelled to accept and 
adopt predetermined morals is the perceived increased probability that such morals, and their 
attendant behaviors, will be adopted and manifested by students thusly taught. Traditional morals 
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education provides a certain level of comfort and less unease with the future. There is a belief 
that telling students what, specifically, the morally correct thing to do in all given situations will 
at least point them in the appropriate direction and make it more likely that they will do so, and 
thus provide comfort or the illusion of certainty about possible preferred outcomes. This is 
precisely one of the problems to which Wilson alludes in his critique of traditional received 
morals indoctrination, but I find that it speaks to the broader compulsion, or perhaps ‘neurosis’ 
as Wilson might call it, to attempt to eliminate uncertainty and struggle against the breakdown of 
comforting and familiar norms and ways of living. Closed, fixed systems that dictate what is 
‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’ provide an illusion of stability and predictability in a world that is 
wildly uncertain and constantly changing.  
To come to grips with this problem and its relationship to an education in morality, 
Arendt’s notion of natality in education is useful. Arendt’s approach to natality, as well as other 
fundamental conditions of human life such as plurality, labor, work, and action, is highly abstract 
and comes from her belief in the fundamental equality of all humans.219 Natality, in direct 
contrast to mortality, is the condition which grounds our ability to insert ourselves in and become 
part of the world.220 Arendt’s conception of the ‘world’ underwent a transformation after she 
wrote The Human Condition, in which she conceived of the world primarily as the space of 
politics. As she stated in an interview in 1964 with Günther Gaus, “I comprehend it now in a 
much larger sense, as the space in which things become public, as the space in which one lives 
and which must look presentable.” I see this public space as commensurate with the one in which 
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moral speech actions are disclosed. We are all born into the world; an involuntary act on our 
part, and for most of the early parts of our lives our natality is dormant or unexercised. Once in 
the world, in this space in which things become public, Arendt says that at some point we have a 
“second birth” as a result of our saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to something.221 We begin to understand 
that we can act in the world, and our yes/no decision is a form of communication to the world. It 
is, in a sense, our first ‘speech act.’ I will discuss Arendt’s conception of action in more detail in 
Chapter 6, but it is the connection between natality and action that exposes the communicative 
nature of natality and thus its place in politics and morality, as well as an education in morality. 
For Arendt, natality is the very essence of education because of “the fact that human 
beings are born into the world”222 and each person born represents unknown actions and 
possibilities, finite in person but infinite across humanity as actions and possibilities stretch into 
the future. This natality unleashes an incalculable unpredictability in the world, and in human 
action it opens up a range of possibilities that cannot be enumerated, and in morality, outcomes 
that cannot be prefixed. In contrast to attempts to curtail the possibility of education through fear 
of the unknown, Arendt sees education as a fundamental necessity of human society because 
such society constantly “renews itself through birth, through the arrival of new human 
beings.”223  
With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the 
world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that 
the principle of freedom was created when man was created but 
not before. It is in the nature of beginning that something new is 
started which cannot be expected from whatever may have 
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Education is a process in which ‘beginners’ are also ‘beginnings’ and with each unique 
origination of action brings something new into the world.225 Such action as beginning presents 
the potential to express the human condition of natality, and the human condition of plurality, a 
plurality that cannot be eliminated nor constrained, through the bringing forth (or ‘birthing’) of 
the new. It is this condition that education is to preserve, but it cannot do so if we get in our own 
way. 
In “The Crisis of Education” Arendt identifies three “assumptions”226 that prevent 
education from accomplishing this task. The first is the mistaken belief that children ought to be 
allowed to exist in a ‘children’s world,’ free from the authority of adults. This leaves them 
subject to a tyranny of the majority that is far worse than any autocracy of an individual adult: 
the tyranny of other children. Adults are left to merely encourage the child to do as she desires 
whilst preventing serious harm. This relationship is constructed in defiance of the actual 
relationship between child and adult in the world, in which a genuine relationship of adult to 
child, or authority to subject, exists, and instead children are banished from the world of adults 
from which they could otherwise learn. The second assumption is that teachers ought simply to 
be teachers, independent of content. This does not mean there is no content and only methods, 
but rather that the teacher is to become a mere technocrat with little or no expertise in his/her 
subject area. The role of the teacher is to merely guide or instruct, not to know or dispense. 
Essentially the only expertise a teacher would have is in pedagogy or methods. This leads to the 
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third assumption that one can only learn and understand what one has done oneself. This 
assumption is easily derived from the previous; if the teacher is not a master of the subject then 
s/he can clearly pass nothing on to the student, but should instead be guided and driven by the 
student’s interest in play rather than work. 
Arendt asserts that the last assumption’s over-emphasis on child-centered learning and 
the de-emphasis of the adult-teacher’s authority and expertise forces children into a world of 
only children which prohibits children from having contact with the adult world they will inherit 
and thus leave them unprepared for it. This situation is somewhat similar to that of a position of 
relativism in which there is no compass to guide them and they are left to whatever forces assert 
themselves (i.e. tyranny or popular culture). When at home, they are under the authority of their 
parents through the private life of the family, which protects the child from the world (and the 
world from the child). This domestic protection is necessary but cannot alone suffice to 
adequately instruct the child in and about the world since, the child having been removed from 
the world and under the dictates of the parents, this protection lacks the necessary freedom to 
learn and is supplanted instead only by the compulsion to learn from the unquestioned authority 
of the parents. This situation is akin to that of the student who receives a traditional education of 
direct, received moral instruction. Without ‘world’ contact the child will know nothing of the 
world he will inherit, and therefore have no understanding or capacity to engage it 
intelligently.227 Arendt feels that teachers are responsible for the continuance of the child and the 
continuance of the world. They must occupy both of these worlds at once and serve as the bridge 
between them: the one that is and the preparation of the persons for the world that will become. 
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It is at this juncture that Arendt’s conservatism plays a role. 
For Arendt, the whole of education is a conservative venture. Its task is to protect “the 
child against the world, the world against the child, the new against the old, the old against the 
new.”228 Far from being only a backward looking conservatism, the most important part of this 
protection requires the protection of the natality inherent in human life, in beginnings and 
becomings, in the capacity for unique persons to disclose unique selves in an old, existing world 
in which the very action of disclosure changes the world and brings forth something new. Arendt 
makes the distinction between conservation in education and conservation in politics; its action 
in the latter is to only preserve the world as it is, destroying or rebuffing natality. If the world is 
to survive, humans must endeavor to alter or create what is new and not only preserve what is 
old. The conservation that education involves is to preserve natality, the capacity for human 
creativity in forms of life. Education means introducing students to the adult world they will one 
day be in position to alter. It involves protecting them from that world and concurrently 
preventing the students from hiding or burying their creative capacities that will allow them to 
act in it. As teachers who simultaneously live and act in the world, we educate students to be 
beginners and conservators in their own right to reflect their own natality.  
Arendt writes that we “are always educating for a world that is or is becoming out of 
joint, for this is the basic human situation.”229 Everything is temporary, from our governing 
institutions to our own personal understandings and beliefs. Education’s goal is to ensure the 
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conditions under which the world might be ‘set aright’ without guaranteeing that such ‘aright-
ing’ will occur. “It is the task of the educator to mediate between the old and the new,”230 and a 
challenge is to maintain authority in education while moving through a world without structural 
authority nor binding tradition. It is an odd place and no small challenge for the teacher-adult, “to 
prepare them in advance for the task of renewing a common world,”231 a world that will quite 
likely not be lived in by the one who has educated someone else for it.  
4.4 Natality and Morality 
Thusly conceived, the paradigm that pits conservative education against progressive 
education cannot continue to stand. Conservation is required for progression. To possess a 
notion of progress implies the concurrent awareness of something extant and something that is 
not; something that can be improved upon by something else that is not yet. Progress builds on 
what is there, sifting and choosing from the existing world that which can aid the move to make 
what is there ‘better.’ One does not need to know where one is going, or to have a predetermined 
object, in order to determine that one thing can be better than another. Arendt’s conservation 
preserves the conditions under which such progress lies in potentiality, lying in wait for the 
appropriate action upon the existing conditions.  
Despite the logic of this conception of education, as preservative and progressive, it is 
resisted primarily because of the destabilizing nature of natality, and especially so in morality. 
Natality is inherently destructive to stability and predictability. When Arendt’s nascent ‘actor’ 
utters his first ‘no’ he has halted the movement of the previously existing action—or at least its 
movement in his sphere of the world. The ‘no’ is a declaration of an insertion in the world, and 
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the insertion itself is unpredictable, as are the consequences that follow. As genuine speech or 
communicative action, the ‘no’ implicitly contains an alternate vision of what ought to be done 
in opposition to what is or has been previously proposed and carries with it an implicit 
conception, as perceived by the ‘speech actor,’ of something that is ‘better’ or something that can 
improve the current state of affairs.232 Natality brings forth the possibility of progress, and that 
possibility requires the paradoxical protection of conservation. 
But can this be done in the face of what Natasha Levinson calls the “paradox of 
natality”?233 A complicating feature of natality is that each of us is attempting to bring something 
new into the world while others do the same. Each of our ‘beginnings’ bumps up against the 
‘beginnings’ of others so that “our efforts to initiate the new take place always in the midst of 
other acting beings whose very presence mitigates against our actions coming to fruition.”234 
This milieu of natality is constitutive of Arendt’s condition of plurality, though it by no means 
determines the actuality of pluralism. Natality is a precondition of action, but action may or may 
not take place. A person can go through the day without ‘acting,’ and it is in this possibility of 
inaction that the importance of educations emerges. Education must foster and promote the 
conditions of natality, but in doing so it also fosters frustration: the inevitable recognition that 
one’s actions have been mitigated by the actions of others. Arendt identified this frustration as a 
cause of human inaction, of the tendency for humans to relieve themselves of the frustrating 
effects of other actions and actors and the disappointment with the unpredictability of the results 
of action. 
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Here we see how Arendt’s thoughts connect to education in morality and cosmopolitan 
education: the plurality that obtains from the successful efforts of the teacher to preserve, 
promote, and foster the condition of natality is the condition that defines the challenge of natality 
in action, but also demands the facilitating process of morality. By ‘mid-wifing’ natality into 
action the teacher creates conditions of plurality under which students must find their way. 
Doing so puts students into each other’s ‘beginnings’ and forces open questions of morality as 
they attempt to act and re-act to and with each other. Natality is actualized in an explosion of 
action and social activity, all of which is unpredictable and unstable, and is particularly 
dangerous to the status quo. Received morals are thus under threat of assault or even irrelevance, 
but the real danger arises from total resistance to those potential threats: this danger arises “out of 
the desire to find results that would make further thinking unnecessary.”235 Arendt focuses on the 
use of politics to govern the association of people in this chaotic milieu of action, but it also 
contains the emergence of an agonistic morality that gestures toward the political in a demand 
for processes qualified to operate in morality; both our shared sameness in the human condition 
of natality and our differentiating uniqueness in the human condition of plurality combine to 
compel inquiry, analysis, deliberation, and judgment from us in order to ‘get on’ with each other.  
Arendt’s conception of the role of natality and its reconfiguration of education in 
morality stands alongside cosmopolitan education in attempting to maintain a “receptivity to the 
new and loyalty to the known.”236 Both Arendt’s teacher and my cosmopolitan must stand in two 
worlds, one that is in danger of dying and changing and one that is emerging and unknown: one 
that has the illusion and comfort of certainty and one that is unpredictable and unsettling. Such 
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an individual must be conditionally satisfied with the knowledge of what she knows and be eager 
to engage with that which is yet to come. Further, she must be prepared to join others “in 
assuming the effort of persuasion and running the risk of failure” rather than relying upon 
“dictatorial intervention, based on the absolute superiority of the adult, and the attempt to 
produce the new as a fait accompli.”237 The teacher is essentially a midwife, using the ways from 
the old and existing world to facilitate the ‘birth’ of something new and unpredictably 
indeterminate, while also purging the unexamined opinions and assumptions that prevent new 
thoughts, new actions, and new becomings that arrest the inherent natality of education.238 The 
‘new’ here is not only that of unique events or widely influential actions, but may also include 
the “quotidian but nonetheless surprising moments in which individuals initiate relationships and 
thereby attempt to forge new social realities.”239 In maintaining natality and involving oneself in 
the development of and participation in an education in morality, one engages with and meets 
other people at the cusp of constructing new social relations and realities with them. The 
combustible aspects of the competing actions play out socially among the actors and the 
beginners, all of which requires the maintenance of the space to act. Violent reactions to actions 
have a chilling effect on further action and thus the maintenance of this political space compels 
governance. Governance of the political space is a result then of an answer to the question How 
shall we act together? For Arendt, acting is living, and thus the question invokes morality by 
asking How shall we live together? 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have provided terms and distinctions between morals education and 
education in morality. Morals education attempts to educate for specific morals and fixed 
outcomes, while education in morality takes as its content the examination of morality itself. 
Education in morality keeps its focus first, on education as a growing, progressive activity, and 
second, on morality as a form of life (skills, tools, methodologies) with a specific domain, in 
which the education aims to initiate the students. In support of this conception of education in 
morality I examined Arendt’s natality in education, a conception which provides the catalyst for 
growth, discovery, and a tradition-trumping newness, which acts as a stepping-stone to speech 
action, public action, and pluralism to be taken up in Chapter 6, and to the progressivity of the 
mediating processes of the plurality of natality and action. 
In order to properly educate in morality and to show that cosmopolitan education does 
this, we must understand the processes by which this education in morality exists. Humans 
possess a concept of morality primarily because of other humans. “[M]en, not Man, live on the 
earth and inhabit the world”240 and practical requirements of living force us to engage in the 
considerations and deliberations about what their presence means to and demands of us, 
individually and collectively. From the fact of shared humanity and its obligation toward 
democratic inclusion, to Arendt’s acknowledgement of the necessity for “assuming the effort of 
persuasion”241 which might fail, and the “task of renewing a common world,”242 we arrive at a 
critical juncture in the formation of cosmopolitan moral education: getting from ‘here to there’ 
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with other people. How can we actually live (action and preserved natality) together? Arendt’s 
natality both exemplifies our shared humanity and provokes the necessity for morality to make 
possible the mediation of infinite ‘beginnings’ and the preservation of the conditions of natality. 
Education in morality requires the collaboration and participation by oneself with other people, 
which creates complexity, unpredictability, and compounded uncertainty. You are here, and I am 
here, so now what? Our utterances of what should be, how things should go, and what each of us 
should do in relation to each other are moral utterances by the very fact that they are intended to 
govern our (yours and others) behavior and actions. The sociability of these facts forces us into 
considering morality as social, not isolated, beings. But how? How are we to go about this task 
of education in morality with others, preserving the natality of each, while fomenting a 
community of collaborative action? How can we begin to stand on the ground of shared 
humanity, preserve democratic inclusion, and continue to live with each other amidst all of this 




Epistemological Restraint, Discourse Ethics, and Agonistic Pluralism 
 
The previous chapter provided a conception of education that exists as an inquiry in 
morality that preserves the capacity for natality and action present in each unique human person. 
That chapter was preceded by the description of a conception of cosmopolitan education that 
automatically entails a moral component. Taken together, cosmopolitan education stands as an 
education in morality that seeks to prepare students to become participants in an inquiry in 
morality that starts from shared humanity and actively maintains the potential for both 
understanding existing morality and the capacity to develop it further. The conception of 
cosmopolitan education offered suggests that we cannot reasonably deny the fact that we are all 
in the world together and cosmopolitanism understands this fact at its core. As a result, 
cosmopolitan education does not exist as a solution to all of the problems produced or 
encountered as a result of this fundamental sociability, but instead orients us to the fact so that 
we may do something about it. Kwame Anthony Appiah has said that “cosmopolitanism is the 
name not of the solution, but of the challenge”243 that faces us, and I will now turn to the 
challenge of identifying the processes by and through which cosmopolitan education can work. 
This chapter will focus on processes that can maintain the key components of cosmopolitan 
moral education: the recognition of shared humanity and its subsequent entailments of living 
together, dynamic engagement, openness and receptivity, and never-ending processes. These 
processes involve (1) the prioritization of moral inquiry over moral belief and action without 
completely dismissing their potential contributions, (2) the necessity of inclusive and democratic 
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dialogue, and (3) the acceptance and use of the inevitability of pluralism in moral inquiry.  
Each of these processes possesses characteristics that can be found in non-cosmopolitan 
theories or activities that I will use as models for the processes cosmopolitan moral education 
could contain. First, I will mine the concept of epistemological restraint to address the 
prioritization of moral inquiry over moral belief and action. Second, I will show that discourse 
ethics provides support for addressing the necessity of inclusive and democratic dialogue, and 
then I will offer the concept of agonistic pluralism to offset the implications of the inevitability 
of pluralism in an inquiry in morality.  
5.1 Inquiry Over Belief  
In order to conduct a genuine cosmopolitan moral inquiry in which a critical examination 
of both existing and possible understandings of morality is undertaken, one must prioritize 
inquiry over belief. Cosmopolitan moral education is offered as a means to inquire into and about 
morality without indoctrination or the predetermination of morals, and as shown in §3.3 it must 
be oriented to a moral process rather than a particular moral result. Education in general, and 
particularly in schooling, is an ethical endeavor (insofar as a formal education system is a 
manifestation of how a society thinks its newest members should live), is filled with rules about 
how we should treat each other, and therefore embodies activity in morality whether explicit or 
not.244 We need to find a sustainable position for educators that allows for a process that is not 
divorced from the community in which they teach, one that considers the personal values and 
morals of the teacher, the students, and the local community, but still makes room for negotiating 
different values and morals from well beyond the local borders and in particular, for those not 
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yet encountered. It must prepare them for future moral inquiry as the result of as-yet-encountered 
moral problems as well as those in the present. 
The goal of cosmopolitan moral education is not epistemic, though a certain degree of 
epistemology factors into everything we do. It is not about whether or not what we believe to be 
moral actually is moral. Rather, the goal is to construct a process of inquiry in morality to 
determine how we can justify our claims of morality such that they can be entered into an 
inclusive and democratic discussion about morality. What justification might we have for the 
claims of morality we make and how can we make them in a moral inquiry? This concern is 
motivated by the diversity of asserted morals, some of it derived systemically, and some through 
individual experience. Some morals and morality systems conflict with other morals and other 
morality systems and cause paradoxes and confusion, problems we must confront and sort 
through. This project assumes that the truth-value of moral knowledge is impossible to determine 
with absolute certainty society- and worldwide, so we must find agreeable means of justification 
for the morals we assert and the inquiry we undertake. We must find a way in which we can 
approach or enter into moral inquiry that can help us reach some kind of agreement about what is 
counted as permissible justification. Given the process-centric version of cosmopolitanism 
offered, I will not (cannot) appeal to traditional moral educational theories because of either their 
pre-determined morals or their emphasis on the behavioral outcomes produced. However, such a 
constraint cannot be allowed to dismiss out of hand traditions or beliefs that one might choose to 
submit to deliberations. The ‘products’ of those traditions or beliefs may be put forward, but they 
must meet the justificatory standards of a socially mediated and inclusive process. 
What is required of a person who holds a belief about morality, but inhabits a socio-
political environment that may or may not share one’s belief? How are we to be certain that 
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others are not merely parroting received or indoctrinated beliefs or that we are not subjecting 
others to ours? These questions suggest that in order to find justification for both our conclusions 
and our processes, we must be certain that our claim of justification meets some kind of criteria 
for legitimacy, and this claim must achieve some level of impartiality. Therefore, justification 
and impartiality must be found before we can justify the prioritization of inquiry over belief. In 
an example of a similar search for impartiality, in this case, for justice, Rawls erected what he 
called the ‘veil of ignorance’245 to create conditions under which he felt an impartiality about 
justice could be attained, and thus that which followed could be justified. Behind the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ one does not know what characteristics or advantages each person possesses. This 
compels each to think self-interestedly, but in an abstract way that includes an impersonal 
viewpoint while retaining the personal one. We want what is best for ourselves, but since we do 
not know what that would be because we do not know what our situation is, we must assume that 
we might be anywhere on a continuum such that we could be anyone else insofar as she sits at a 
place in the world that could be much worse than we would desire, and so we would choose 
goods, and a distribution of them, that would be equitable.  
However, behind the ‘veil,’ each agent is not allowed to possess knowledge of the good 
and such knowledge is necessary to moral thought and action.246 Rawls aims for justice via 
reasonable justification, but his veil allows for a liberal conception of the good to steer the 
‘deliberations’ toward a conception that is highly individualistic. It reduces the good to that 
which can only be obtained by pursuing one’s self-interest (granting certain conditions)247 and 
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systematically sets up the privileging of liberal conceptions of the good over other conceptions, 
thus negating attempts at impartiality through its own devices. Similar criticisms are leveled by 
feminists who identify the reinforcement of male-dominated theories of morality found in such 
liberal conceptions that may seem impartial, but the very assertion of impartiality in existing 
conditions allows for the maintenance of the status quo.248 Further, applying Rawls’s ‘veil’ to 
morality results in a utilitarian system whereby the good for all is determined by one’s own self-
interest, confined to an extension of a ‘liberal’ morality, and thus erasing an objective or 
impartial morality. Thus, neutrality can be a problem, particularly for liberals because they are so 
concerned about the neutrality of governing institutions in morality. To ‘save’ impartiality 
requires something other than principles; it requires processes that can be agreed upon by all 
even if the substantive determinations cannot. This is where the important moral framework for 
democratic deliberation lies; in the mutual, possibly universal, agreement of all appropriate, 
legitimate, and otherwise capable members that the fundamental value of deliberative democracy 
is in the processes by and through which it functions.  
In order to achieve such a condition we need something else; a mechanism that can 
suspend prior judgments or beliefs that obscure impartiality in order to accommodate inquiry. 
The concept of “epistemological restraint” 249 allows one to hold beliefs that one feels it 
unreasonable to force on others through public policy simply, or solely, based on those beliefs. 
The beliefs that one might have are admissible in deliberations, but in the same way as any other 
reasons; they must be capable of being understood and accepted as reasons, and might be 
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rejected or accepted as such. An individual would not offer his belief as the sole reason for 
enacting public policy or for the construction of moral norms, but rather attempt to offer reasons 
that everyone can understand and participate in. This does not mean that they are accepted, but 
only that they might be accepted as reasons. 
There are two ways to approach epistemological restraint. In the first, one can admit a 
type of skepticism about knowledge of the world. It is possible to hold a position about which 
one has doubts, but also know, having done due diligence on alternatives, that it at least appears 
to be the best option. Similarly, it is also possible to hold a belief about which one may be 
certain, but feel uncertain about one’s fallible capacities, and thus possess a reticence to enforce 
upon others policies based only on that belief.250 In this view, epistemological restraint is guided 
by the idea that there are ideas about which it is impossible to determine the truth, and this 
skepticism should prevent us from forcing others to comply.251 In the second, the desire for 
impartiality is motivated not by an internalized “skepticism about our own views, but rather by a 
desire to justify fundamental political principles to others.”252 Such a process is the result of a 
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desire to enter into “fair terms of cooperation” with others.253 One engages in epistemological 
restraint not because one cannot be certain about the truth of a belief, but rather because adopting 
policies about which reasonable people disagree would be to base one’s project upon something 
about which reasonable people reject:254 skepticism about the ability to know what the good life 
is. Essentially, this second approach avoids skepticism because it folds the skepticism back into 
the project itself. Reasonable people disagree about what the good life is, so that disagreement 
becomes the point of focus and the attempts to resolve it form the content of what is to be 
done.255 As Jonathan Quong notes, it is “permissible to endorse epistemic restraint for sceptical 
reasons – Rawls only needs to show that the reasoning leading to epistemic restraint does not 
require acceptance of skepticism.”256 
For cosmopolitan moral education, it is important to not privilege reasonable non-belief 
over reasonable belief, but to instead admit that both have something to contribute to the 
conversation. In Rawls’s attempts to overcome the skeptical argument (an argument which 
essentially cripples any attempt to construct a decision-making procedure) he appeals to the need 
for some decision making process: some legitimate form of arbitration. “Granting that God’s will 
                                                
253 John Rawls in Quong, “Political Liberalism Without Scepticism,” 336. 
254 This phrasing, “about which reasonable people disagree,” and alternately, “reasonable disagreement,” is 
as posed in Quong in his gloss on Rawls. Thomas McCarthy [in “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: 
Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue,” Ethics 105, no. 1 (1994): 58] writes that Rawls uses the phrase “on terms all can 
accept,” but then connects it to Scanlon’s formulation “the basic desire to be able to justify our actions to others on 
grounds they could not reasonably reject.” See Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000: 153. Scanlon, in a note to this statement, acknowledges Derek Parfit in helping him 
formulate this statement instead of the alternative “that everyone could reasonably accept.” This is no small matter, 
for the alternate version requires consensus of acceptance whereas the previous statement only requires non-
rejection. I am not convinced, as McCarthy appears to be, that one can so easily ‘connect’ the two. 
255 See Brian Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” Ethics 105 (1995); Brian Barry, Justice as 
Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Graham Long, Relativism and the Foundations of Liberalism 
(Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004); and Steven Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998) for examples of the skeptical critique. 
256 Quong, “Political Liberalism Without Scepticism.” 322. 
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should be followed and the truth recognized does not as yet define a principle of adjudication.”257 
The issue is not the validity of the truth claim itself, but rather in what way a reasonable decision 
can be made.258  
Epistemological restraint offers an answer. That is, as Nagel says, “the distinction 
between what is needed to justify belief and what is needed to justify the employment of political 
power depends on a higher standard of objectivity, which is ethically based.”259 Nagel appeals to 
what he calls a “highest-order framework of moral reasoning” wherein we transcend our 
personal viewpoint and take position in the impersonal viewpoint, or, rather, the ‘view from 
nowhere.’ The impersonal viewpoint is not that which has lost the personal interest, but rather 
one that has combined the personal viewpoint with the view of all the other viewpoints. This 
impersonal viewpoint will not only contain our particular reasons for justifying our belief, but 
also all the other possible reasons for withholding justification. It is ‘impersonal’ because it is not 
solely ‘personal.’ When we view our beliefs from the impersonal viewpoint it becomes clear that 
appeals to the truth of our beliefs “must be seen as merely appeals to our beliefs, and should be 
treated as such,” unless they can be justified from this impersonal viewpoint. In essence, in 
justificatory contexts, a line is drawn between the private and public domains; one can separate 
one’s belief from the thing believed.260 Nagel’s epistemological restraint is different from Rawls’ 
‘veil of ignorance’ because it not only allows those behind the veil to consider conceptions of the 
good, but it admits the deliberations about such conceptions as the activity of primary 
                                                
257 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 214-215. 
258 A more thorough and detailed examination of this issue can be found in Joseph Raz, Authority (New 
York: New York University Press, 1990). 
259 Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 229. 
260 Price, “Epistemological Restraint—Revisited,” 401-407. 
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importance. 
Joseph Raz points out that epistemological restraint could threaten ideologies or belief 
systems through the influence of external doubts such as secular notions of religious belief.261 
However, it is possible to address this concern. It is not cosmopolitan education’s aim to either 
preserve or erode systems of belief, but rather to provide people with the space necessary to 
learn. Cosmopolitan education’s use of epistemological restraint is a way to respect the beliefs of 
others without privileging any. Were cosmopolitan education to uphold such an objection it 
would result in reducing an educational endeavor to indoctrination; it would strip away the actual 
‘education’ part of the activity. Human history is marked by nothing if not continual change in 
beliefs, ethics, morals, and governing structures. In short, the objection is primarily a political-
structural one, and as such is not sufficient to upend the cosmopolitan moral educational project. 
Admittedly, schooling is not immune to these structural and political issues, but cosmopolitan 
moral education is not dependent upon formal institutional educational structures to exist, and 
therefore cannot necessarily stand in the way of their rise or fall, but merely exists as a process 
by and through which debates about their rise and fall might take place. 
It is not necessary for epistemological restraint to be used within a process that has as its 
focus a particular political implementation: it need not produce anything except reflection.262 The 
point is that one can keep epistemological restraint free from the culpability of the erosion of 
beliefs if one prioritizes the legitimacy of the presumptively objective claims and the primacy of 
the legitimating processes over the results of the process. In cosmopolitan education the inquiry 
                                                
261 Joseph Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” edited by Joseph Raz Journal of 
Political Philosophy 8, no, 3 (1990). Nagel felt that this concern was substantial enough to back away somewhat 
from his position on epistemological restraint in a footnote in Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality Philosophy & 
Public Affairs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 163, but retained his conclusion. 
262 This is in direct relation with Arendt’s notion of thinking as being ‘invisible’ and that there is no actual 
concrete result of thinking.  
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into morality does not lie in the identification of specific morals to be adopted, accepted, and 
enforced. Instead the inquiry ought to be conducted in a democratically justifiable way, and in 
doing so, provides the legitimacy required for an education in morality. Such a justified 
education might be found in the processes of deliberative democracy and discourse ethics, or 
even more so, as I will suggest, in moral agonism.  
In criticism it might be said that this view intrinsically values democratic processes, and 
thus a core principle is un-debatable, acting as received knowledge. I can offer two answers. 
First, in cosmopolitanism, and due to the primacy of shared humanity, everyone must be invited 
to contribute to the construction of the mores, codes, laws, and customs that will govern their 
lives. This claim lies at the core of cosmopolitan philosophy, and my conception of cosmopolitan 
education. Justice, equality, and morality are tied together in this valuing of process, but the 
execution of the process is the defining characteristic, and primary guarantor of its morality. The 
second answer lies in the process and its founding presuppositions of argumentation and 
discourse, and will be examined in the following section.  
If we are to have shared ethics, morals, and laws, it is reasonable to prefer a process that 
seeks to include the arguments, opinions, and beliefs of as many members of the to-be-governed 
group as is possible, and even when it might not be ‘reasonable,’ but rather irrational or purely 
emotional, it still appeals to the undeniable fact of our human and shared existences. Is it 
possible that the perfectly collaborative group will come up with a terrible answer? Yes. Is it 
possible that democracy will choose the ‘wrong’ option? Yes; Hitler was elected through an 
ostensibly democratic process after all. However, inclusive democratic deliberation provides 
recourse for correction. It provides the unsuccessful lobbyists with another opportunity to 
persuade others, as well as the possibility that their efforts may never be successful. Here the 
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choice is clear: a world in which one gets one’s way regardless of the manner in which 
something is done and thus quite likely to enact its moral ideas in an immoral way, or a world in 
which one may not get one’s way but the manner in which the other choices are chosen is, itself, 
a moral one (or at least not immoral). Such a process also requires that the participants of 
democratic deliberation be persuadable, too, but yet impervious to demagoguery. Maintaining a 
reasonable and autonomous place here requires deftness and skill. Those that ‘think’ are less 
likely to be persuaded to immoral or evil action and thus underscores the importance of an 
education in morality, in the tools of critical thinking and inquiry that go into examining what is 
moral and what is not.263 Learning how to accept received morals only equips one with the skills 
to adopt whatever one is asked to adopt. Education in morality entails learning how to critically 
examine what is presented as ‘moral.’264 One must be open to the possibility that the status quo 
or the position one holds could be incorrect. One must accept that a deliberative, inclusive, and 
democratic process might produce a result with which you are unhappy. One must willingly 
accept two very difficult constraints; the world may not conform to one’s conception of the good, 
and one’s conception of the good just might be wrong. What we do in this case will form the 
content of Chapter 4, but what exactly we do, the kind of argument we have, forms the content of 
a cosmopolitan dialogue in morality. 
5.2 Discourse in Morality  
The process by and through which education in morality are to take place requires a 
scheme that comports with the conception of cosmopolitan education offered in Chapters 2 and 
3, confronts the reality of our ever-changing understandings of ethics From Chapter 3, and 
                                                
263 The importance of thinking in morality will be examined in Chapter 6.  
264 See Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem; and Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment. 
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allows for the holding of beliefs as well as the space in which to proffer them as reasons, when 
appropriate, as well as the compulsion and space to withhold them in the interest of impartiality 
as discussed in the previous section. We need to find a form of dialogue about morality that is 
inclusive and democratic and can allow its participants to maintain the legitimacy of their work 
while also maintaining the work itself, and the concept of discourse ethics offers a model.  
Before proceeding further, however, I must make a note about the discussion of Jürgen 
Habermas’s theories that follows. In his arguments for communicative action and discourse 
ethics, Habermas makes a distinction between ethical and moral questions and treats them 
separately in his explanations. 265 In brief, Habermas places morals in the same domain as 
questions of justice, questions whose answers can be universalized, whereas ethics lies in the 
domain of plans for one’s life which are culturally conditioned and not possible to answer 
universally. Habermas sees the question of How should I live as either an ethical or a moral 
question, but not both at the same time.266 However useful this distinction is for his purposes, it 
is not relevant for mine. Cosmopolitanism is interested in the question How should we live 
(together) and therefore the ethical question and the moral question are combined. In the quotes 
and explanations derived from Habermas’ theory I will use the words as he uses them. For my 
purposes it will not matter whether the specific concern is ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ in the way that 
discourse ethics applies to cosmopolitan moral education. 
Further, I will be taking discourse ethics as it is, and not providing a full treatment of 
‘deliberative democracy,’ an umbrella conception under which discourse ethics is often placed. 
Deliberative democracy has a broad reach and rich intellectual history, but is both too broad and 
                                                
265 This distinction is taken up at length Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on 
Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin, 3rd ed., (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993). 
266 Ibid., 1–17. 
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too rich for my purposes, and entails certain empirical and concrete characteristics from which I 
wish to maintain distance (per arguments in Chapter 3). There certainly are similarities, and 
deliberative democracy is generally designed to deal with moral disagreements in politics.267 It is 
a system that requires justification of claims that are mutually acceptable and can be understood 
by all, with the goal of determining conclusions that are applicable to everyone, but can be 
challenged or amended at a later date.268 All of these characteristics are compatible with 
cosmopolitan education. However, deliberative democracy is often primarily associated with 
very specific processes of government and may involve the erection of institutions and relatively 
static structures for its implementation.269 As was made clear in Chapter 3, I would like to stay 
clear of such manifestations of such concrete models for cosmopolitan education. Deliberative 
democracy has potential as a limited piece of a larger cosmopolitan puzzle, but it often comes in 
the form of a concrete, tangible implementation that serves predetermined and prescribed ends, 
and all within confines of liberalism, and is not broadly applicable enough to offer a complete 
model for my project. 
                                                
267 See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004). 
268 See Gutman and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?, 7, for these characteristics. For other 
variations see Seyla Benhabib, Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996) which contains essays by Benhabib, Joshua Cohen, Iris Young, Jean Cohen, and Gutman, all of which defend 
deliberative democracy, but with different emphases. For instance, in Joshua Cohen’s essay, he asserts the necessity 
of procedural democracies to protect autonomy through stronger protections and the guarantee of social and 
economic rights, but this would lead to a certain amount of concentration of centralized power in a government. In 
contrast, Benhabib offers a vision of a de-centered model, reducing the role of a centralized arbiter and increasing 
localized networks of deliberation. I utilize the Gutman-Thompson characteristic because of their lack of specificity 
and compatibility with other conceptions of deliberative democracy. 
269 See, for instance, James Fishkin, When the People Speak (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
has explored the practical implementations and results of applied deliberative democracy by analyzing a series of 
deliberative democratic polling activities in different parts of the world. His results show that people are generally 
interested in influencing public policy when given the opportunity, and that they are capable of changing their minds 
after reasonable dialogue and the acquisition of new information. This suggests that much of contemporary political 
discourse could be influenced through more widespread use of such processes. Through his research at the Center 
for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University, Fishkin has obtained interesting results using pre- and post- 
dialogue surveys. See http://cdd.stanford.edu for a series of projects and results. 
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Fundamentally, discourse ethics are grounded in the ‘ought’ of ethics. When we make 
statements such as ‘one ought not physically injure someone else’ we do not intend the 
prescription be applicable only to the person who holds this view; we expect it to apply to 
everyone. Our intention is to assert what we believe to be a moral norm, or at least what we 
believe ought to be a moral norm, and the assertion is a presentation of an argument. For 
Habermas, since morals are normative, and a person in isolation cannot determine moral norms, 
then the justification of a norm depends upon the mutual understanding between two or more 
persons.270 Moral norms, as public artifacts must be publicly generated. Habermas concludes 
that, unlike Kant’s deontology, moral deliberation cannot take place in the privacy of one’s 
mind, and in fact the nature of morality (as a norm that ought to apply to everyone) dictates that 
such deliberation take place in public, with others.271 The moral viewpoint is not contained in 
self-legislated a priori principles, but rather within a community of people, in which the 
deliberations of the good and morality contain participants who are fully cognizant of the desires 
and perspectives of others, however foreign or competitive.272 Taking a position in such a 
process, a position similar to the constraints of belief in favor of impartiality found in 
epistemological restraint, enables the “impartial standpoint [that] overcomes the subjectivity of 
the individual participant’s perspective without becoming disconnected from the performative 
attitude of the participants.”273 Without such restraint, real communication, genuine 
argumentation about values, cannot occur. Habermas asserts that “the understanding of self as a 
                                                
270 This use of ‘isolation’ is compatible with Hannah Arendt’s distinction between ‘isolation’ and ‘solitude’ 
which will be of significance in Chapter 6, though Habermas’s use of the word is not intended to gesture to Arendt. 
271 Moral thought, however, can take place in the privacy of one’s mind. 
272 The internal dialogue and self-legislation, as in the Kantian tradition, is vitally important, but it 
constitutes only one-half of the entire process of morality. This will be covered in more depth in Chapter 6.  
273 Habermas, Justification and Application,13. 
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person and as a member of a community simultaneously…is preserved in the communicative 
presuppositions of moral argumentation. Just this structure compels each participant in 
argumentation to adopt the perspective of all others.”274 For discourse ethics, there is no need to 
construct reasons for why one should adopt the perspective of others; it is automatically entailed 
in engaging in argumentation.  
In defining what can be derived from the attempts at such mutual understanding between 
persons, a number of ‘presuppositions’ are automatically entailed. “[A]rgumentation leaves 
participants without a choice; just in virtue of undertaking to engage in such a practice as such, 
they must accept certain idealizations in the form of presuppositions of communication.”275 
These presuppositions are not obligations we must accept in order to engage discursively, but 
instead “they make possible the practice that participants understand as argumentation.”276 These 
presuppositions of communication are: 
a) That it is possible for participants to communicate and understand the 
meaning of what they communicate, 
 
b) …there is full and equal inclusion of everybody and all relevant arguments 
and reasons,  
 
c) …the only force exerted is that of the better argument, and 
 
d) …all participants are sincerely and genuinely interested in finding the better 
argument.277 
 
These presuppositions in discourse ethics are compatible with cosmopolitan education because 
                                                
274 Ibid., 24, 48. 
275 Ibid., 31. 
276 Ibid. (emphasis in original). 
277 ‘Finding the better argument’ is connected to the inherent aim of education as a process. It is essentially 
progressive in that it builds upon and from that which it begins in the interest of growth, requiring evaluation and 
improvement. 
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they do not privilege or rest on a particular way of life or conception of the good, they are the 
conditions that make communicative action possible, they do not exclude anyone who wishes to 
take part, and they are automatically involved in argumentation.278  
What deliberation provides is important for Habermas. We must enter into real 
discussions and not speculative ones. “We cannot anticipate the outcome of real discourses 
concerning proposed principles of justice among those potentially affected by their 
observance.”279 Only the affected deliberators themselves are appropriate agents for justifying 
their claims, whereas philosophers can only take part in “reflective analysis of the procedure 
through which ethical questions in general can be answered.”280 It is a process by which ways or 
forms of life and conceptions of the good get public and democratic airing, and it is minimally 
intended to be universal insofar as it does not reject participants on bases of ethnicity, 
nationality, or any other ascribed characteristic. Persons may exclude themselves by refusing to 
take part, but they cannot be forced or prevented from participating if they so choose. 
Discourse ethics works in many other ways with cosmopolitanism. In discourse ethics, 
the moral point of view must be that which detaches “itself from the egocentric (ethnocentric) 
perspective of each individual’s (or our) way of life and demands that interpersonal conflicts be 
judged from the standpoint of what all could will in common.”281 But the moral point of view 
also requires that one “transcend the social and historical form of life and particular community 
                                                
278 For my purposes there is little difference between argumentation as constructed by Habermas and 
deliberation. Both are intended to refer to discussions that take place between two or more persons who have 
gathered to consider the reasons for or against something.  
279 Ciaran Cronin in Habermas, Justification and Application, xviii. This is in contrast to Rawls, for 
instance, for whom the veil of ignorance provides a speculative space in which to make impartial decisions about 
justice (and morality, for Habermas).  
280 Ibid., 75. 
281 Ibid., 24. 
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and adopt the perspective of all those possibly affected.”282 This gestures to Nagel’s ‘view from 
nowhere.’283 They both offer a view of the world as well as oneself contained in it. Both offer 
more than the limited subjective/local perspective does, and not completely disembodied as an 
absolutely objective/universal perspective would be; one has not lost oneself in the search for a 
vantage point of the world that contains more than just the subjective and local self. The test for 
education in morality is how well it accommodates the juxtaposition of these perspectives and 
whether everyone can acknowledge that the juxtaposition is generally valid.284 
Any education in morality, short of indoctrination or moral relativism, must be an 
inquiry, must occupy concurrently, or rather must consider the reasonable desires of, the 
impersonal/universal and the personal/local viewpoints. The world does not only consist of you, 
nor does it not contain you in it. You are there and all that matters to you is there as well, and 
everyone else is there along with everything else that matters to them. If the worlds never 
collided or connected, it would not matter, but they do collide and they are inter-connected. This 
requires that, much like weighing evidence for making a judgment about any non-moral act, you 
must take into consideration all that is available to you to consider in moral action and that 
includes other viewpoints. In the ongoing inquiry and determination of morals and morality this 
requires the consideration of all available options, lives, and experiences even when one’s beliefs 
and reasons conflict with the material purposes of the discussion. 
In examining moral dialogue, there is a distinction between the moral behavior required 
to conduct the dialogue and what behavior counts as moral as determined by the dialogue. It is 
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the first of these to which both cosmopolitan moral education and discourse ethics are oriented. 
Discourse ethics does not “say what the answers should be, only how we should find them,”285 
and is not only for a particular community or for people who possess a certain ideology. As 
Thomassen writes, “[g]iven the pluralism of moral views that exist in today’s societies, 
Habermas believes that an ethics for modern societies cannot give substantive answers to moral 
questions.”286 Instead, discourse ethics provides a procedure for answering moral questions and, 
as shown in Chapter 3, this is cosmopolitan education’s goal as well. However, this pluralism is 
at once a motivation and a problem for discourse ethics. “Once moral theory breaks out of the 
investigative horizon of the first-person singular, it encounters the reality of an alien will, which 
generates problems of a different order.”287 Pluralism is thusly problematized by discourse ethics 
and necessarily complicates an unreachable goal: consensus. 
Consensus is thwarted by many practical issues, not the least of which is basic social 
organization. Because it is impossible to get everyone involved in any given discussion of 
morality, one must generate local outcomes and test them with and against other outcomes 
produced elsewhere, and these should be entered into the local discussion.288 In discourse ethics, 
the best we can hope for is partial justification for the norms that result, which are not justified 
by 100% consensus, but are also supported by reasons that cannot be completely and reasonably 
rejected. Discourse ethics appreciate the contributions to morality that can be made from both 
particular and broader (i.e. cultural or traditional) origins. The kind of discourse encouraged by 
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discourse ethics combines the possibilities of individually constructed thought and disclosed 
assertions as well as those which have developed in concert with local cultural and communal 
norms that have influenced them.  
The problematization of pluralism by Habermas is a point of departure for my project 
from his, and this is no insignificant juncture. For Habermas, the goal of discourse ethics is 
consensus. His conception of ethics is universalist, which would seem to work, too, with 
cosmopolitan education, but it does not. Habermas sees discourse ethics as a means to reach a 
consensus about ethics. If cosmopolitan education adopted the goal of consensus it would then 
have a fixed goal, one that could be empirically assessed. On the one hand, to form such a 
consensus might create the substantive moral decisions that are supposed to be elided by the 
construct of discourse ethics in the first place, and thus his assertion that discourse ethics could 
not be oriented to producing substantive answers to moral questions is in doubt. On the other 
hand, in light of epistemological restraint and impartiality, the key formulation of what counts as 
justification is that which others could not reasonably reject, not that which everyone could 
reasonably accept, the latter oriented to positive consensus. Discourse ethics can still provide a 
procedure for the utilization of epistemological restraint, but it cannot be oriented to consensus 
of acceptance, only an acceptance of the presuppositions of argumentation (and such acceptance 
need not be universal, but rather accepted by those engaged in the argument).289 What results 
from these arguments is beyond the purview of a cosmopolitan educational process; deciding 
ahead of time what the result should or will be removes the justification for creating the inclusive 
                                                
289 As Habermas noted, entering the argument entails acceptance. Those who do not accept these 
presuppositions will not join the argument. However, adopting epistemological restraint is essentially an act of 
accepting the presuppositions because epistemological restraint entails that one recognize that one’s beliefs could be 
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processes through which to come to a decision. Such concern with consensus, in the face of so 
much moral pluralism, dooms an inquiry into morality to undermining its own justification. It is 
to that inevitable pluralism I now turn. 
5.3 Agonistic Pluralism 
Morality is predicated on an implicit acceptance of the fundamental conditions of our 
lives: our social lives. We would not need morality, as Arendt notes, “if men were not distinct, 
each human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they would not need 
neither speech nor action to make themselves understood.”290 If we were all identical there 
would be no need to assert how one ought to act toward another. It is this distinctness, this 
fundamental difference in the ‘who’ that each of us is that prompts the desire and need for 
morality. Pluralism and morality are thus inextricably linked, and even though Habermas, 
consensus-oriented as he is, understands the ineradicable nature of moral pluralism, he draws 
from this the conclusion that “finding a solution to these few more sharply focused questions 
becomes all the more critical to coexistence, and even survival, in a more populous world.”291 
While his answer is to continue seeking consensus, others suggest accepting its impossibility and 
instead encourage focusing on the management of pluralism. To this end I will now examine the 
concept of agonistic pluralism and then show that the move to consensus is unnecessary. 
Agonism is derived from agon, the Greek word for struggle, contest, or conflict, and in 
Greek drama agon refers to the pitting of the protagonist and antagonist against each other. Most 
uses revolve around competition and contestation and involve discipline, endurance, tenacity, 
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and struggle.292 In Greek athletic contests it was not only about defeating your opponent, but also 
in competing well and with respect toward the competition itself as well as your opponent, 
without whom you cannot compete nor excel. Further, the more challenging or capable your 
opponent, the greater the respect and gratitude toward him because it is the formidable opponent 
who makes excellence possible. The focal point was the contest, not the outcome. A champion 
who wins badly or without struggle is no champion. A true champion excels because of the 
contest, because of the struggle, and it is in the struggle that the Greeks placed human drama and 
value.  
In Greek culture agon was the key dynamic force through which excellence (arête) was 
achieved. For the Greeks agon was largely a public affair. Contests often took place as formal 
events with spectators, but agon also animated daily Greek cultural life. These struggles may 
have begun as some individual trial in which a citizen proved his excellence, but agon grew to 
encompass cultural accomplishment and continuity, permeating all aspects of community life, 
from the Olympic games to the politics of the polis.293 Agon has less communal value when only 
a private affair. Whatever has been produced or tested privately can only truly come into being 
and ‘prove’ its value through public struggle and contestation. One may have the Socratic 
conversation with oneself, a necessary dialogue to be sure, in order to produce legitimate 
thought, but those thoughts are not ‘in the world’ until they have been disclosed through human 
action which must be public. I will address this characteristic in more detail in Chapter 6. 
In political theory agonism refers to the theory that recognizes that not all conflicts can be 
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(Westport: Bergin & Garvey, 1994), 30. 
293 “The agon was a cultural tour de force which initially involved personal gain and accomplishment but 
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resolved in such a way as to eliminate further conflict, and in fact there is potential for positive 
effects of such conflict by approaching the conflict discursively, and not to find a ‘winner’ 
(though there may be temporal winners and losers in normative, legislative, and policy conflicts). 
Agonists deny the possibility of universal harmony, and, for the most part, universal anything 
except universal conflict. However, the production of an outcome does not mean the conflict is 
over, it merely signifies a new point to contest. Agonism is a state if being in which contestation 
occurs. In political life, usually democratic but not exclusively, and as illustrated quite clearly in 
many ideological debates, agonism appears to be the constant; laws are passed, policies enacted, 
but the contestation over them continues, with further amendments to laws and policies over 
time. Beyond the structurally instantiated normative we see that opinions, beliefs, and other 
convictions are contested as well.  
Proponents of agonism are often critics of Habermas and discourse ethics and often deny 
both the importance and possibility of consensus, and of dialogue to reach it, primarily based 
upon the plurality of human life. Chantal Mouffe is one of the most vocal of these. Her 
opposition to both Habermas and cosmopolitanism lies in the respective perceived aims of 
consensus and universalization. She asserts that it is impossible to achieve a fully rational 
consensus and that her model of agonistic pluralism not only deals with current democratic 
challenges, but is in fact the operant condition of democracy.  
For Mouffe, the constitutive concept of politics is power, power is constitutive of the 
social, and thus the goal is to formulate politics that constitute forms of power that are more 
compatible with democratic values. In order to do this, one must recognize the distinction 
between ‘politics’ and ‘the political.’ Mouffe defines ‘the political’ as the intrinsic antagonism of 
human relations that emerge in our social relations. ‘Politics’ consists of the practices, 
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discourses, and institutions that order our coexistence. In ordering our coexistence, it is not only 
normative but also moral because that ordering sets goals, limits, and prescriptions for how we 
are to coexist. Thus, “only when we acknowledge the dimension of ‘the political’ and understand 
that ‘politics’ consists in domesticating hostility and in trying to defuse the potential antagonism 
that exists in human relations”294 can we approach the task at hand. That task is not to reach 
consensus, per Habermas, because doing so would eliminate ‘the political.’ Instead the task is 
one in which we “establish this us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist 
democracy.”295  
Mouffe’s ‘politics’ aims to perceive the ‘other’ not as an enemy, but as an adversary 
whose right to defend his ideas is not abridged. One’s “adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate 
enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the 
ethico-political principles of…liberty and equality.”296 The ‘ethico-political’ principles exist 
through conflicting interpretations, leading to what Mouffe calls “conflictual consensus.”297 
These contestations consist of different conceptions of the good, not consensus per se, and thus 
become the embodiment of democracy through “a vibrant class of democratic political 
positions.”298 This conception admits that antagonism will likely remain, rational discussion may 
not resolve it, and deliberation may prove equally as futile. However, “[t]his does not mean of 
course that adversaries can never cease to disagree, but that does not prove that antagonism has 
                                                
294 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 101. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid., 102. 
297 Mouffe, On The Political, 56. 
298 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 104. 
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been eradicated,” and compromises are possible as well.299  
This distinction between ‘antagonism’ as conflict between enemies and ‘agonism’ as 
conflict between adversaries is vital. Both take place within a political relationship, but the goal 
is to convert the antagonism into agonism, and thus redefine the conflict as one that is more 
democratically collaborative even if the difference remains. Agonism is, as Mouffe states, ‘in 
fact [democracy’s] very condition of existence,” and offers a regulative service.300 Echoing 
Laclau, Mouffe notes that any consensus reached in agonistic pluralism is a temporary 
stabilization of power that “always entails exclusion,” always leaving some ‘other’ on the 
outside.301 Thus antagonism survives, ‘the political’ re-engages, and the domesticating services 
of ‘politics’ are required yet again. Bonnie Honig writes that “to affirm the perpetuity of the 
contest is not to celebrate a world without points of stabilization; it is to affirm the reality of 
perpetual contest, even within an ordered setting, and to identify the affirmative dimension of 
contestation.”302 The avoidance of conflict is the driving force behind most political theories, but 
agonism can play a role in disrupting these hegemonic tendencies.303 In agonism, no decision 
will be closed on the edges of ‘the political.’ It will “always be open to question and answer, 
demand and response, and negotiation.”304 The criticality that is inherent in education in morality 
is alive and well in agonism.  
                                                
299 Ibid., 102. 
300 Ibid., 103. 
301 Ibid., 104. 
302 Bonnie Honig, “Difference, Dilemmas, and the Politics of Home” in Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 15. 
303 See Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993). 
304 James Tully, “The Agonic Freedom of Citizens,” Economy and Society 28, no. 2 (1999): 166-167. 
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Despite Mouffe’s opposition to cosmopolitan democracy, agonistic pluralism is not 
incompatible with the model of cosmopolitanism I offer.305 Cosmopolitan education easily 
incorporates Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism, which plays a large role in my formulation of moral 
agonism. In order to remain in an agonistic state, rather than an antagonistic state, requires “a 
capacity for agonistic respect”306 wherein a ‘distance’ is maintained within and among people to 
allow them to see themselves as actors within a larger group of actors, all of whom have the 
same right of participation. Each participant’s view is from ‘somewhere,’ but is so by invoking 
both a personal and impersonal standpoint concurrently. By inhabiting agonism, one keeps the 
personal and includes it in the impersonal that governs the interpersonal interactions. The 
deliberations that take place do so in this context, one in which judgments might be made, but it 
is understood that they are the judgments ‘for now’ and are subject to alteration in the future. By 
eliminating the finality and permanency of judgments, the agonist state can maintain the 
processes of democratic deliberation, collaboration, and contestation. In essence, adversaries 
collaborate to contest each other’s ideas, externalizing the personal standpoint (this matters to 
me) while internalizing the impersonal viewpoint (that matters to you).  
Mouffe contends that the ideal speech situation envisioned by Habermas could never take 
place because “no deliberation could ever take place without impediments to free and 
unconstrained public deliberation.”307 In Mouffe’s view, Habermas’ presuppositions rely on 
                                                
305 The core of Mouffe’s criticisms of cosmopolitanism is similar to those she holds of Habermas and 
discourse ethics: the perceived orientation toward and organization for consensus. 
306 Donald, “Multiculturalism Revisited,” 295. 
307 Eva Erman, “What is Wrong with Agonistic Pluralism?: Reflections on Conflict in Democratic Theory,” 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 35, no. 9 (2009): 1042. Erman criticizes Mouffe’s view, maintaining that Mouffe 
requires consensus around the ‘ethico-political’ principles she assumes, and that her argument for agonistic 
pluralism cannot proceed without such consensus, and thus Mouffe is as dependent upon consensus as Habermas. 
See also Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism,” The Political Science Series (Vienna: 
Institute for Advanced Studies, 2000): 13. 
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conditions so ideal that in order for them to obtain, the conflict they are summoned to mediate 
must be eliminated, thus precluding the need for the dialogue. She quotes Wittgenstein saying, 
“we have got on slippery ice where the is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are 
ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk: so we need friction.”308 Every 
conclusion of deliberation that results in a decision always excludes other possibilities that could 
have been chosen, possibilities ostensibly proffered in the deliberation, and sometimes not. We 
need the friction of ‘the political’ in order to gain the traction necessary for ‘politics’ to be of any 
value. Agonism is not necessarily ‘grist for the mill’ of politics—which is supplied automatically 
by the pluralism of human and social life—but rather the competing streams of water that make 
the wheel turn.  
Conclusion 
While agonistic pluralism and discourse ethics battle it out over the capabilities and 
possibilities of each other, impartiality and epistemological restraint observe with patient 
impunity, and ethical/moral progress simply waits for agonistic pluralism and discourse ethics to 
realize that they are merely two parts of the same progressive and regulative process.309 Why 
care about agonistic pluralism or discourse ethics at all if there was not some compulsion that 
was more important than them both? The reason for deciding about how to deliberate about 
ethics and morals, and to determine the terms and guiding principles under which the 
deliberations will take place, is to make things ‘better.’ The compulsion in both agonistic 
pluralism and in discourse ethics is to improve the way politics, or public action, are done. Both 
recognize that the manner in which deliberations about what we ought to do are conducted truly 
                                                
308 Ludwig Wittgenstein in Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 98. 
309 At this point I will switch from Kitcher’s use of ‘ethical’ to reflect his emphasis on ethics to ‘moral’ to 
reflect my emphasis on ‘morality.’ 
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matters in morality as much as it does in political and public legitimacy.  
The fundamental grounding of our moral lives in our shared humanity, in our shared 
forms of life in action, and in our universal capacity to insert our pluralistic selves into the world 
community make it incumbent upon us to share in an equally shared moral inquiry. One in which 
all may participate, with genuine interest in the inquiry over personal desires and beliefs, and 
with the real aim of improving our shared conditions of living at no other person’s expense. This 
is what a cosmopolitan moral education seeks to instill and how it could do so. However, this 
only gets us halfway to the ‘punch’ of cosmopolitan education in morality and moral agonism. If 
the process is prioritized over the results while still maintaining that results are not irrelevant, 
then where can we go from here? How can agency be justified beyond procedural obligations? In 
the following Chapter I will draw on Hannah Arendt’s work on ‘action’ to provide the space in 
which the procedural obligations can be enacted while still preserving the non-dogmatic and 




Public Action in Moral Agonism 
 
The previous chapter showed that both Habermas and Mouffe understand the inevitability 
of the need for political public interaction. Habermas cannot conceive of human life without 
communication, and Mouffe cannot conceive of human life without pluralism.310 Habermas’s 
response is to focus on justifying a specific set of procedures through which communication can 
occur and produce justified results. Mouffe’s response is to frame subsequent responses to 
pluralism within the context of agonism. Habermas’s communication, or ‘communicative 
action,’ cannot get by without experiencing Mouffe’s pluralism and needs her agonism to be 
better. In the cosmopolitan education I envision, practitioners of discourse ethics need to see that 
consensus in an outcome is not only impossible, but also unnecessary. Practitioners of agonistic 
pluralism need to see that politics works, however futilely, as either a consensus seeking process 
or a process that finds its consensus in the shared agreement that some ‘coming together’ is 
required, even if it is to argue and deliberate. In order to bridge them, this chapter will consider 
Hannah Arendt’s conceptions of action, plurality, the public, and the importance of thinking in 
morality. This will be followed by another look at agonism before Arendt is summoned again to 
draw together discourse ethics and agonistic pluralism on a cosmopolitan foundation to reveal 
what I call ‘moral agonism.’ 
As discussed in Chapter 4, morals education exists primarily to educate a society’s 
newest members into the existing moral norms of society, typically through specific morals, 
                                                
310 This is not to suggest that Habermas does not recognize plurality. He does. However, he emphasizes 
communication as though communication can be enough to eradicate or mediate pluralism, and that may not always 
be possible. 
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whereas an education in morality seeks to provide students with the form of life that morality 
represents as a field of inquiry. Cosmopolitan education embodies the acknowledgment of the 
practicality of educating new members for existing moral norms as morals education does, but 
also the necessity of educating them for the moral norms that are not yet extant. Thus 
cosmopolitan education acknowledges the necessity of providing society’s new members with 
the tools and processes to develop morals by engaging in deliberations about morality. Educating 
only for existing morals is more likely to impede the progressive movement toward an 
understanding of future morality as well as the ability of individuals to participate in its 
development. Cosmopolitan moral education presumes, and quite rightly in light of known 
human history, that morality and many accepted morals will change over time and it admits the 
rationality of preparing for those changes as well as the ability to initiate them. The ability to be 
an influential and meaningful participant in morality is contained in each person through his or 
her natality, and if that natality is not preserved, meaningful participation or action will not 
happen.  
It is one thing to be capable of change—humans have needed adaptable capacities since 
human time began—and yet quite another to be an agent who initiates or participates in change 
meaningfully. In the context of ethics and morals, the normative guidance for doing so is 
tremendously important and requires a stance that is appropriately disposed to an understanding 
of what has counted in morality before, what counts currently, and the processes by which future 
morality can be engaged; these dispositions are cultivated in an education in morality. I have 
already shown the importance of Arendt’s conceptions of natality and conservation in education 
to these processes. In the previous chapter I offered a view of some processes of discourse ethics 
and agonistic pluralism as mechanisms that are compatible with cosmopolitan education that can 
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preserve natality and produce an education in morality. Now I wish to offer more substantial 
theoretical support for this project by examining Arendt’s conception of thinking and its relation 
to morality. I will then show how natality exists in the thinking about morality and is manifested 
through public action, and thus morality is ultimately made to be public. I will conclude by 
showing that such a public morality needs to be supported by a disposition toward morality that 
admits shared humanity, plurality, and uncertainty, and is progressive as well. I call this 
disposition moral agonism, and it is the ‘product’ of a cosmopolitan education in morality. 
6.1 Making Morality Public 
In the Introduction to The Human Condition, Jerome Kohn writes that for Arendt, “when 
moral and religious commandments are pronounced in public in defiance of the diversity of 
human opinions they corrupt both the world and themselves.”311 Due to the self-reflective nature 
of morality, as opposed to the world-directed nature of politics (because action can only take 
place with others), the split between the two seems rather clear. However, Arendt recognizes that 
actions that result from morality, ostensibly the products of thought and natality, are as much 
other-directed as they are toward our self. In essence, our thoughts are ours alone while our 
actions are for everyone. The intent of our actions might be wholly self-regarding, but the 
outcomes of our actions are not only ours and, once unleashed into the world, are determined by 
the world and the others persons in it.  
In Arendt’s attempts to isolate moral principles, she finds it necessary to abandon both 
transcendental and traditional received (e.g. religious) morality, because these require knowing 
the conscience of men and no one can know that. Conscience itself, thought Arendt, is suspect 
and largely the product, in contemporary understanding, of an alteration of meaning from its 
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origins. This alteration she traced to Paul of Tarsus and Augustine, and the meaning and role of 
conscience became almost exclusively that as determined by religious use in Christianity. Since 
we cannot rely on religious or received morality, we must find morality somewhere else. In her 
examination of conscience she determined that in Christian terms it involves simply whether one 
will or will not obey God; in secular terms the conflicts of conscience are “nothing but 
deliberations between me and myself.”312 As a result, Arendt begins in morality from what she 
determines to be the only two secular moral principles that one can positively assert, and both are 
from Socrates: (a) that it is better to suffer harm than to do harm, and (b) that “multitudes of men 
should disagree with me rather than that I, being one, should be out of harmony with myself and 
contradict me.”313 In exploring these two propositions she reveals the importance of thinking in 
morality. 
6.1.1 Thinking Morality 
Arendt organizes her conception of thinking in morality around Socrates’ assertion that 
when considering the morality of an action, one must be in agreement with oneself; the “two-in-
one” must be in accord.314 In other words, if one wants to be able to live with oneself, there are 
some things one must not do. 
For nothing can be itself and at the same time of itself but the two-
in-one that Socrates discovered as the essence of thought and Plato 
translated into conceptual language as the soundless dialogue 
between me and myself…Nothing perhaps indicates more strongly 
                                                
312 Arendt, “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” 108. 
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314 Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” 441-442. Arendt has explored this concept many times. 
See also Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 179-192, (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1978); and Arendt, “Some 
Questions of Moral Philosophy.” 
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that man exists essentially in the plural than that his solitude 
actualizes his merely being conscious of himself, which we 
probably share with the higher animals, into a duality during the 
thinking activity. It is this duality of myself with myself that makes 
thinking a true activity, in which I am both the one who asks and 
the one who answers. 315 
 
The deliberation of what those things are takes place in a dialogue with oneself and this 
deliberative dialogue constitutes thinking. Arendt concludes that in this dialogue the criterion of 
right and wrong ultimately does not rest on habits or customs shared with others nor on some 
transcendent or divine moral law but rather in regard to an agreement with oneself: “I cannot do 
certain things, because having done them I shall no longer be able to live with myself.”316 One 
must be able to live with oneself in order to find internal moral harmony; one does not want to 
live with a ‘criminal.’ Establishing harmony in the relationship with oneself is substantially 
different than doing so in one’s relationship with others. A person can disagree with other people 
and merely remove himself from their presence to get away from them and their ideas, but he 
cannot get away from himself. He is always there, waiting to pass judgment on himself. There is 
only one way to avoid the judgment of oneself and that is by not thinking. 
According to Arendt, we can have this dialogue, can only think, when we are alone, with 
ourselves, in private. Private in this sense does not necessarily mean total absence of something 
‘public,’ but rather that one is not in the public realm of action.317 One has removed oneself from 
                                                
315 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 185. 
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acting in public and has acquired solitude. Arendt distinguishes between solitude and isolation, 
the former being the kind of separation from human action that allows one to have a dialogue 
with oneself, the latter a state of being in which one is not involved in inter-action with others 
nor in a dialogue with oneself, but instead “concerned with things of the world.”318 For instance, 
reading a book may require that you not be disturbed by others, but may not require a dialogue 
with oneself; one needs the isolation to accomplish the task, but there is no guarantee that 
thinking is taking place.319 The dialogue with oneself requires that one cease acting in the world 
and instead that one ask questions of oneself about one’s experiences. “Thinking is an inquiry 
into human experience,”320 which includes claims about morality wherein the two-in-one 
attempts to find internal agreement about these claims. The relationship that one has with oneself 
in answer to the question ‘can I do this and still live with myself?’—a question put to oneself—is 
posed in relation to others; it automatically takes up the question as a social problem and is a 
question that would not be asked without the presence of other people.321 The presence of other 
people takes on additional weight when one is living with, as opposed to living among, other 
people. ‘Living with’ supposes a situation in which genuine action, spurred by natality and 
thinking, is taking place with others, not mere activities undertaken without thought.  
Arendt’s conclusions that first, thinking can only be done in solitude and second, that 
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morality is the result of human plurality, have important implications for teachers. For instance, 
Eduardo Duarte has concluded that a popular pedagogy, cooperative learning, actually prevents 
the learning sought.322 Ostensibly, cooperative learning attempts to create mini communities of 
learning in classrooms and foster “positive interdependence” and teamwork.323 Arendt 
determined that solitude is necessary for real thought to occur, and solitude requires the 
withdrawal from the presence of others, and in particular, the cessation of action. However, 
Duarte points out that cooperative learning forces students into a public community of action in 
which solitude is impossible. Duarte says that proponents of cooperative learning “move forward 
from the unquestioned assumption that thinking is a socially mediated process.” 324 It might be 
that ‘learning’ is socially mediated as long as learning requires some combination of thinking 
with action, but thinking itself cannot be socially mediated. The conception of morality offered 
in my project is one that is socially mediated, but the thinking behind it is not. I will assert that 
we must act on our thoughts in public, but the thoughts that arouse or guide our actions must be 
done in solitude (even if they are influenced by social life and interaction). In light of this, a 
teacher must provide her students with the socially mediated dialogue that facilitates the active 
declarations of their thoughts, but she must also task and provide them with the opportunity for 
solitary reflection on the public action in which they have partaken.  
The thought-dialogue that results from the self-questioning initially takes place in 
‘solitude,’ but its reason for being is that there are other people about whom one must consider in 
contemplating how one will act and interact. Thus, the question put to oneself cannot only be 
                                                
322 See Eduardo Duarte, “The Eclipse of Thinking: An Arendtian Critique of Cooperative Learning,” in 
Hannah Arendt on Education: Renewing our Common World Critique, ed. Mordechai Gordon, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, Inc., 2001). 
323 Ibid., 204. 
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posed as a matter of self-interest. When one says to oneself “This I can’t do,”325 it is not only or 
simply because one takes issue with the action, and not only or simply because of the net result, 
but because of the placement of oneself in a world in which one (oneself) does something that 
acts on another person in some way; the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ that one gives to oneself is based upon the 
combination or interaction of oneself with others in the world. Thus one’s thinking about one’s 
actions in the human condition of plurality forces the moral question and makes thought the 
integral internal mechanism by which morality is derived and constructed. Essentially, without 
thought one does not have morality, but might only have acquired ‘morals.’ 
Engaging oneself in this dialogue is not harmless, however passive it may appear. 
Thinking is dangerous even in light all of its benefits, though Arendt reminds us that discrete 
thoughts themselves are not dangerous, and even though thinking plays a central role in the 
development of morality it is also a destroyer of morals. “[T]hinking has a destructive, 
undermining effect on all established criteria…on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of 
in morals and ethics.”326 Such destructive thinking does not destroy morality, for the compulsion 
to judge right and wrong stays with us, but it can destroy specific morals; existing judgments can 
be rejected. For whichever morals have been accepted in morality, they will represent a morality 
of the old, while new members capitalizing on their natality, and in reaction to the human 
condition of plurality, may critically examine the morals they have inherited and thus subject 
them to potential modification or even eradication. Thinking puts everything in the world of 
morality in jeopardy while concurrently assuring that morality will stay in the world. Thinking 
(infused by natality) allows for the possibility that anything we currently know or believe about 
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morality could be found false or moot. The very conception of morality itself might be upended 
as the result of action informed by thinking. It recognizes that all of our moral convictions could 
be questioned. 
That Arendt says that thoughts themselves are not dangerous indicates a crucial point 
about thinking. Thinking puts morality in a position to be ‘born’ into the world; thought alone is 
not enough to create morality. A dangerous thought causes no more harm than a magnanimous 
thought does good. No matter how much thinking one has done and no matter how rigorously 
harmonized one is with oneself, the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ that has been discovered or self-legislated does 
not yet represent morality. Since moral thought finds its origination in the world in consideration 
and as a result of the existence of other humans, it must also find its actualization there. It is still, 
at this pre-action point, entirely subjective (since it only exists in thought-form in the subject), and 
has not yet taken any form of life in the world. It is, at best, nascent morality and remains to be 
‘born’ into the world. Whatever conclusions have been drawn are as yet unknown even in some 
ways to the one who has drawn them, because even one’s actions can be surprising to oneself. If 
the thought-morality has any being at all, it is in its pregnancy, or natality. If one is to produce a 
moral act and insert anything into the domain of morality, one’s thoughts must be disclosed and 
thrown out into the world as action.327 The internal, reflective deliberations undertaken in thought 
by the “two-in-one” do not constitute morality until they have been converted into action and 
disclosed in the public realm in which they find their object and relevance.  
                                                
327 I use the world “thrown” here because it best suits the idea I have in mind, of thoughts being cast into 
the public realm. It is not used in order to conjure Heidegger, as some of his more ardent readers might be inclined 
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of the midwife and birth concepts in Arendt. For those who wish to pursue this connection, Arendt would encourage 
a close reading of Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1962). 
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6.1.2 Morality in Action 
Arendt asserts that we can only think when we are alone and that we can only act in the 
presence of others, in public. For Arendt, the ‘public’ is constituted when “individuals come 
together in a particular way around an issue or object of common concern.”328 Individuals 
coming together to collaborate and deliberate in order to determine better ways of living together 
would seem to qualify as an issue of common concern. The previous section showed that 
thinking is necessary for morality, but thinking alone is not sufficient. Disclosure of the thinking 
about morality is necessary for morality to ‘come to life,’ because according to Arendt, without 
‘God’ handing down moral laws or demonstrable eternal truths (as opposed to what Arendt 
identifies as eternal truths that are simply un-provable) we are forced to live our lives “without a 
banister.”329 Her examination of Socrates’ propositions leaves two general alternatives in 
locating morality; morality and moral life exist either in the private thoughts of the individual or 
are found in the interactions between people in public.  
If morality exists only in private thoughts, one person could investigate and exercise 
moral judgment in conversation with oneself. The dialogue would be undertaken, the harmony 
with oneself found (or not), and that would be the end. According to Arendt (and Habermas) this 
is untenable because other people live in the world, not only oneself.330 “The plurality of the 
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human condition” places a fundamental moral limitation on politics.331 For the two-in-one to be 
in harmony one must be able to ‘live with oneself.’ For the two-on-one to be in harmony with the 
world, one’s actions must comply with one’s thought-determined morality and must then be 
disclosed through public action. The inner-conversation is taken up due to one’s relation to 
others or in thought-reaction to the presence of others in the world. It is one’s in-the-world-
interactions with other persons, not one’s musings about ‘what if’ one was to interact with other 
persons, that drives moral questions. The fact of interaction forces upon one the need to think 
about those interactions. Morality happens in the world and the inter-actions within it. It does not 
only happen in one’s own mind or actions (though it certainly exists by and through them). Since 
morality has no existence or presence in the world while still hidden in thought, this first 
alternative is not enough. Morality needs action, which leads to the second alternative for 
morality: that it exists in the public actions and disclosures of the internal moral self into the 
external world along with other persons’ insertions of themselves.  
Morality is constructed through the public disclosure of one’s self via previously private 
thoughts about morality and the public, interactive arguments and negotiations that follow. One 
may have a dialogue with oneself and it is through this dialogue that thinking occurs, but 
morality does not take form until one enters a public dialogue with others about morality through 
the disclosure of the moral self. Morality exists in the public disclosure of internally constructed 
judgments that are then tested, debated, negotiated, and sometimes instantiated in public laws or 
in social behaviors. One thinks and then one acts by disclosing those thoughts to the world, 
primarily through speech action.332 Chris Higgins notes that Arendt seems to both vacillate and 
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equivocate between ‘action’ and ‘speech’ and he points out that though a chapter in The Human 
Condition is titled “Action” it contains mostly thoughts about speech. He ultimately decides that 
Arendt “knits them together closely enough,”333 citing Arendt’s passage that “[w]ithout the 
accompaniment of speech…action would not only lose its revelatory character, but, and by the 
same token, it would lose its subject.”334 Nonetheless, not all action, and moral action at that, 
requires explicit speech. Arendt writes that some Germans, who under Nazi rule rejected the 
Nazi form of life by refusing to obey Nazi laws, came to this refusal by asserting “This I can’t 
do,” rather than, “This I ought not do,” which reveals first, an important difference between these 
two formulations, and second, the manifestation of two important results.335  
First, the formulations matter. The “can’t” is self-referential; ‘I could not live with myself 
if I did this.’ The “ought not” is social in that I should not or ought not do this because, though it 
might be possible for me to live with myself if I did so, others with whom I live would not want 
to live with me (or some other less dramatic consequence). With the “can’t” the directive 
originates internally, but it develops because of others. With “ought not” the directive originates 
externally and develops because of others. However this may be conceptually, the way the self-
referential ‘can’t’ plays out in the world makes it part of a social process. By asserting ‘I can’t’ 
and then by acting out that refusal, the insertion in the world becomes a suggestion to others 
about how one might, or even perhaps ought, act and therefore becomes a part of the public 
discussion of morality. 
The formulations then manifest two results that show their importance in public morality. 
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First, The non-cooperating Germans’ inaction became an action. By refusing to unthinkingly and 
uncritically comply with the Nazi’s new laws, they disclosed themselves to the world and thus 
inserted an action, however passively, by essentially say ‘no.’ Secondly, they kept alive the 
natality that is required for action. Their passive-actions of non-cooperative dissent eliminated 
the chance of consensus and natality-killing authoritarian control of morality by the Nazis, 
enacting and preserving the condition of plurality along with natality. By refusing to comply they 
retained the potential for an alternative version of Nazi morality. The Nazis turned previously 
existing morality on its head, first, because they presented new morals that simply replaced the 
old ones, and second, because the coercive mandate of the new morals essentially undermined 
morality by eliminating the public processes by and through which morality exists. These 
activities had a devastating effect on the characteristics of the pre-Nazi world, but the potential 
for something new and better than the Nazi world remained possible and ever-present through 
the non-cooperative passive-action of some citizens, despite the action-crushing world created by 
the Nazis. In this way an old-world morality (pre-Nazi morality) was preserved and lived on 
through the (in)actions of the dissenters, which could in turn help influence the creation of a 
post-Nazi new-world morality. 
Such passive action, and particularly under such conditions, is rare and can become 
necessary. More optimal for Arendt are the kind of conditions that are born when each person 
who enters the public dialogue truly thinks about what is being said and then re-discloses a new 
thought through speech action. This requires that one remove oneself from action in order to 
have the dialogue with oneself in solitude, and then return to disclose the (new) thoughts in 
public. Each public disclosure leads to a private dialogue in which the initial disclosure is treated 
with the thinking of an entirely different and unique individual who then discloses his thoughts 
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on that which has been disclosed by another. The second person’s response becomes a disclosure 
if the second person has thought by virtue of having had a genuine dialogue with himself. 
However, if the second person merely sends out exactly, and without thought, what was 
previously disclosed, this response is neither disclosure nor action; at best it is merely a re-
disclosure of someone else who has already been disclosed, and thus adding nothing to the 
deliberation. If, however, the re-action is new, and is followed by other genuine actions, the 
participants are constantly presented with new actions to inform new thoughts, creating a 
sequence in which each participant participates and combines with the others to learn something 
new with each subsequent disclosure and publicly participate in the development of morality. 
A person who is a thinker and an actor, whose thoughts and actions are constitutive of his 
inherent natality, must enact morality in the public realm. “With word and deed we insert 
ourselves in the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth.”336 Doing so allows 
morality to become the public dialogue that it must become, and that public realm is constitutive 
of a political, social, and moral process. The questions one asks oneself arise out of the problems 
of living in the world with others, putting morality squarely in public, existing in engagement 
with others through self-disclosure. The engagement is one of action and reaction, revelation and 
response, creating public dialogue in morality. It is also uncertain. By entering the public 
dialogue in morality one throws one’s lot in with others, one’s community, and all of humanity. 
It is a choice to not force or coerce, and, as Christine Korsgaard puts it, “to share, to trust, and 
generally speaking to risk your happiness or success on the hope that [others] will turn out to be 
human,” too.337  
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6.1.3 The Unfinished Uncertainty of Morality  
The interplay between thinking and acting must occur in order for something moral to be 
going on. Neither received tradition nor non-judgmental relativism requires such thought. In fact, 
relativism merely conditions one to never think nor make judgments, while accepting received 
judgments entails not thinking and the re-disclosure of judgments already made, providing 
nothing new. Such inertia exists in defiance and opposition to human plurality and requires an 
almost deliberate artificiality or denial of the human condition.338 Lev Yakubinsky claims that 
dialogue is a natural consequence of social life. Language and communication grew out of social 
living by necessity. Dialogue takes place with interruptions and unpredictable twists and turns, 
reflecting the plurality of humans involved. Monologue, however, can exist only with 
suppression of interruption, sometimes internally regulated, but usually regulated by rules placed 
upon participants so as to constrain their natural impulse to participate. It is for this reason that 
ideological morals that are presented for acceptance without argument cannot suffice for public 
consideration; doing so would not be a public action. Further, most of these received morals are 
re-disclosed by people who themselves have not thought about them, thus their disclosure of 
them is not a true disclosure, but rather a re-disclosure and therefore not a public action. In 
contrast, accepting a challenge to one’s moral disclosure, considering it in examination of life 
experience, and responding with a new disclosure are actions born of natality, require thought 
and action, and need both the private and public realms.  
What makes this process difficult is that the consequences of action or the re-actions that 
follow our (moral) disclosures are infinitely unpredictable; we can have no way of knowing the 
consequences of our actions, which Arendt says are boundless, before they are unleashed. This 
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fact does not stop people from attempting to deny the fact of unpredictability, or to rein in the 
uncertainties of an uncertain world. For most people uncertainty is unsettling and makes it 
difficult to know what to do in the face of so many contingencies. People want some way of 
determining indeterminate outcomes to soothe anxieties: thus the appeal of received morals 
based on authority and tradition. They provide both a pre-approved guide for action that 
eliminates the fear of ‘doing the wrong thing’ and the perception of stability and predictability in 
how actions—and the actions of others—will be received and approved. This need for 
reassurance might also be a sign that we lack confidence in our own capabilities for action.339 It 
may result from a direct knowledge of our limitations, and thus the desire to protect ourselves 
from the potential failure of what we do. The problem with restrictive models is that action, 
through the establishment of relationships, exceeds limits and boundaries,340 including the 
boundaries of received, bounded systems of morals. Alternately, this uncertainty may arouse a 
fear of using and possessing judgment because doing so implies the admission that if one is 
capable of judging one might also possess responsibility.341 Human action and genuine natal 
disclosure will eventually blow apart any preconceived limits or constraints placed upon it and 
render the received morals unreliable in the face of both thought and action. 
It might be that no one has any responsibility. Arendt identifies a seed of this perception 
in noting, “behind the unwillingness to judge lurks the suspicion that no one is a free agent, and 
hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or could be expected to answer for what he has 
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done.”342 If it can be shown that human actions are the result of unseen factors or psychological 
influences caused by external conditions or actors, one can more easily evade culpability with 
either oneself or others. Psychologists and sociologists can provide alibis for us by citing such 
behavior-modifying factors as parental influence, peer group pressures, or, in some instances, 
genetics. However, if we accept any of these alibis as absolution for our actions, then we cannot 
hold others accountable for theirs, all of which results in the elimination of the possibility of 
possessing moral judgment of others and convinces ourselves that none can be made of us, 
either. This is the refuge of relativism. Further, it is quite possible that if unseen factors have the 
kind of interference posited then we are even more responsible for what we do, obligating us to 
take steps to offset the corrupting influence of these unseen factors.343 However, responsibility, 
both yours and others’, is entailed in cosmopolitanism. In order to hold someone responsible we 
must regard him as a ‘person’ who is free and autonomous. Admitting shared humanity brings 
others into the domain of ‘persons’ and grants them both consideration and responsibility, thus 
admitting them into the domain of responsible persons. Assigning responsibility means they 
cannot also be excluded from considerations and deliberations of morality because this would 
push him outside of the circle of shared humanity, something a cosmopolitan cannot do. Second, 
wielding judgment, especially under the auspices of some authority, logically and implicitly 
subjects oneself to the same precepts. In this way cosmopolitanism escapes relativism and 
preserves the capacity for judgment through responsibility. 
Arendt would also recognize, in this context, that a search for consensus in morality, 
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while ostensibly noble, would ultimately undermine its own value and would only be successful 
in creating the conditions under which evil could emerge. First, such a thing would be impossible 
in a world of unique human beings, flush with natality, plurality, and potential for action. 
Second, if something approaching consensus could be found, it would wipe out action, which 
would eliminate the need for thinking—what would one need to think about if all was agreed 
upon and nothing new was brought into the world to challenge the old world?—and without 
thinking there would the be loss of a crucial barrier to tyranny (of the single authoritarian or the 
majority, it would not matter which) and thus usher evil through the front door.344 Third, and 
contemporaneous with the second point, if consensus was found how would those who found the 
consensus protect it from future challenge by new members born into the society, dangerously 
brimming with natality? The ‘old guard’ would have to constrain human action, perhaps even 
violently, denying the natality inherent in human life, and prescribe all parameters and 
constraints, thus taking the direct route to an ultimately illegitimate coercive state of the world, 
leading to the same world-destroying conditions of the second point. 
Arendt finds that “life without speech and without action…is literally dead to the world; 
it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men.”345 Living a life in 
speech and action among others automatically entails morality, however uncertain its content. To 
live a human life that contains the human conditions of natality, action, and plurality, one must 
accept the inherent unpredictability contained in each of these conditions. What makes each 
person unique, what enables action, and what preserves natality is the unavoidable 
unpredictability, and therefore uncertainty, of human life. Morality, as an always-emergent 
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product of human plurality and action, finds its place in the world as a result of these conditions 
and occupies a central role in human life. I would add this concept to Arendt’s list of human 
conditions: the human condition of uncertainty, a condition whose inevitable presence logically 
demands an understanding of life and morality as unfinished—or, rather, never finished—
business. The acceptance of the ineradicability of pluralism and uncertainty encourages thinking 
and action and disposes one to be prepared to inhabit an agonistic state of morality. 
6.2 Discourse Ethics and Agonistic Pluralism 
Discourse ethics and agonistic pluralism need not maintain a mutually exclusive 
relationship in cosmopolitan education, and one can bring them together by thinking with 
Arendt. Arendt’s conception of power is situated in the public sphere, where people engage in 
collaborative action, though they may actually be acting in opposition to each other as they might 
in moral contestation. Where Arendt has ‘power,’ as derived from collaborative public action, 
Habermas has “common convictions,” which “create the legitimate power for which strategic 
actors then compete.”346 That competition is the contestation of ‘the political’ in ‘politics’ per 
Mouffe. Arendt’s ‘power’ is action, and action creates relationships with the world and others in 
it by exceeding limits and boundaries.347 Those relationships introduce the moral component of 
life by provoking consideration of what those limitations and boundaries are or ought to be.  
In this context, action is the disclosure of the moral self in public which affects one’s 
relationships in the world. While Arendt asserts that human action is universal and public 
(insofar as all humans are potential actors) which affirms Habermas, each human behind each 
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action is unique and the way in which one inserts one’s self into the human world is a 
representation of that uniqueness, thus admitting the ineradicable nature of plurality which 
affirms Mouffe. The production of Habermas’s “common conviction” lies in the manner in 
which communication can take place and the processes by and through which the participants act 
with each other to deliberate. For Arendt that potentiality lies in ‘power’ which is the 
actualization of natality through action. According to Arendt, power requires “the living together 
of people,”348 —’living’ in the sense in which Arendt means that human ‘life’ occurs in ‘action.’ 
Though people may all live on the earth, and in doing so share humanity in common, they cannot 
act unless in the presence of others, and it is only through public action that morality has life. It 
is not enough to act as though or because there are other people; in such cases morality is a 
secondary consideration to one’s acts. Instead, action in the world occurs with other people and 
thus they become not only a primary consideration, but also an actualized component of our 
actions and morality.  
To maintain the conditions for human action people must remain in contact with each 
other. Arendt credits cities and the ‘organization’ within them with keeping people together after 
action has passed, a period during which people can and do withdraw to both their private lives 
as well as the solitary nature of ‘thinking.’ Discourse ethics can help provide ‘organization’ by 
and through which further action can take place by contributing a structure and process that 
invites everyone to participate in action in order to progress. The acceptance of the preconditions 
of communication and the democratic principles that undergird them provide a consistent public 
space in which individual speech action can take place. 
It is in these preconditions where Mouffe’s agonism can find a space to enter without 
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disrupting the process. There are preconditions that can even be preconditions of Habermas’s 
preconditions. For instance, Erman notes that there can “be no conflict without deliberation” and 
“conflict is dependent on some shared idea of what is at stake”349—the conflict must be about 
something that the different parties have in common, something as simple as a dislike of the 
status quo even if the reasons are different. Essentially they must at least agree about what the 
disagreement is about. Or, they might disagree about what the disagreement is about but agree 
that there is a disagreement. Thus a consensus is formed among the participants in the conflict, 
but by no means necessarily as a permanent or immutable consensus; it is not monolithic. For 
Erman, the “shared idea” is an ‘impediment’ to Mouffe’s rejection of a form of consensus in the 
ethico-political principles of politics because it represents a consensus; if Mouffe holds that 
conflict due to plurality is inevitable, then Mouffe admits consensus. However, for Mouffe “the 
free and unconstrained public deliberation of all on matters of common concern is a conceptual 
impossibility, since the particular forms of life which are presented as its ‘impediments’ are its 
very condition of possibility.”350 Thus the difference here is largely about where the consensus 
lies and not in consensus, per se. Further, Erman takes consensus narrowly: those engaged in 
conflict. Mouffe takes consensus more broadly, including everyone who could be engaged in the 
conflict. Two different ‘populations’ are at issue, and thus the two conceptions of consensus are 
not comparable.  
The forms of life for Mouffe that exist as impediments are a result of plurality, and such 
plurality is opposed to a moral consensus consisting of an impartiality that is impossible to attain. 
The shared idea, or the ‘that’ which is at stake, is that people will continue to relate with and to 
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each other, through deliberations of morality, and is the active process of inhabiting agonism. 
The shared idea is that there is something to be done or changed; there is a better way or 
outcome to be pursued. Conflict itself can form a precondition of communication. The 
omnipresence of human plurality guarantees that conflict, or antagonism, will always be present 
and serve as a compulsion for adjudication. Preserving the natality of each person’s potential for 
contributing to the alterations that come from joining in the adjudication is essential for morality 
to continue its role in human life, despite the conflict or hostility that may be provoked.  
The ‘domestication’ of hostility by ‘politics’ that Mouffe invokes is a process that 
recognizes the multiple conceptions of the good and the conflicts therein—the results of the 
condition of human plurality—but also recognizes that each is allowed its place in speech action 
(Arendt) or communicative action (Habermas). The domestication of hostility and the actions 
that cause it are one in the same; human speech and action mean, “to take an initiative, to begin, 
to set something into motion.”351 The human condition of plurality ensures that ‘hostility’ or 
antagonism will obtain, and thus what remains is for action to emerge. Speaking or acting 
introduces one into the world. When one recognizes another’s action one admits acceptance of 
the other person as another human and the act of acting among others is an act of being human. 
Re-acting to another person’s speech act with one’s own introduces the conflict, tension, and 
agonism of two humans interacting as well as the means by which the conflict can be 
transformed from antagonism of eliminative violence to collaborative inter-action. The action 
here is a dialogue of disclosures—of one’s self into the world as well as into the 
argument/interaction with the other person—that admit concurrent possibilities. One set of 
possibilities might include the interest in the actions such as an issue, argument, topic, policy, or 
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morality, while another set might include the interest in an improvement regarding that which 
governs our interactions such as policies, procedures, or morals. Yet another possibility might lie 
in an interest in seeing the thing through or in legitimizing the process by and through which we 
act by finding some ground upon which to contest each other.  
In a move similar to Arendt’s distinction between ‘work’ and ‘action,’ Habermas makes a 
distinction between ‘work’ and ‘interaction,’ wherein work refers to instrumental and strategic 
activities and interaction involves the negotiation of behaviors352 that guide certain norms, 
particularly those involving coordinated, concurrent, or otherwise shared activities.353 The 
dialogue of action that occurs in this agonistic, yet democratic, state is vital to the formation of 
morality. The actual contestation of the ideas that are disclosed by participants tests the 
substance of each disclosure. Participants receive the disclosures of others in a milieu of 
disclosure and response, thinking and reflection, as each moves back and forth from the private 
to the public to think and act. Participating in this process puts one in the middle of a shared 
morality as well as a shared inquiry and education in morality. Its public nature entails its 
placement in the moral domain and as (potential) public actors each of us is an agent of 
morality.354 
6.3 The Educational Value of Moral Agonism 
Agonism sits at the intersection of plurality and unpredictability and at the cusp of 
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education. Gert Biesta asserts that plurality is “the condition of education itself,”355 and 
education should be “first and foremost concerned with the opportunities for human beings to 
come into the world,”356 but in order to be so it must entail interaction with others, not merely 
being among them. Education is an endeavor that is often organized with and for certainty, 
confidence, and a presumption of its merits. The content is presented to students, usually without 
alternatives, and they are then assessed to see if they have learned it. The assessments are also 
used to determine if the methods used to teach the students have been effective. If not, they are 
redesigned in order to increase the likelihood, attempting to approach certainty, that more 
students will learn the content next time. Teachers are encouraged to engage in this kind of 
‘reflection’ on their activities all for the sake of ensuring that more and more learning takes 
place. Educational content is an explicit admission of what the designers of it desire the learners 
to know; the organizing principle of certainty is an implicit admission that the process by which 
this is done is secondary. 
But how can we be certain that certainty will be achieved in the face of so much plurality 
and natality? One popular and widely enacted answer is the implementation of standardization in 
education. The aforementioned efforts to achieve certain predetermined outcomes are all 
designed to adhere to a standard, a fixed set of content and criteria designed to ensure that every 
educational effort has the same aim, goal, assessment, and relative measurement for each 
student. Standardization is one dominant response to the quest for certainty that fulfils the aims 
and capabilities of a technical and instrumental approach to education. Standardization provides 
a familiar, common, easily articulated set of discrete educational goals that eliminate educational 
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and intellectual variation that might otherwise produce unforeseen and unpredictable outcomes. 
Standardization adds further efficiency and certainty to educational efforts by making it easier to 
deliver, administer, and assess those efforts. 
However, the injection of agonism into such an educational world disrupts those 
determinate and determining efforts. Agonism cannot be meant to understand learning as the 
acquisition of that which already exists in the world, but instead as a response to what exists and 
to new insertions. Biesta writes that someone has learned “not when she is able to copy and 
reproduce what already existed, but when she responds to what is unfamiliar, what is different, 
what challenges, irritates, or even disturbs.”357 The acquisition of forms of knowledge or logic 
admits us into a ‘rational community,’ which is a community of people who are connected by 
what is said and whether it is justified. However, there is another community, the ‘other’ 
community, which is constituted by those not circumscribed by the rational community. This 
‘other’ community is different and it challenges the rational community and disturbs it. In a 
rational community, since what matters is only what is said and its justification, anyone can say 
it, and therefore everyone becomes interchangeable. Biesta states that we need to maintain the 
‘other’ community because if it disappears, so does the world. Maintaining the possibility of 
difference and challenge in the world is vital. Such experience forces us to confront agonism 
head-on and is a first step in reversing the natality-destroying trends of certainty and 
standardization. These certainty and standardization efforts in education seek to make teaching, 
learning, education, and even life, ‘easier,’ but as long as thinking and natality can be preserved, 
they will not.  
Rather than seeking ways to make education easier we need to make it harder in order to 
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make it better, by restoring the tempering effects of agon in forging educated beings. Agonism is 
vital for an education in morality in particular, and education in general. Agonistic pluralism may 
appear to make it more difficult to resolve moral differences and even harder to say something 
definitive about morality, but those difficulties must not be avoided. It is easier to flail about 
aimlessly in moral relativism or to fall back upon some ‘authority’ to defend your moral choices 
for you in a received moral tradition, but such retreats limit the educational value of the efforts. 
The real work in education, the gain and growth, takes place when students challenge the 
boundaries that have been previously drawn, both in ability and conception, and the real work in 
education in morality lies in the same. One may have the conversation with oneself, a necessary 
dialogue to be sure, in order to produce legitimate thought, but those thoughts are not ‘in the 
world’ until they have been disclosed through human action which must be public and most 
effectively through speech action. Revealing one’s moral self is risky and making one’s moral 
thoughts public can be daunting, but this must be done if one is to have any kind of input in the 
life of morality. Others doing the same may oppose or contradict what one discloses, but one 
must be revealed in order to renew the world of morality and to keep morality meaningfully 
relevant to those new members of the ‘world,’ the space in which revelations become public.358 
Earlier, it was suggested that agonism appeared to be the contemporary norm and 
constant state of affairs because of the ongoing contestation of existing norms, policies and laws. 
Yet in these contexts, the desire of most parties is to ‘win’ the policy argument, implement the 
winning policy, and then keep that policy in perpetuity. Alas, for such aspirants in a democracy, 
and particularly in those examples we presently have, it is extremely difficult for such designs to 
withstand constant and evolving opposition. In these empirical cases agonism (which, more 
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accurately, is merely antagonism) persists only because the ‘winners’ of these debates are unable 
to implement their policies permanently. As stated before, most of those interested in specific 
morals and moral norms are not hoping to revise their judgments or open them to debate, but are 
instead seeking to compel others to accept and obey them. Agonism does not seek contest in 
order to determine a ‘winner’ or specific outcome, but rather to test and improve the mettle of 
that which is being contested. A good contest is one that is contested well by all participants, not 
one that has simply produced a result. Further, if both participants are there to contest the better 
idea, and if the contest is well executed, neither loses. In fact both participants win because a 
well-contested bout will result in a more accurate determination of the better idea, something 
from which both contestants can benefit. 
The kind of educational world that utilizes discourse ethics and agonism while couched 
within the framework of cosmopolitan education guided by cosmopolitan philosophy describes a 
state of being in education in morality that I call moral agonism. Cosmopolitan education, as an 
education in morality, asks the participants to stand in spaces in between dueling certainties, 
dogmas, traditions, and received knowledge. It is a signpost for processes that are based on our 
shared humanity—which essentially stands for the shared conditions of being human—and 
neither a medium of specific answers nor a roadmap of directions. It does not solve the 
‘problem’ of plurality, but rather embraces it by inhabiting agonism in morality. Using Mouffe’s 
phrasing, cosmopolitan education attempts to convert the antagonism in morals education into 
the agonism of an education in morality. It is firmly rooted in our humanness, in the hard facts of 
the conditions of human life that define, inform, and constrain us, from plurality to natality and 
from thought to action. It asks us to transcend fallible and largely arbitrary boundaries erected by 
humans, but by doing so it is an almost explicit replacement of transcendent impulses for 
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concrete, dialogic, and pragmatic ones. We live in a world with other people and each one is 
unique, a characteristic that is shared by all. None of us can predict, nor hope to control, what 
will arise when any or all of us choose to act in the world and yet each of us that does so in the 
context of morality will do so because we want to make the world better in the face of the 
uncertainty that it will actually become so. By inhabiting moral agonism one can participate in a 
cosmopolitan education in morality despite impulses for certainty. 
The desire for certainty in morality leads educators in the field of moral education into all 
kinds of trouble. When education is organized to deliver ‘true knowledge’ there is no need to pay 
attention to anything that is not ‘true.’ There is no need to question or investigate, and nothing to 
compare to that which has been given.359 In contrast, moral agonism takes the uncertainty of 
moral ‘truth’ as a starting point, and the unpredictability of what might replace it as the only 
certainty. Moral agonists cannot rely on the ‘truth’ of moral claims, only on their justification via 
agon in public disclosure. Education in general is the process by which someone enters “into a 
community of thought and action,”360 and such a community governed by the principles of 
discourse ethics and agonistic pluralism as offered here, as well as thought and action as 
conceived by Arendt, and concerning itself with morality, brings one into communion with 
others through moral agonism.361 Education, not unlike morality, cannot allow itself to suffer 
from a lack of thought in order to produce action; this would doom us to either re-creating under 
the guise of the new, or of unthinkingly accepting the old, and thereby be devoid of genuine 
                                                
359 Carsten Ljunggren, “Agonistic Recognition in Education: On Arendt’s Qualification of Political and 
Moral Meaning,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 29, no. 1 (2010): 20. 
360 Ljunggren, “Agonistic Recognition in Education,” 19. 
361 By ‘communion’ I mean an act of sharing, of intimate fellowship and rapport in a deliberative dialogue 
of mutual interpretation. It does not have to be harmonious nor conflict free, but in the coming together for a 
particular purpose in a form of public and communicative action one forms a ‘community’ within which one lives in 
action, however briefly. 
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action. Further, we must take care to avoid overemphasis on simple communication (of opinions, 
or moral claims) with a concurrent lack of emphasis on thinking about them. 
Discourse ethics and agonism, through the framework of cosmopolitan education, offer 
similar functions for moral inquiry. The payoff is not in the product, but in the process. The 
product does matter; morality education is, after all, a quest to find potentially prescriptive 
behaviors to address problems we encounter through experience and it is nothing if not an 
attempt to improve our lives. However, it is not only about producing outcomes, but also about 
aligning ourselves with the outcomes and part of our alignment comes from the process that gets 
us there. The two-in-one questions itself to find out if they-he can live with themselves-himself 
and the process they-he have engaged. Socrates concluded that it is better to suffer harm than to 
do harm and cosmopolitan education carries with it this barest of prescriptions by implicitly 
prescribing that one consider one’s fellow human beings in action. Acting in the world is a 
responsibility and cannot be taken lightly nor without skilled deliberations. Our shared humanity 
and living space bring such concerns to the forefront of every action we take; we must not only 
be in harmony with ourselves, but also with those whom our very contemplation serves to 
consider. The double-edged sword of morality cuts both ways, provoking our actions and 
thoughts to constantly adjust and triangulate between each of them and others, though without a 
final certainty or fixed destination. 
For moral agonism, having or maintaining agonism is not enough. Agonism involves not 
only contestation, but also contestation for the appropriate reasons; to test and improve, often as 
a reaction of dissent or disapproval, and sometimes passively rather than actively. In moral 
agonism the desire is to encourage the contestation, and therefore deliberations, in order to 
improve the existing understanding of morality, to make what understanding we have clearer, 
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stronger, and more efficacious. Moral agonism, in short, is an educational mechanism. In 
attempting to transform antagonism in deliberations of morality into agonism one transforms the 
processes utilized. Processes such as those that adhere to non-thinking, non-participatory 
principles or static traditions lie outside the moral domain and are antagonistic, and need to be 
transformed into agonistic processes that take place within the domain of morality and have as 
their object inclusive participation and improvement of its own processes as well as its products, 
such as morals. Further, these agonistic processes are utilized to strengthen and improve what 
they contact such as the policies they produce, the reflective and active methods of morality they 
encourage, and the skills in morality of those who participate. Shared humanity, democratic 
inclusion, infinite human pluralism, and ethical progress are combined in a process of constant 
disclosure, action and reaction, inquiry and evaluation, natality and growth. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by examining the important role that thinking plays in morality 
wherein thinking is a process by and through which one has a dialogue with oneself and attempts 
to come to an agreement with oneself about morality. This agreement, however sound, is not 
enough to suffice for morality until it produces an action, usually through speech and in the 
public sphere. The action produced, if a product of the individual’s natality and genuine thought, 
is a disclosure of the self and an insertion of something ‘new’ into the world. The human 
condition of plurality provokes an onslaught of actions and re-actions, or interactions, that for 
morality produce the content of a public dialogue in morality to be challenged and tested through 
agonism. Cosmopolitan moral education engages students in public acts, or deliberations, of 
morality, pressing individuals to inquire about morality, think about their moral choices, and 
publicly justify them. The ineradicability of the human condition of plurality and the 
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preservation of natality ensure that morality is never complete or ‘finished,’ but instead continues 
to emerge from the ‘old’ world into the ‘new,’ constantly renewing itself. Cosmopolitan 
education requires that one recognize the benefits of agonism whilst in the throes of public 
insertions about morality, resulting in the inhabiting of a political, moral, and dialogic 
educational agonistic morality.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
7.1 A Review: Looking Backward 
The preceding chapters were organized around large, self-sustaining concepts that were 
brought together: a chapter on cosmopolitan philosophy and education and another on 
cosmopolitan processes and ethical progress; a chapter on the field of moral education and 
education in morality; a chapter on political processes in dialogue; and finally a chapter primarily 
about the work of Hannah Arendt in thinking, plurality, and public action. This project could 
have instead been a treatise on cosmopolitan philosophy and education wherein I could have 
summoned the various other contributions—discourse ethics here and moral thought there—as 
specific pieces of the cosmopolitan education in morality puzzle were assembled. However, 
since it was made clear in Chapter 3 that process matters, it did not ‘feel right’ to throw the 
pieces together to merely serve the end of creating a picture of cosmopolitan education in 
morality. Doing so would have felt like a contradiction of my statement in Chapter 1 in which I 
stated that due to cosmopolitanism’s inherent non-dogmatism one cannot simply prescribe a 
pedagogy and say, “There, now go do this.” Instead, this project required that each piece be 
taken through its own processes and justifications so that the value of each could be revealed. 
Such a process is not at all unlike a cosmopolitan educational model in which each person is 
provided the opportunity to contribute something of value to morality.  
The model embodied by the project also possesses a challenging characteristic; there is 
no absolute or perfect starting point in connecting these apparently disparate ideas. I could have 
started with any of these points and worked through the others. I could have begun with politics 
and finished with the field moral education. Or instead I could have started with natality, a 
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beginning that would be thematically appropriate, and concluded with a gathering under the 
cosmopolitan umbrella. This flexibility is indicative of functional elasticity rather than 
formlessness, and the locus of that flexibility is on the nature of cosmopolitan philosophy and 
education. I began with cosmopolitanism because of its framing characteristics. It lays down a 
few ‘ground rules’ that are derived from seemingly incontrovertible principles in order to then 
dispose what follows to certain processes. The chief ground rule, that we humans are connected 
through the fact of our shared humanity, is well worn and time tested, but it suffers from some 
conceptual confusion. Is it only our ‘good’ characteristics that count as ‘humanity’ and bring us 
together? Can someone be inhuman? If a human can do something unspeakably bad, how can 
that not be a part of what it means to be human? It is for this reason that Arendt was brought in to 
bridge the gaps between the other pieces and offer support for shared humanity. Arendt provides 
a bookend to cosmopolitanism and provides cosmopolitan philosophy with a stronger foundation 
in shared humanity through her conception of the human condition. Taken this way, the political 
processes described in the middle chapters serve as planks on the bridge that connect the support 
pilings of cosmopolitanism and Arendt, and they form a partnership in an education in morality.  
The processes of epistemological restraint, discourse ethics, and agonistic pluralism were 
invoked as a synthesis of means for people to engage in moral dialogue, contribute to ethical 
progress, and maintain democratic inclusiveness essential to shared humanity in recognition of 
all person’s inhabitation of the human condition. The human condition of human plurality forces 
upon us issues of morality. Our actions in the world as responses to that plurality make us all 
participants in politics and morality, through which the human condition of natality prevents us 
from ever knowing what is going to happen as a result of our actions. These Arendtian human 
conditions are more formal and conceptually clear articulations of what our shared humanity 
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actually shares. It also accommodates a more expansive and inclusive conception of humanity by 
retaining the inclusion of those who violate morality. Possessing the potential to do something 
‘bad’ is as much a part of the human condition and natality as it is to have the potential to do 
something ‘good.’ Natality shows us that it is the potential that initially binds us. Recognizing 
this prevents ‘badness’ from becoming grounds for exclusion from humanity. Our failings, moral 
and otherwise, are a part of what we share and thus the cosmopolitan principle of shared 
humanity is truly shared, from top to bottom and from best to worst.  
Chapter 2 framed the project with cosmopolitanism. From the principle of shared 
humanity to the logical consequent of democratic inclusiveness, the parameters for what 
followed were set. The recognition of living with other people, the necessity of openness and 
receptivity to the world, and the concurrent need to engage dynamically with it circumscribed a 
general attitude that could help maintain a commitment to shared humanity and the democratic 
impulses therein while also recognizing that there is always a new understanding to be had. 
Chapter 3 underscored the importance of process in cosmopolitan education in morality in light 
of the framing conditions set in Chapter 2 such that even though human actions are undertaken 
for certain ends, the processes by which they are attained contain valuable and formative 
characteristics in morality. Philip Kitcher’s ethical progress provided a historically grounded 
description and vision of ongoing processes of collaborative ethical deliberation that fall within 
cosmopolitan parameters, and are able to accommodate the political processes outlined in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 4 developed the concept of education in morality and distinguished it from 
other prevalent forms of moral education. Education in morality—as a process-centric, 
democratically inclusive, non-dogmatic inquiry grounded in the principles of what education 
is—is suited to accommodate an education in natality, which protects in students both the 
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intrinsic unique potential for creative action in the world and protects the world from their 
inevitable false starts. Education in morality and natality combine to place the student in a 
position to understand morality and participate in its development through the political processes 
examined in Chapter 5. With the cosmopolitan and educational tone thusly set, the political 
processes of epistemological restraint, discourse ethics, and agonistic pluralism were mined for 
their contributions to a cosmopolitan educational dialogue and inquiry in morality. 
Epistemological restraint creates a rational and publicly shareable space for those with 
contrasting beliefs to continue to deliberate meaningfully with others. Discourse ethics provides 
a method by which interested parties can collaborate in deliberation with genuine interest, while 
agonistic pluralism shows that even though difference is ineradicable it is also necessary to 
active and democratic life. Chapter 6 synthesized these process and the cosmopolitan conditions 
that framed them through Arendt’s conceptions of thinking, action, and the public realm of 
politics and morality.  
Wilson’s critique of moral education exposes the importance of the processes, criteria, 
and methods through which we come to understand and participate in morality. Wilson is 
correct, I think, in seeing that scientific methods have something to offer moral philosophers and 
educators, namely that all theories, results, and conclusions must be tested and retested and 
verified, and then re-examined again when new information comes to light. Where Wilson goes 
wrong is in presuming to offer criteria that are only descriptive and based upon very rationalistic 
principles. His criteria are an interesting place to begin; they are a ‘conversation starter,’ but 
should not be seen as a resting place. Science is at its best and most accurate when it is 
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descriptive; in prediction it merely plays the percentages and often falls apart.362 For instance, 
climatologists go to great lengths to understand and describe climate patterns and effects. Within 
the field there is very little dissent about the descriptive effects of climate change in the past 
century and very few climatologists who have concluded that there has been no such change. 
Most of the controversy about climate change exists outside of the field and revolves around 
prescriptions for what to do about it. Climatologists may offer prescriptions for how to slow or 
reverse human-influenced climate change, and these prescriptions are likely to be better than 
those of non-scientists for achieving the goals intended, but they are based on probability models 
on what they currently know from the descriptive data. In morality it is similar. For example, the 
Defining Issues Test might identify certain types of moral reasoning and the processes by and 
through which they develop.363 It might also be able to make prescriptions for how to duplicate 
or prevent the same processes and development, but these, too, will be based on probabilities of 
what we know, and more importantly, will not tell us what morals we ought to have.  
There is, however, a crucial difference; whether or not one agrees that human-influenced 
climate change is occurring, most people agree that it is best to not harm the world’s climate. 
This is why those who oppose climate change theories attempt to discredit the science. The 
moment they accept that human activities are inducing climate changed they cannot reasonably 
oppose any attempts to slow or reverse this process. In morality, the issue is not so clear. It is not 
only a questions of whether or not a particular behavior is moral, but also a question of what 
                                                
362 Prescription is hard to conceive in meteorology unless one considers climatologists’ prescriptions for 
how to slow or reverse human-influenced climate change, or how to avoid getting wet when it rains—bring an 
umbrella or a raincoat.  
363 Defining Issues Test (DIT), is a test of moral reasoning and development constructed by James Rest. It 
consists of five moral dilemmas about which subjects are asked to provide responses using a Likert scale, thus 
providing quantitative data for analysis. See “The Center for the Study of Ethical Development,” 2008, 
http://www.centerforthestudyofethicaldevelopment.net/. 
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exactly morality is. Climatologists generally have a clear idea about what counts as relevant data 
and how to collect it, though they are always interested in exploring news ways to improve these 
methods. In morality we are still, and always, engaged with the fundamental step of figuring out 
what the domain itself is and what it is that counts as moral. In climatology and most other 
sciences the question of what ‘climate’ is has been settled, leaving only the descriptive aspects to 
pursue, and there are few if any debates about climate is. In morality, however, the answer to the 
descriptive question does not tell us what morality is nor what ought to be moral.  
Further complicating matters is that this moral business is social. Social forces have 
created in each of us a type of subjective foundation. I cannot help to deliberate from ‘some 
place,’ from some position in and among the things I am evaluating. Williams concluded, “I 
must deliberate from what I am.”364 Nevertheless, what I am is not always so clear and the 
origins and influences that make up what I am are so numerous and non-discrete that reductivist 
attempts at clarification become downright silly in their futility. Least of all ‘I’ cannot be reduced 
only to the experiences I have had because those are constantly happening or being revealed, and 
so many more are yet to come. However, I can remain open to potential influences by the things 
that are not part of my historical and experiential background. I am who I am precisely because I 
can change and be changed, influence and be influenced. If this were not the case I would not be 
me. I would instead be you and everyone else and we would all be exactly the same. Human 
plurality condemns us to both being who we are and to becoming another version of ourselves. 
As a human, the ability to influence and to act in the world must necessarily be accompanied by 
the potential to be acted upon and influenced. And just as one might choose to not act, one might 
also choose to not be acted upon. However, if we are to take Arendt’s assertion seriously, that 
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one who chooses to not act, to not live among others, has chosen a life that has “ceased to be a 
human life,”365 then it becomes clear that we must be open to either both possibilities or neither 
of them. 
How truthfulness to an existing self or society is to be combined 
with reflection, self-understanding, and criticism is a question that 
philosophy, itself, cannot answer. It is the kind of question that has 
to be answered through reflective living. The answer has to be 
discovered, or established, as the result of a process, personal and 
social, which essentially cannot formulate the answer in advance, 
except in an unspecific way.366 
 
In seeking to educate in morality we cannot simply say ‘here it is, learn it, be it, live it.’ 
Instead we need to think about it ourselves, determine whether or not it is something we can 
countenance, and then bring about our actions in living in a manner that reflects those thoughts. 
Through our actions in life we make our morality public, subjecting it to the judgments and 
reflections of others. Our actions are both items to judge and points to consider and they come 
back to us, perhaps differently, as they are re-transmitted into the world by others. Whether we 
humans possess the capacity for ‘universal moral grammar’ or whether we are merely self-
interested utility-maximizers, the processes of justification, verification, and adjudication take 
place through personal and social processes and are the only way in which morality can exist. 
Ideologically distinct and bounded forms of life may call themselves morality, but they are 
instead non-political, non-moral constructions that deny the dynamism, pluralism, and natality of 
human existence.  
In a simplistic way cosmopolitanism does contain an acceptance of the idea of a universal 
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moral grammar.367 It recognizes the importance of social environments and individual autonomy, 
and it accepts what should be obvious; humans have the capacity to conceive of and develop 
morality. This can be seen in the same way that humans can conceive of and develop language. 
The first language each of us speaks is almost entirely determined by our social environment, but 
that does not mean we cannot develop the capacity to think and speak in other languages. 
Sometimes one language is more suited to our communication needs than another (e.g. 
schadenfreude) and thus possessing the capacity—and on a continuum, a realized capacity that is 
closer to proficiency than mere potential—to access or learn other languages is beneficial. 
Similarly, cosmopolitanism enables recognition of the contribution that other forms of life and 
morality can make to our own lives. Having the capacity to deeply consider and reflect upon 
multiple ways of living and multiple conceptions of morality is likely to evoke a more steadfast 
disposition to respect, engage, and collaborate with them in the further development of morality.  
This latter characteristic is the other tine in the fork of cosmopolitan education’s flexible 
orientation to change that most bounded systems of morality do not have. One is encouraged to 
expand and develop morality, not merely take it as it is. Words and concepts are added to 
languages all of the time, and other words and concepts fade into disuse, obscurity, and even 
obsolescence, and it has been no different for morality nor is it likely to be. There is an 
expectation that one will be capable of both accepting and initiating change. The importance of 
agency in the development of morality is a kind of inoculation against becoming a passive 
recipient of moral principles and strictures.  
We are left with a human condition in which morality is active, public, unpredictable, and 
ever changing, a conception that renders fixed systems of morality incapable of responding to 
                                                
367 See Marc Hauser, Moral Minds; and John Mikhail, “Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and 
the Future,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11, no, 4 (2007). 
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new conditions that emerge in the world. A person who hopes to be a moral actor and developer 
must be educationally disposed to the unpredictability of morality. This disposition involves the 
inhabitation of moral agonism, a space wherein mutually respectful adversaries who are 
genuinely interested in finding the best idea contest their ideas. This disposition requires the 
acceptance of unpredictability and the inevitability of change, the desire for improvement, the 
humility of recognized fallibility, the necessity of democratic inclusion, and the daunting 
awareness that the moral project will never be finished.  
7.2 The Implications: Looking Around Us 
The results of this project have a few implications for education, morality, and research. 
Due to the recent increase in interest in cosmopolitan philosophy in education, this project 
attempts to lay down a path for exploring cosmopolitanism’s potential in the field of moral 
education. I hope to offer moral educators a wider range of options and a more flexible 
framework for introducing education in morality to students in light of increased global 
intercultural contact. This education in morality does not abandon moral judgment, but it does 
leave behind the antiquated notion that morals and morality are permanently fixed. This 
admission leaves open the possibility of amendment to moral constructions and enables an 
individual to more competently adapt to new understandings of the world and developments in 
morality. Individuals so disposed will also be more likely to possess the capacity to participate in 
the development of morality rather than be a passive recipient of received or predetermined 
moral knowledge. 
In this project, the work of Hannah Arendt emerged as an excellent resource for thinking 
about cosmopolitan education and its role in an education in morality, and though other scholars 
have leaned on Arendt in order to think about cosmopolitan education, few if any have given her 
 186 
work so large a role.368 The affinity between ‘shared humanity’ and ‘the human condition’ 
aside—and no insignificant affinity, either, since the former is the most fundamental principle in 
cosmopolitan thought—Arendt’s conceptions of thinking, natality, and action, as well as 
important concepts not explored in this research such as forgiveness and promise-making, may 
offer cosmopolitan education thinkers deep philosophical, political, and conceptual clarity for 
increasing not only the strength of their arguments, but in providing another language with which 
to think and converse about what cosmopolitan education is and could be. While Arendt could 
not be called a cosmopolitan in the sense that such a person is the adherent of a free standing 
cosmopolitan-’ism,’ she has articulated conceptions of the purpose of various political and social 
activities that sound very cosmopolitan. 
If the solidarity of mankind is to be based on something more solid 
than the justified fear of mans demonic capabilities, if the new 
universal neighborship of all countries is to result in something 
more promising than a tremendous increase in mutual hatred and a 
somewhat universal irritability of everybody against everybody 
else, then a process of mutual understanding and progressing self-
clarification on a gigantic scale must take place.369 
 
Perhaps the ‘demeanor’ of Arendt’s work, a demeanor that might be commonly called too 
‘realistic’ if not a little melancholy, is too hard-edged or depressing for the more optimistic 
cosmopolitan proponents. I see in Arendt’s starkness and cold stare at the human condition an 
offset to most cosmopolitan thought and also additional tools of investigation. It seems fitting 
that a scholar whose work has been so difficult to categorize or situate within dominant 
ideological and theoretical perspectives has much to offer a philosophy that avoids dogmatic 
prescription. It is my recommendation to cosmopolitan educational theorists to engage Arendt’s 
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81-94, (Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970), 84. 
 187 
work more fully so that cosmopolitan education and educators can move beyond simply 
justifying their claims to the crucial step of enacting their claims in the political and policy-
related arenas for development of cosmopolitan educational processes. 
An exciting implication of this research is that cosmopolitan education can contribute to 
moral education in schooling without a specific or dedicated program of moral education 
curriculum. Since it is the process and the disposition toward inquiry, growth, and the new that 
matters most, and since cosmopolitan education in morality is established in education rather 
than in morality, this orientation can find space in any subject area. It can implement the 
processes of democratic inclusiveness, openness and receptivity, mutual respect, agonistic 
contestation of ideas, acceptance of fallibility, and necessity of improvement to engage in 
examination of any content in formal schooling. Whether in a world history class or a chemistry 
class, cosmopolitanism’s openness and recognition of the unsettled and uncertain nature of the 
world can beget a curiosity in what currently appears to be and in what might come next. 
Curiosity in education might simply be a differently formed conception of natality since it is a 
catalyst for inquiry and as a desire to learn, as opposed to a desire to know, it instigates a process 
of discovery, comparison, and judgment that can be undertaken regardless of the content.  
The critical approach to education in cosmopolitanism encourages attention to 
differentials and orients one to the spaces of incongruence as much as similarities. Sometimes 
this means the places where competing ideas conflict and sometimes this means the places in 
which one idea falls short. It encourages the identification and questions of assumptions. This 
inherent criticality can be threatening to some because cosmopolitanism holds that all knowledge 
is open to revision and our most stubborn ‘facts’ ought to be reviewed periodically. Even our 
certainties should be vetted and contested, or in agonistic terms, should be tested by the new 
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challengers that emerge. In education the new challengers take the form of new students, new 
ideas, and new methods. Cosmopolitan education helps students reconceive these threats as 
challenges and opportunities to reinforce, improve through revision, or replace what is known 
with something that might be better. 
The deliberate utilization of moral agonism as part of and resulting from a cosmopolitan 
education in morality suggests a number of benefits. An agonistic orientation in education and in 
morality is less susceptible to manipulation and rhetoric and hence indoctrination and 
demagoguery. One so disposed is less likely to accept things at face value or fall prey to clever 
persuasion. Since moral agonism is grounded in a recognition of the public space of morality and 
politics it would also increase sensitivity to the instrumental uses of public knowledge and power 
for unjust individual or private benefit and therefore be a ‘canary in the mine’ in detecting threats 
to democracy or justice. A moral agonist would understand morality relationally, as things done 
with and in consideration of other people. She would understand that collaboration is ever-
present and necessary for public moral goods, even in the form of contestation. Others, including 
adversaries, would be seen as partners in seeking improvement in the rules, customs, structures, 
and institutions that order social relations. This kind of collaboration would not be a zero-sum 
game; moral agonist participants would see that even if one’s own proposal ‘loses,’ we all gain 
from the knowledge of the better idea or way.  
The conception of cosmopolitan education developed in this project could serve as a 
unifying set of principles for the field of moral education. There are many different ideas and 
forms of moral education and many different theoretical foundations supporting them. The 
inclusive nature of cosmopolitanism, both in theory as well as in education, could serve to gather 
together the different moral theories and programs and do two things. First, it could present them 
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as the content of the conversation or deliberation of morality in education. Cosmopolitanism 
does not say that one system is good and another bad. It does, however, offer a way to discuss 
competing forms of moral education that is less about which is ‘the one’ and more about what 
each has to offer an education in morality. There may very well be times in which a utilitarian 
perspective might be ‘better’ and other times in which a virtue approach would be more 
compelling. The value of a cosmopolitan education in morality is that, in the spirit of Terence, no 
morality systems known to man are foreign to it: they all have a place at the table.370  
Second, the basic principles of cosmopolitanism could be used to sift through the other 
morality systems to find the compatible components of each and bring them together under one 
roof. In this case, rather than taking each of the morality systems in total and moderating the 
‘discussion’ between them as it might in the first instance above, it would effectively stand as the 
mediating set of principles or criteria for what might be included in the discussions. For instance, 
any prescription found in another morality system that allowed for the implementation of a rule 
to prevent subsequent generations from amending the moral codes set by the present generation 
would quite obviously run afoul of a cosmopolitan orientation to morality. Thus, such future 
exclusion could not be part of the cosmopolitan mediated discussion. 
This development leads to yet another potential research question: what would an 
education in morality look like or consist of if one were to apply the kind of cosmopolitanism 
offered in this project to all of the existing moral education theories and programs currently in 
use? What would the field of moral education look like if it were ‘filtered’ by cosmopolitanism? 
My current project contemplated cosmopolitan education in morality, itself, as a means of 
education as a moral education, not as a submission of yet another competing version. However, 
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it might be useful to understand how the application of cosmopolitan education processes would 
work specifically in existing morals education constructs. In a quick survey of 134 articles in 
leading English language journals of moral education, articles that were specifically about 
morals education methods, content, or programs, I could find only four that include cosmopolitan 
philosophy or cosmopolitan conceptions of either education or morality.371 Clearly, this 
dissertation is only a start in re-conceiving the field of moral education using a cosmopolitan 
lens, and in particular a lens that utilizes a more public and political approach. Perhaps this 
project can help provide justification for more research as well as a language for teachers to be 
more deliberate and articulate in their cosmopolitan educational intentions even in the absence of 
systemic implementations. 
The emphasis on the political form of morality and education in morality suggests room 
for inquiry in what should seem rather obvious by now: the influence that cosmopolitan 
education could have on the development of civically engaged citizens. Given the inherent 
democratic impulse that results from the concept of shared humanity and the disposition to 
public action, engagement, and deliberation that would be found in moral agonism, cosmopolitan 
education would appear to be poised to contribute to the civic education of its students. It would 
be interesting to see to what extent, if any, cosmopolitan education might influence the civic 
dispositions of students as either compared to traditional civic education programs or in addition 
to them. My suspicion is that it would have a greater influence on the civic participation of those 
who are members of multiple political communities or who have more transient civic 
experiences. It would seem reasonable to think that those who have had traditional civic 
                                                
371 These articles were originally isolated for their content on various morals education theories and 
programs such as character education, values clarification, ethics of care, and Kohlbergian cognitive development 
models, among others. 
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education—that is to say those who have been educated for a specific political system or set of 
civic processes—would be less likely to participate in communities in which they are either part-
time or transient members, whereas those who have had a cosmopolitan educational experience 
might be more willing to engage with those new or only partially-familiar constituencies. 
As things presently stand, there are Montessori schools, Waldorf schools, and 
International Baccalaureate schools, each with their own specialized curriculum, methods, and 
training for teachers. There is no system of Cosmopolitan schools, though this is no cause for 
pessimism in proponents of cosmopolitan education. One could think of progressive education 
and see that there are very few schools with ‘progressive’ in the title though they might espouse 
a progressive orientation school-wide. And there are many teachers who one might be able to 
label ‘progressive teachers’ despite being surrounded by non-progressive educators. There are 
certainly educators who embody some combination of the traits or dispositions of a cosmopolitan 
educator, and it is quite likely that few of them even think of themselves as such. But one does 
not have to identify as a cosmopolitan to be one. 
A 2008 study of international schools’ mission statements found that while international 
schools show a dominant emphasis in cognitive and academic development, they also contain a 
significant number of cosmopolitan characteristics and an orientation toward the development of 
attitudes and emotional development that aid in intercultural understanding and cosmopolitan 
ways of being. These cosmopolitan characteristics appear to be both incidentally embedded in 
traditional educational practices as well as deliberately cultivated in the general educational ethos 
of international schools. There is a school in Berlin, Germany, called the Berlin Cosmopolitan 
School that professes to “help students become enlightened and responsible citizens of the world 
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who will be able to confidently shape their own lives.”372 On the ground, so to speak, it is not 
necessary for a teacher to identify with cosmopolitanism or as a cosmopolitan teacher in order to 
be one. As the quote by Charles Gellar in Chapter 2 shows, children engage in open, receptive, 
and critical inquiries requiring the negotiation of personal and ‘other’ motives, desires, and 
beliefs every day.373 Teachers elicit these processes, too, and others found in the description of 
cosmopolitan education offered in this project. However, in the same way that a cosmopolitan 
education in morality involves the public disclosure of oneself as a means to suggest a better way 
for people to live together, the deliberate disclosure and efforts of a teacher to embody the 
processes of a cosmopolitan education contributes to the public debate about what ways of 
education might be better. 
7.3 The Project I: Looking Forward 
What this dissertation suggests in rethinking the field of moral education using 
cosmopolitan philosophy and education is in many ways a return to a conception of education in 
which the educational, political, and moral are all part of the same process and aim. For humans 
education is part of the process of survival and we have chosen to formalize this process as a 
result of group formation. Schools are one component of the ordering of our social existence and 
through schools other forms of life and their governing social and institutional structures are 
communicated to our newest members. Because these forms of life and institutions are 
developed by us and then influence us, they come up for moral consideration. Or, as 
Thrasymachus unpleasantly (to him) discovered, a public assertion of what is ‘right’ or just can 
                                                
372 Berlin Cosmopolitan School, Berlin Germany, “Mission Statement” (2009): 
http://www.cosmopolitanschool.de. The statement continues, “We focus on academic achievement, multilingualism 
and the development of social and intercultural skills.” 
373 Gellar in Hayden and Thompson, “International Schools and International Education,” 337. See also 
chap. 2, p. 51. 
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be put to public scrutiny. And here is our point of return.  
A cosmopolitan educator, an educational agonist, and a moral agonist—be they separate 
or one in the same—essentially employ the same tactics in the same process as Plato’s Socrates. 
Our contemporary educators seek to inform and enlighten, yes, but also to equip students with 
the ability to take more ownership of their own educational processes over time, which, in the 
social realms of morality and politics, requires the ability to participate with others in the 
exploration and contestation of what we think we know and believe. It requires shining a light on 
assumptions and assertions to find out whether or where we have gone astray in our thinking. 
This kind of educator is a torpedo fish, a gadfly, a mediator, a shield, a catalyst, and a midwife 
for bringing learning and thought into the lives and forms of living of students. My conjuring of 
Plato’s Socrates identifies the process by which Socrates chose to be in the world—as an 
Arendtian participant in the space of politics in which things become public and where one lives 
and must look presentable—and his choice of subject: justice, or what is right for one to do in the 
ordering of society and in our actions within it. ‘Doing’ in Socrates’ world is the same as ‘acting’ 
in Arendt’s, and one’s actions carry implicit moral consequences.  
This kind of education requires teachers who are up to the task and it will not be easy. 
Though being a catalyst for thought and action might require some ‘sting’ we must avoid 
numbing or shocking others too much. Diogenes reportedly walked with a lamp during daytime 
claiming to be searching for an honest man and Socrates’ met his end as a result of perception 
that he was ‘corrupting’ the youth. Questioning assumptions can problematic for some and 
education is a field that is riddled with assumptions of expert knowledge and closed, received 
traditions of morality are even more steeped in the certainty of the knowledge they possess. 
Schools are seen as places of knowledge acquisition and skill development. The kind of certainty 
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symbolized by schools and education is seen in the expectations people have of them. Recent 
schooling reform movements in the United States have been driven largely by a perception that 
our schools and teachers are not doing what they should. However, what it is schools and 
teachers should be doing is as diffuse as the U.S. population is diverse. In general, schools and 
teachers are supposed to produce people who can contribute to the general welfare of society—
where ‘general welfare’ is defined in a multitude of ways—but today what it comes down to is 
this: what do the students get from their time in school and the expense of their parents’ tax 
dollars? Can they get jobs or get into colleges?  
A teacher who is focused on the process of learning and whose aim is to teach someone 
how to learn and how to prepare for uncertainty will engage in methods that will appear counter-
intuitive to those on the outside. Testing as a measure of learning is popular because it provides a 
concrete result to a concrete demand. And make no mistake—many of the demands made of 
schools are concrete: produce law abiding, appropriately skilled, and employable citizens. It will 
be very difficult for many people to see how engaging students in seemingly unanswerable 
questions with temporary answers can in any way guarantee a concrete set of skills and 
capacities, particularly those that might be measured for assurance of their proficiency. 
Cosmopolitan educators must embody the traits and dispositions they hope to instill. They have 
to be willing to forego easy answers and quick fixes in order to attain the long-term goal in 
education. They will need to swim against the current in which outcomes are known in advance 
and uniform, standardized tasks are undertaken to achieve them. They must be creative when 
others conform, and leave things unfinished and untidy when others will race to finish and sew 
up every last hole in the curriculum. Most difficult of all, they will need to repeatedly attempt to 
engage those who do not want to engage, to contest pedagogies with pedagogues and parents 
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who to not want to do so, and continue to include those who reject them. 
7.4 The Project II: Rolling Up Our Sleeves and Sharing Morality 
By now an obvious question might be this: What are we to do? What might this 
cosmopolitan education in morality look like? Since there is neither a tangible programmatic 
example nor a pedagogical instructional manual, how can I illustrate what I have taken great 
pains to describe? Fortunately, there are some real world examples. In “The Emergence of a 
Shared Morality in a Classroom,” David Hansen reports on his observation of a sixth grade 
classroom wherein he identified four characteristics of what he called a “shared morality.”374 
First, shared morality is a shared good in which everyone is a part of its construction and 
maintenance even though they might have different values. Second, it is an enabling good 
because “it enables meaningful interaction to occur, a shared morality at the same time 
constrains behavior.”375 The shared morality that emerges must be one that enables continuous 
emergence of newly negotiated standards of action, and thus indicates the third characteristic; it 
is an emerging good. It is not a predetermined morality wherein the teacher cleverly guides the 
students to the predefined ends of behavior. Instead it is a continuously developing dynamic that 
flows from the aspirations of the participants. Fourth, it is fragile. It is subject to the gains and 
losses in its membership as people enter and leave the ‘community,’ thus altering and 
influencing its constitution. Further, if attention and participation by its members wanes, its 
continued existence is imperiled. It requires consistent and continuous input and support or it 
will disappear. These characteristics bear a striking resemblance to the four correlates of shared 
humanity I presented in Chapter 2: living with other people, openness and receptivity, dynamic 
                                                




engagement, and the never-ending process of all three together. The following examples, none of 
them radical, fit within the framework of both shared morality and cosmopolitan education based 
on shared humanity. 
Hansen observed the sixth grade classroom of a teacher, Kathy, who began the year by 
using standard expectations of student conduct and the students’ own conceptions based on their 
own lived experiences.376 As the weeks progressed she brought them into contact with the 
mechanisms by and through which they could participate in developing preferred standards of 
conduct with each other. For instance, students are often overly eager to answer questions by 
blurting out their answers, shouting over the answers of others, or interrupting their classmates. 
Kathy ‘corrected’ this behavior not by stating that the rule in the class is to wait until called 
upon, but by reminding them that others have a right to respond, too. Kathy’s goal in this was to 
help students understand their relation to the others in an environment in which they must all 
participate. For content learning, Kathy’s queries to reluctant or unprepared students involved 
keeping the student ‘on the hook,’ so to speak, but allowing the opportunity to call on a fellow 
student to out or provide an alternative response. Students invited to help were then encouraged 
to respond to the classmate that called on them rather than to the teacher, fostering a dialogic 
learning environment in which the good of learning is also shared. This stands in marked contrast 
to traditional forms of learning in which the individual is attempting to out-learn or out-shine his 
classmates.  
An example in which Kathy dealt with misbehavior is instructive. When a student is off 
task she does not tell the student what he should be doing, but instead asks the student what he 
ought to be doing. He is then positioned to think about not only the ‘correct’ answer to that 
                                                
376 Ibid., 346. 
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question—where ‘correct’ means the standard of conduct for students in that class—but his 
conception of it, too. He must think about how that standard—listening to his classmate, for 
example—fits in with his competing desire—passing a note to his friend. Peer activation is 
useful, too. Kathy asks the other students to contribute suggestions to the list of things the 
distracted student should do. This is an important way to not only share morality as understood 
by one another, but to also have the students share in the responsibility for it rather than leave it 
to the teacher to be the instigator and final arbiter of class code violations. Hansen notes that 
these ways of teaching help the students develop relationships in morality with their classmates 
rather than only their teacher. 
These examples provide a brief glimpse at how some of these cosmopolitan education 
aims can be accomplished in a classroom while also helping students engage in an education in 
morality as both subjects and developers of it. I now want to add uncertainty to the process. One 
strategy Kathy uses is to have students take turns leading the class through activities or 
assignments. In these cases an individual student will take on the role of the teacher or leader of 
the activity, a strategy that means that Kathy, the teacher, will remain mostly on the sideline. 
Throughout the year Kathy will model the expected procedures and behaviors that range from 
keeping students attentive to the activity to pushing students to give more complete and 
thoughtful answers that include reasons so students know what to do. Let us think about this 
teaching choice. We can be reasonably certain that the students will not be as efficient or skilled 
in running these activities as Kathy nor can we expect that everything will get ‘covered.’ Kathy 
is hardly putting her feet on her desk and taking a nap; she is fully present, engaged, and ‘in 
control,’ but the variable represented by the students is a highly unpredictable one. Kathy cannot 
know where the class will end up, how long it will take, or if it will even work at all (though she 
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can have some predictive proficiency since she knows the individual students’ capabilities). 
Kathy is ‘letting go’ of control over the tangible results and discrete knowledge imparted in order 
to prioritize a process that is important, educative, and autonomously empowering for the 
students.  
Where is the agonism in this series of illustrations? It is directly in front of us. The 
students in the class bring with them their own uniqueness, their own values, and their own 
desires or preferences. The mix of student experiences, expectations, and desires are likely to 
contain the most plurality during the first weeks of the class since they have yet to negotiate 
standards with each other. It will also be brimming with natality as each student brings with her a 
multitude of possible thoughts and actions that will contribute to the class’s ethos. As Kathy 
slowly brings the students into the development of classroom standards of conduct, students’ 
public declarations of what ought to be done will be put to a constant test, with each new idea or 
questionable act going under the light of justification. It is also important for agonism that 
Kathy’s method of behavior correction is interrogative rather than declarative. She does not say 
to a student that X is not right to do. She instead asks him what he thinks he should be doing 
instead of X. The student is put in the position to inquire into questions about her conduct and 
the conduct of others. This inquiry is partly information-seeking, partly expectation-meeting, and 
partly standard-making. The interrogative method employed by the teacher means that 
assumptions are questioned and existing standards, while held as legitimately authoritative for 
now, are up for discussion. They are tested by the class and accepted, rejected, or assimilated, 
thus becoming part of a new or existing standard that will soon be challenged and tested again. 
Kathy progressively increases her demands for student participation in and responsibility for the 
emerging shared morality, which conditions students to prepare for the expanded role and 
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obligations of adulthood. As adults the students will need to fully inhabit these processes ‘for 
real.’ In this way Arendt’s conception of natality, and the dual role of education as conservator 
and creator, can be more clearly understood.  
The teacher protects the students from the ‘outside world’ by carefully bringing them into 
the participation in and development of classroom morality rather than instituting irrevocable 
rules. Such external rules are adult rules and are of the world of adults, not children. These 
‘world-based’ rules would encroach upon the ability of the students to develop their own in a 
meaningful way, essentially obstructing or destroying their natality. The teacher also protects the 
outside world from the children. She monitors their skills and development and carefully 
constructs the educational world of activities appropriately to facilitate the exercise of their 
natality in morality. One does not give kerosene and a lighter to a 7-year-old, and one does not 
have a 12-year-old re-write the section of a school’s bylaws that govern student conduct. The 
teacher begins from the existing standards of the school and the experiences of her new students, 
and then creates a space for them to examine, discuss, challenge, and amend them as the students 
acquire and become more efficient in forms of self- and social-governance. 
It would be fair to point out that there is nothing specifically transnational or global in 
what I have presented in these examples. However, there need not be any for cosmopolitanism to 
remain relevant. There is nothing that has been described that cannot be done in a highly diverse 
classroom containing students from different socioeconomic, religious, or cultural backgrounds. 
Admittedly, such a highly dialogic classroom requires the sharing of at least a rudimentary 
common spoken and written language. Regardless of how one might choose to impart or create a 
common language, some people might perceive it as an attack one’s beliefs or own personal 
standards of morality through the forced acquisition of something that might cause them to think 
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differently about their own langue or the culture from which it comes.377 This, too, I admit is 
possible. Nevertheless, we cannot abandon those who wish to engage any more than we can 
force people to acknowledge that morality is public and shared; we can only publicly share the 
processes by which it is developed and invite everyone to join in. 
And here the project has come full circle. Everyone is invited, our humanity and our 
human conditions are shared, and the morality we develop is shared as well, even when it 
conflicts. We deliberate with each other in a contest of mutual respect in order to manage and 
improve the ways in which we will live with each other. Further, having classrooms that include 
significant diversity and operate in the way envisioned might be our best hope for the future of 
human interaction and morality. The more creativity born from natality that can be utilized to 
propose newer and better ideas to be contested agonistically, the seemingly greater our chances 
for improvement. A cosmopolitan education in morality recognizes the potential value of unique 
contributions that each of us could make to each of our lives. In this way, a cosmopolitan 
education in morality is truly cosmopolitan; it grants all of us citizenship in the world of 
morality. 
 
                                                
377 I am thinking here of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that language is necessary for thought. If this 
hypothesis is true, then the kind of language people have acquired will determine the kind of thoughts they have 
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TABLE 2. Variables found in article titles and abstracts: Number of articles containing variables 
(yearly frequencies and totals). 
 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total 
 
Philosophy Variables 
 Philosophy 12 28 17 38 95 
 Character Education 4 0 5 17 26 
 Dewey 2 0 4 6 12 
 Aristotle 0 0 2 9 11 
 Kant 1 2 0 4 7 
 Virtue Ethics 0 0 0 2 2 
 
  19 30 28 76 153 
 
Psychology Variables  
 Kohlberg 36 33 25 34 128 
 Psychology 12 15 26 35 88 
 Cognitive Developmentalism 12 11 10 14 47 
 
  60 59 61 83 263 
 
Pedagogical Variables 
 Moral Reasoning 26 34 43 44 147 
 Cognitive Developmentalism 12 11 10 14 47 
 Character Education 4 0 5 17 26 
 Citizenship Education 0 0 3 23 26 
 Values Clarification 5 8 1 0 14 
 Virtue Ethics 0 0 0 2 2 
 
  47 53 62 100 262
 
Concept Variables  
 Values 25 42 73 75 215 
 Cognitive 20 21 26 38 105 
 Character 7 10 18 41 76 
 Citizenship 0 2 17 43 62 
 
  52 75 134 197 458 
 
 
